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ABSTRACT
ON TRIAL: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN THE GODWIN-WOLLSTONECRAFTSHELLEY FAMILY FICTIONS

Colleen Fenno, B.A., M.A.
Marquette University, 2010

William Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Mary and Percy Shelley wrote during
an era of democratic possibility and intense legal and penal reforms, when changes to
criminal justice procedures were adopted that would have far reaching consequences,
even for contemporary practices. Their fictions – Caleb Williams (1794), Maria: Or the
Wrongs of Woman (1798), Frankenstein (1818), Falkner (1837), and The Cenci (1818) –
raise questions and seek answers to questions at the heart of these reforms: What happens
to individuals falsely accused of a crime without the resources to defend themselves?
What happens to victims of crimes associated with guilt or shame or who suffer from
crimes unacknowledged by the justice system? If direct testimony doesn’t guarantee
truth, then what good is it? Should criminal procedures seek retribution, deterrence,
reform, rehabilitation, or perhaps restoration?
Proceeding chronologically through their texts, my project considers the ways that
this literary family addressed these questions. I use the contemporary notion of
restorative justice as my frame, attempting to place their works within their own
historical eras as well as reflect on how they underscore issues that may be pertinent and
pressing – though different – today. Uniquely colliding with both an era of criminal
justice reform and an age of democratic revolution, I argue their fictions advocate for
individuals disenfranchised from the justice system and imagine alternative models of
justice. They imagine criminal procedures that prioritize the victim’s, the accused’s, and
the community’s participation in often complex and convoluted truth-seeking processes.
They envision outcomes that attempt to repair harm through dialogue, accountability, and
consideration of social disparities, rather than merely punishing offenders or deterring
individuals from committing future crimes. I suggest, finally, that motivated by a similar
desire for equitable, participatory, and restorative conditions, their fictions offer strategies
for imagining justice that are both historically progressive and currently relevant.
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Introduction
On Trial: The Ideal of Restorative Justice in Fiction by the
Godwin-Wollstonecraft- Shelley Family
William Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Mary and Percy Shelley lived and
wrote in an era shaped by questions of legal and personal justice. On the heels of
Enlightenment attempts at legal reform and radical fervor following the French
Revolution, cultural debate regarding justice intensified at the turn of the eighteenth and
nineteenth centuries in England. Professionals from within the criminal justice system,
writers of fiction, and individuals reading the various species of popular crime texts –
from broadsheets and Old Bailey Sessions Papers to criminal biographies and novels –
engaged in this discussion in an effort to determine the most fair and efficient criminal
justice model.
Considerable changes regarding justice processes and outcomes resulted from
these debates about the criminal justice model. Changes in the prosecution of criminal
cases shifted regarding the use of circumstantial evidence and direct testimony. Material
evidence was first embraced and trusted during trial, and then subsequently doubted, as a
means to the certain proof of a crime. Direct testimony gradually and informally
transitioned from the “old format” – an altercation between the victim and the accused
before a jury, with the judge acting as sole arbiter – to the “new format” – an adversarial
system that set two legal advocates against each other, finally culminating in the
Prisoners’ Counsel Act of 1836 (Langbein). Criminal justice reforms also took place
regarding the desired outcomes of the justice process: as Foucault has so famously
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documented, punishment gradually shifted from a public spectacle widely and severely
applied in order to serve as a deterrent to a more privately executed, highly regulated
penalty intended to rehabilitate the accused. This paradigm shift in punishment led to the
development and modernization of the prison system, put forth by advocates such as
Jeremy Bentham in his text The Panoptican (1791), as well as the increased belief in the
possibility of prisoner reform through solitary confinement, put forth by advocates such
as John Howard in his text The State of Prisons (1777).
Contemporary scholars interested in criminal justice often look back to this era of
vast reforms, placing great emphasis on the implications of these changes. They argue
that many of the changes resulted in great consequences, both then and now, for the
theory and practice of justice: Some scholars argue that changes in this process largely
removed the victim and accused from criminal procedures, replacing their participation
during trial with participation by prosecution and defense advocates, thus shifting the
emphasis from truth seeking to combat and closure (Langbein). Others argue that
changes in criminal outcomes led to an emphasis on punitive resolutions, which largely
severed the offender from a process of recognizing and addressing the harm his offense
had caused in order to focus on retribution or deterrence (Cornwall). Still others argue
that these changes affected cultural representations of justice, as literary authors began to
both reflect and challenge these shifts in their fictional content and form.
Despite the significance of this era of reform and the substantial value that
interdisciplinary approaches have contributed to our understandings of both literary and
justice practices during this era, a significant gap in scholarship remains. While studies
of literature and law surrounding these transitions have been thorough, much of their
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emphasis seems to eschew romantic era texts: much interdisciplinary scholarship lies
either during the mid-eighteenth century, when authors such as Henry Fielding and
Samuel Richardson explored the use and manipulation of circumstantial evidence for
story telling in their fiction, or later in the nineteenth century, when authors such as
Charles Dickens and George Eliot used their realist texts to give voice to the accused and
critique the way defense counsel had usurped the defendant’s role during trial.1 Each of
these studies helps to clarify the relationship between literary form and legal
modernization as well as deepen understanding of the connection between literary
content and legal subject matter; however, a gap still remains involving fictional authors
writing during the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, who may have been
influenced not only by particular criminal justice reforms but also by the wider cultural
event of the French Revolution.2
Codification and regulation of criminal laws, shifts in truth-seeking processes, and
changes to penal outcomes were gradual and ongoing during the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries, but certainly the events of the French Revolution interrupted and
radically shaped our cultural understandings of fair and equitable justice reform. The
extreme violence that erupted on the continent shattered hopes, both in France and
1

See for example Alexander Welsh’s landmark study Strong Representations (1992), Jan Melissa
Schramm’s Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology (2000), and Hal
Gladfelder’s Criminality and Narrative in Eighteenth Century England: Beyond the Law (2001).
2
Nancy E. Johnson’s The English Jacobin Novel on Rights, Property, and Law (2004) considers Jacobin
texts, but her study does not extend to Romantic era texts. Jonathan Grossman’s, The Art of Alibi: English
Law Courts and the Novel (2002), is one of the few full-length studies that considers romantic era texts –
both Caleb Willaims and Frankenstein. While Grossman argues that, generally, the law court and the novel
shared a “cultural and historical entwining” (4), my emphasis is more concerned with the specific justice
model for which novels by the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley family seem to advocate and how
democratic reforms were linked to this model. Christine Krueger also considers several texts from the turn
of the century in her recent study, Reading for the Law (2010), which spans the early modern period to the
Victorian. Krueger’s study takes on a wider breadth than my own, focusing on “outsider jurisprudence” in
literature, law and history through the lens of concepts such as precedent, agency, testimony, and motive
(3). My focus is both chronologically narrower (1790s – 1837), less specific conceptually (democratic
reform and the justice model), and focused on fictional texts by one influential literary family.
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abroad, for a peaceful and progressive transition to a more representative government and
equitable justice system. Instead, democratic ideals seemed to dissolve as the new ruling
class in France adopted the same abusive practices as the previous oppressors. In
England, fear of an uprising similar to the Revolution gave rise to a climate of censorship
and state control both immediately following, and in the years after, the events in France.
During the 1790s, sympathizers with the cause of the Revolution became suspect and
even criminally prosecuted, as manifested in events such as the Treason Trials and
suspension of habeas corpus. Decades later, in 1817, habeas corpus was again
suspended, imprisonment without trial was legalized, and “gagging acts” were introduced
to prevent meetings of more than fifty people (Foot 32). The Peterloo Massacre, an
uprising staged by frustrated workers, resulted in further reactionary governmental
responses such as the Six Acts in 1819. For individuals who witnessed the promise of the
uprising as well as the violent and repressive fallout that followed, the Revolution made a
very profound mark on their understanding of justice and how it should it be applied.
Literary texts treating issues of legal or penal reform that were written
surrounding and following the French Revolution offer considerable breadth for
reflections on justice beyond the realist works that have previously been studied. Such a
breadth offers, on the one hand, Jacobin texts that address individual rights and
democratic reform through often didactic, sometimes dogmatic, prose fiction, and, on the
other hand, gothic texts that covertly and subversively examine power relations through
the dark psychology of individual characters. The value of considering both genres, and
the many, many deviations and overlaps between them, arises from the shared desire to
reach a wide, popular audience and the shared spirit of reform, which underlies both
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representational approaches. The fictional texts that treat issues of justice by William
Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Mary and Percy Shelley provide an excellent starting
place for considering justice during this transitional era in law and literature.
To begin, Caleb Williams (1794), Maria: Or the Wrongs of Women (1798),
Frankenstein (1818), Falkner (1837), and The Cenci (1819), demonstrate these authors’
investment in individual rights and justice reform. Each of the family’s fictions, and in
many cases their non-fiction tracts as well, offer different historical entry points for
considering how justice was imagined and represented as the democratic ideals of the
French Revolution inched further and further away in time. Beyond this larger historical
scope, a consideration of their texts is also worthwhile on a more personal, particular
level. A survey of this one family’s literary texts demonstrates the interdisciplinary and
interfamilial nature of cultural debate: as fiction writers, the Godwin-WollstonecraftShelley family engaged in the major legal, political, and social conversations of their
historical era. Each of their texts builds on and modifies concepts of the previous.
Despite the wealth of scholarship available on this Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary
and Percy Shelley, very few scholars consider the interplay between all four of the
authors’ works.3 Moreover, there is no study currently available that addresses the
contributions their fictions make to discussions of criminal justice during this age of
reform.

3

Julie Carlson’s England’s First Family of Writers: Mary Wollstonecraft, William Godwin, Mary Shelley
(2007) provides one recent exception. Her book focuses on themes related to writing, living, and dying in
the family’s texts. Carlson’s study provides a fine model for considering the family’s texts together – and
establishes the currency and relevancy of doing so – although her book places little emphasis on Percy
Shelley. The addition of Percy Shelley makes for interesting additions to the family’s intertextual
conversations, particularly concerning the way his work shows (the extremely under-estimated) influence
of Wollstonecraft.
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With this in mind, my project proceeds chronologically through their texts,
searching their fiction for answers to questions about the nature of how one ideal of
justice arose out of their historical era of debate. It seeks answers to questions that were
being revisted, and in some cases, asked for the first time. At the heart of the debate were
questions about the truth seeking and legal processes: What happens to individuals falsely
accused of a crime without the resources to defend themselves? What happens to victims
of crimes associated with guilt or shame or who suffer from crimes unacknowledged by
the justice system? If direct testimony doesn’t guarantee truth, then what good is it?
Questions about the desired outcomes of justice processes were also at stake in the
debates: should criminal procedures seek retribution, deterrence, reform, rehabilitation, or
perhaps restoration?
In considering the ways that this literary family addressed these questions in their
texts, I not only attempt to place their works within their own historical eras, but I also
use the contemporary notion of restorative justice in order to frame my inquiry. As I
explain more fully in the methodology section that follows, such a frame allows me to
consider their shared principles using a cohesive approach that seems organic to the ideas
they imagine in their fiction. It allows me to reflect on how their texts underscore issues
which were significant in their own historical eras as well as pertinent and pressing –
though different – today. Using restorative justice as a frame, further, suggests how this
family’s fictions offer imaginative ways to think about justice, which are both historically
rooted and currently relevant. Uniquely colliding with both an era of criminal justice
reform and an age of democratic revolution, I argue that their fictions envision criminal
procedures that recognize the circumstances of the disenfranchised by imagining truth-
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seeking processes that promote individual participation by victim, accused, and
community, regardless of status. I argue that they envision outcomes that seek to repair
harm through dialogue, accountability, and consideration of social disparities. I suggest,
further, that motivated by a similar desire for equitable, participatory, and restorative
conditions, their texts anticipate contemporary justice models, in particular, the ideal of
restorative justice.
My first chapter addresses the earliest of their texts, Godwin’s novel Caleb
Williams. In this chapter I consider how Godwin differs from his contemporaries of the
“Classical” criminal justice school – such as Bentham or Howard – by imagining an
alternative to punitive criminal justice models. I argue that the novel highlights the ways
in which Caleb (and other) disenfranchised individuals suffer from unfair legal
definitions of crime, impartial arbiters, inconsistent processes, and ineffective punitive
outcomes. Throughout each of these critiques, I suggest that Godwin draws his readers’
attention to the harms this corrupt criminal justice system poses to individual and
community alike and the ways in which punitive measures (such as incarceration or
solitary confinement) neither deter crime nor reform criminals. I posit that Godwin’s
addition to the family’s overall contribution to the criminal justice debate lies in his
vision of a more democratic, participatory alternative to the adversarial and retributive
system his novel critiques. I suggest that in the novel’s final scene, the trial between
Falkland and Caleb, Godwin imagines a justice process that seeks disclosure of social
imbalances contributing to criminal behavior, recognition of the victims’ unique
experiences, and inclusion of the community in determining outcomes and solutions to
crime. Further, in depicting a justice process that allows both Caleb and Falkland to
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participate, I argue that Godwin shows the benefits of testimony to the justice process:
Caleb helps to clarify the truth of the events and also receives acknowledgment from his
community, and Falkland recognizes Caleb’s suffering and admits to his own guilt.
My second chapter argues that, in her unfinished novel Maria: or the Wrongs of
Women, Wollstonecraft extends Godwin’s treatment of unfairly accused individuals in
the justice system by considering inequities against disenfranchised victims– a topic
Godwin touches on in Caleb Williams but does not develop. As critics have noted,
Maria’s testimony at the end of the novel challenges women’s exclusion, based on
property rights, from participation in the justice system and underscores the importance
of granting individuals the right to be heard in a legal setting. Beyond critiquing injustice
towards middle-class women disenfranchised from the civil justice system, I argue that
Jemima’s narrative represents female victims in criminal law who likewise may not be
heard. I draw on historical research regarding class and sexual crime to argue that
Wollstonecraft’s novel shows how gender, social status, and the nature of a crime made
reporting and pursing prosecution difficult for many female victims. When
Wollstonecraft grants Jemima first person ownership of her narrative in chapter five, I
posit that she establishes the value of testimony as integral to acknowledging an
individual’s autonomy, regardless of social standing. I suggest that Wollstonecraft
demonstrates how the opportunity to speak about private abuse, and to be heard, aids in a
victim’s conception and recovery of self. Finally, I argue that Wollstonecraft anticipates
the need for a public space to acknowledge abuse in order to expose and correct injustice.
My third chapter considers the contributions which Godwin and Wollstonecraft’s
daughter, Mary Shelley, makes to the family’s fictional vision of justice. I argue that,
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beyond her parents’ treatment of unfairly accused individuals and marginalized victims,
Mary Shelley draws our attention to the complex situation of the offender. I consider her
representation of offenders as it evolves from her first novel, Frankenstein, to her last
novel, Falkner, positing that Shelley develops her parents’ vision of justice in three ways
from Frankenstein to Falkner. First, I argue that she continues to critique and comment
on judicial processes and outcomes in both novels, but in her later novel her critique
lessens substantially. Second, I argue that she considers the balance between individual
and systemic responsibility in the evolution of criminal behavior. She shifts from an
emphasis on the role institutions play in contributing to a criminal’s development in
Frankenstein to a greater focuses on individual accountability in Falkner. Third, I argue
that she returns to and extends her parents’ justice model; she conveys the obstacles
standing in the way of a more restorative justice model in Frankenstein and imagines
potential solutions to these barriers in Falkner. I argue that in both novels Shelley
underscores the significance of recognizing an offender’s experiences through testimony
and the critical need for taking responsibility within a criminal justice model seeking to
repair harm. In Chapter Three, I also attempt to acknowledge the vast changes taking
place in literature and criminal justice over the course of her two novels’ publications,
and discuss how these changes may account for her shifting representations.
In my fourth and final chapter I focus on Percy Shelley’s play The Cenci. I argue
that, although the play seems superficially opposed to the family’s visions of justice
because the victim arranges for her father’s murder, The Cenci makes a valuable
contribution to this intertextual conversation about justice. As Godwin does in Caleb
Williams, Shelley’s play represents a justice system founded on corrupt processes and
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outcomes that fails to restore harm or produce truth. Like Wollstonecraft’s novel, it
draws attention to the trauma of sexual crime, but it also emphasizes the challenges of
articulating this trauma in a nineteenth-century English criminal justice system that
demands chastity and a contained, authorized language in which to express the crime. In
depicting the damaging effects of silencing marginalized individuals and providing no
opportunity for recognition, I suggest that Shelley's play replicates his family’s texts by
considering the circumstances that contribute to criminal behavior. I argue, further, that
The Cenci extends their consideration of justice by complicating the accountability and
remorse for which Frankenstein and Falkner seem to advocate: Shelley implies that
accountability is impossible when the justice system and wider culture enforce silence in
order to achieve closure. Finally, I acknowledge that the content of The Cenci elides
restorative representations, but I insist that the play’s form does not. I suggest that
Shelley’s literary choices about narrative voice and dramatic representation embody an
even more active form than Godwin’s, Wollstonecraft’s, or Mary Shelley’s depictions of
justice. This form shows connections between the rhetorical choices called for in both
matters of justice and matters of literature, ultimately endorsing an interactive,
democratic justice model that grants victims, offenders, and the community the
opportunity to participate in processes and outcomes.
II. Methods, Terms, and Qualifications: “How is it that other people’s creations can
be so utterly their own and so deeply apart of us?”4
Regarding my method, as may already be apparent from the language of my
introduction, my goal in considering these texts is concerned with both the past and the
present. This goal means, first, that I have attempted to place Godwin’s,
4

Clifford Geertz qtd in Easterling, xv.
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Wollstonecraft’s, and the Shelleys’ fictions in their historical and cultural contexts. I
have tried to examine their texts within the age of criminal justice reform and revolution
of which they were a part. In order to accomplish this, I have relied heavily on an array
of studies, perhaps most frequently John Langbein’s The Origins of the Adversary
Criminal Trail (2003), J.M. Beattie’s Crime and the Courts in England: 1660-1800
(1986), and Anna Clark’s Women’s Silence Men’s Violence: Assault in England 17701845 (1987). These studies have been foundational in moving me towards an informed
understanding of how law and criminal justice were practiced in the historical moment
when these works were produced. They have shaped my understanding of why, and how,
these authors represent justice in their works. This goal means, second, that because I am
interested in these fictions not only as a cultural reflection of historic conditions, but also,
and more specifically, as an aesthetic response to justice reform, I am also trying to place
these texts within their literary era. I draw from a wide array of scholarship in order to
place these texts in their literary contexts, including interdisciplinary studies, studies that
consider these authors’ influences on each other, and stand-alone studies that comment
on one of the specific works my project addresses. These studies have helped me to
understand that, as Christine Krueger notes, rather than existing separately or opposing
one another, literature and law share a “history of…mutual dependency” (11). These
studies have also given me the confidence to declare that, based on the quantity and
breadth of scholarship available, interest in writing by the Godwin-WollstonecraftShelley family is still thriving. I hope my project adequately reflects this persistent
interest and continues to engage it. Finally, as my frequent use of the term “restorative”
likely suggests, a third goal of my project is to connect these fictions in a meaningful way
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with current issues of testimony, justice, and consideration of the disenfranchised within
the twenty-first century. My approach to considering how imaginative texts can enhance
our appreciation for, and understanding of, matters of justice has been greatly informed
by James Boyd White’s When Words Lose Their Meaning (1984) and Martha
Naussbaum’s Poetic Justice: The Literary Imagination and Public Life (1986).
Regarding my use of the term “restorative” and my attempt to convey these texts’
relevance to contemporary issues of justice, I need to make a few qualifications. To
begin, the term “restorative” is a current descriptor for a very nuanced and varied
criminal justice model. It is used and practiced differently in such diverse settings as
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission to Milwaukee, Wisconsin’s
Benedict Center, a nonprofit agency, which serves women in conflict with the law.
Despite the term’s multiplicity, each of the many institutions and individuals that employ
the term seem to share several key ideas about it as it concerns their application of
justice. Cormier’s definition, taken from David Cornwall’s book Criminal Punishment
and Restorative Justice (2006), adequately reflects these key ideas. Cormier says that
restorative justice is:
An approach to justice that focuses on repairing harm caused by crime while
holding the offender responsible for his/her actions, by providing an opportunity
for the parties directly affected by a crime – victim, offender and community – to
identify and address their needs in the aftermath of a crime and seek a resolution
that provides healing, restoration, reparation and reintegration, and prevents harm.
(88)

Inherent within this definition is the significant role of victim, offender, and community
participation within the justice process, as well as the emphasis on a resolution that seeks
an alternative to solely punitive outcomes. While these traits reflect our current
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understanding, I use the term throughout my project to describe the justice model that I
argue William Godwin’s, Mary Wollstonecraft’s, and Mary and Percy Shelleys’ fictions
imagine, although the term was not contemporaneous with their works. Less than an
anachronistic blunder, I use the term “restorative” because it seems deeply connected, as
my project hopes to prove, with their representation of justice and the processes and
outcomes for which their fictions seem to advocate. In their era the criminal justice
debate and democratic reform was expressed in works concerned with a similar desire for
inclusive, participatory truth seeking processes as well as outcomes that seek an active,
engaged, and empathetic alternative to exclusively punitive resolutions. Using the term
“restorative justice” allows me the benefit of uniting their shared principles under one
umbrella, and it also shows the progressive and continued relevance of their
representations of justice.
In relation to this term, I often bring in contemporary events related to justice in
order to draw connections between the past and the present. By making these
connections, I do not mean to universalize these fictions’ themes in an ahistoric or
reductive way. I do not intend to imply that there has been no change or progress in
criminal justice administration and understanding. Nor do I intend to suggest that the
plight of fictional characters is of the same or equal value to the experiences of
contemporary individuals who have been subject to abuse or disenfranchisement within
our own era. Finally, I do not wish to collapse the vast differences, nuances, and
complications that exist between the nineteenth-century fictional episodes I discuss and
the practical application of justice in the twenty-first century. Rather, I mean to show
how the issues these texts raise were significant in their own historic eras and are often
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still relevant and pressing – though different – today. I intend to show that these texts are
worth considering because they provide historic and imaginative ways for thinking about
contemporary justice.
My last qualification regards my choice of canonical authors. It seems somewhat
paradoxical, in a project concerned with the under-represented, that I would elect to write
about texts by Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and the Shelleys. Admittedly, writing about
these very well-known authors leaves out a large portion of lesser studied authors who
also merit attention. Nevertheless, this family and these texts seemed to have chosen me
– the characters on their separate pages spoke to me as if they shared a space together.
They engaged me in a reflection on justice that started with their fictions and has
stretched well-beyond. In the spirit of dialogue and democracy that was so important to
these authors, their fictions have allowed me to join in a large and ongoing conversation
with other scholarship addressing what these works meant and what they mean now.
Their fictions have also opened my eyes to other people, places, and texts concerned with
issues of justice. Drawing on my own experience, then, I believe these works by this
much studied family are worth considering anew – their approachability, even popularity,
and their narrative contexts make them a feasible place to start undergraduate students
and anyone willing to begin thinking and talking about justice in a different way. Given
this family’s desire for reform, their commitment to citizen engagement, and their intent
to reach a wide audience, I think this is a possibility that Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and the
Shelleys would appreciate.
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Chapter One
An Alternative Approach to Reform: Restorative Justice in William Godwin’s Caleb
Williams
The object of Caleb Williams was to “expose the evils which arise from the present
system of civilized society…to disengage the minds of men from presupposition, and
launch them on a sea of moral and political enquiry…[to consider] the administration of
justice and equity, with its consequences, as it exists in the world at large, and in Great
Britain in particular.” – William Godwin (1795)
“In so many parts of the world we have been brought up on a strict diet of retributive
justice. What we have experienced in the Truth and Reconciliation Commissions is that
retributive justice is not the only and certainly not the best kind of justice." – Archbishop
Desmond Tuto (2006)

In the wake of the violence and possibilities of social transformation offered by the
French Revolution, in a decade of severe repression and fear of insubordination in
England, and in the midst of cultural debates about individual rights, penal reform, and
legal modernization, novelist and prose writer William Godwin (1756-1836) engaged in
an historic debate about the most fair and equitable criminal justice model. At the heart
of this debate about justice were questions about the truth seeking and legal processes:
Should these processes be formal or informal? Should victim and accused participate
directly or be represented by advocates? Should trial procedures be public or private?
Questions about the desired outcome of these processes were also at stake in the debates:
Should criminal processes seek retribution, deterrence, reform, rehabilitation, or perhaps
restoration?
Godwin imagines reasoned and progressive responses to these questions in his novel
Caleb Williams (1794), which anticipates ideas similar to contemporary models of
justice. Despite Godwin’s responses, however, the voices of criminal justice that
emerged the loudest during this “Classical” era of reform, and frequently cited today both
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popularly and academically, are Bentham and Beccaria. In Criminal Punishment and
Restorative Justice (2006), David J. Cornwall states that, “historically, the eighteenth
century penal philosophers Cesare Beccaria and Jeremy Bentham have been regarded as
the founding contributors to the [criminal justice] debate” (Cornwell 54). As founding
contributors, Beccaria and Bentham are often credited with planting the seeds of our
western criminal systems, which emphasize punishment and retribution as means to
reduce crime, rehabilitate criminals, and achieve justice. After over 200 years of systems
based on their models, however, with less and less participation by victim and accused in
the justice process, as well as increasingly over-crowded prisons, many have been
searching for a different model (Cornwall 34).
In the past two decades one justice model alternative to the retributive model that
seeks to address both process and outcomes has emerged on an international scale.
Professor of Law, Gerry Johnstone, and Executive Director of the Center for Justice and
Reconciliation, Daniel W. Van Ness, refer to this model as “a global social movement”
(5). This movement is the restorative justice model, implemented in such diverse settings
as truth commissions in South Africa (Chapman and van der Merwe) to juvenile courts in
New Zealand (McElrea) to local prisons and community prosecution units in urban cities
in the United States.
South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission5 describes their reasons for
adopting this model in a manner that, as we shall see, echoes some of the same rationales
behind William Godwin’s criminal justice model – to correct larger social disparities and
5

As described on the Truth and Reconciliation Commission’s (TRC) website, in 1995 the TRC “was set up
by the Government of National Unity to help deal with what happened under apartheid.” The truth
commission attempted to achieve full disclosure of the human rights violations committed under apartheid
and encourage social transformation and healing through government sponsored public amnesty and victim
hearings.
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define justice beyond retribution or punishment in order to repair harm to offender,
victim, and the community. We can hear this echo when the Commission explains that
“We believe…that there is another kind of justice – a restorative justice which is
concerned not so much with punishment as with correcting imbalances, restoring broken
relationships – with healing, harmony and reconciliation” (qtd. in van der Merwe 26).
But while restorative justice examples like the Truth and Reconciliation
Commission have “quickly become the model for other countries” and restorative justice
practices have moved from prisons to schools and workplaces, even its advocates advise
caution about adopting the model uncritically. A recent study, Truth and Reconciliation
in South Africa: Did the TRC Deliver? (2009), underscores the necessity of considering
the “multifaceted” and “intertwined” nature of justice, reconciliation, truth, and social
transformation (44) and criminologist David Cornwell warns that “attempts to re-define
the nature of crime and the purposes of punishment need to be approached with caution”
(35).
If it is the manifestation of Beccaria’s and Bentham’s models that contemporary
justice advocates seek to alter or critique through widespread adoption of Restorative
Justice paradigms, then perhaps a good place to begin investigating not only the
criticisms of the punitive models they advocated, but the potential attributes and
implications of more restorative models they overlooked, may be with individuals who
disagreed with Beccaria and Bentham during their own historical era. One such
individual whose voice was perhaps drowned out of the debate for a variety of reasons –
some of which were likely personal scandal and perceived radicalism – is William
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Godwin.6
Philip Jenkins describes Godwin’s overlooked contributions to the criminal
justice debates. He remarks that,
It is important to emphasise the prophetic value of [Godwin’s] criticism. The
trends Godwin describes…continued to be guiding principles of western prison
systems until the middle of the next century, when they began to be subjected to
criticism of precisely the type Godwin had put forward in the 1790s. Godwin had
already identified their fatal flaws and presented an impressive critique of
Classical assumptions...Had it not been for Beccaria’s success, this might have
been achieved decades earlier. (125)
While Godwin’s contributions to criminal justice and the “very sophisticated radical
theor[y]” that Jenkins refers to have been considered more recently, particularly in
literary studies, Godwin’s anticipation of restorative justice practices through the
democratic, participatory model he puts forth in Caleb Williams has not been widely or
closely scrutinized. 7
Looked at through a lens of criminal justice paradigms, we see that Godwin’s
political tract An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice and its Influence on Modern
Morals and Manners (1793) laid out a theory for achieving justice rooted in utilitarian
principles, which were committed to more equitable and just processes of law. Godwin’s
theory granted individuals involved with a crime the opportunity for open disclosure and
6

Whereas Bentham’s and Beccaria’s views toward deterrence and punitive control implied stricter
containment of citizens, Godwin’s views were radical because they granted citizens greater responsibility
and authority. One possible reason Godwin’s ideas were dismissed, then, was because they failed to serve
the interest of the dominant class.
7
For example, Kenneth’s Graham’s The Politics of Narrative (1990) discusses the role of trials in the novel
as “an emblem of the open society he advocated, an environment where truth may emerge despite
confusion and prejudice” (33). Hal Gladfelder’s Criminality and Narrative in Eighteenth-Century England:
Beyond the Law (2001) places Caleb Williams among texts working to subvert an ideology of punishment,
arguing that it “ultimately permi[ts] a radical critique of the law itself as an instrument for the enforcement
of oppressive gender and class relations” (xii). Jonathan Grossman’s The Art of Alibi: English Law Courts
and the Novel (2002) considers how Caleb Williams’ form and subject matter shifted along with legal
changes during the nineteenth century, particularly in terms of a structured, suspenseful plot and its
connections to the genre of criminal biography. Nancy E. Johnson’s The English Jacobin Novel on Rights,
Property, and Law (2004) devotes a section to discussing agency, status, and the right of property as means
to granting legal autonomy in the novel.
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participation in their justice procedure, held offenders accountable to the community –
rather than the state or the monarchy – and aspired towards reconciliation through
conversation, flexibility, and consideration of harm caused rather than blanket
punishment regardless of the crime committed. Moreover, in his novel, Caleb Williams
(1794), Godwin imagines scenarios for testing out and applying these theoretical
principles anticipatory of restorative justice, exposing their complications, and
fictionalizing them in a form that could reach a wider audience.8
In Caleb Williams, Godwin tells the story from the first person perspective of
Caleb, the son of peasants and the servant/secretary of Falkland, a wealthy squire who
inherited a massive country estate. Early in the novel, Caleb discovers that Falkland not
only murdered another squire – the tyrannical Barnabas Tyrell – but also allowed two
innocent men – a tenant farmer named Hawkins and his son – to be charged, tried, and
hung for the crime. When Caleb discovers Falkland’s secret, Falkland reacts by framing
Caleb for the felony of burglary. The action of the novel unfolds around this false
accusation, with Caleb being relentlessly pursued and persecuted by both Falkland and
the justice system. Throughout this pursuit, Godwin represents and critiques different
possibilities for achieving justice – from the premodern duel to the prison system and
formal legal process. The novel concludes with a final trial scene in which Caleb
publicly accuses Falkland of murdering Tyrell, contributing to the “miserable end of the
Hawkinses,” and manufacturing false allegations against him (334). Falkland confesses
to the charges and Caleb feels relief that, despite his suffering, “the world may at least not
hear and repeat a half-told and mangled tale” (337).
8

The price of the novel was considerably less expensive than his philosophical treatise and therefore more
widely affordable. Further, as fiction, the narrative allowed readers a context in which to envision the
ideas.
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Uniquely situated in the midst of cultural debates about legal and penal reform, as
the western world moved from a culture of public torture to a culture of surveillance,
Godwin intervenes in the debate by representing and critiquing this range of justice
models – chivalric, anarchic, punitive, and restorative.9 He considers their legal theory
and application through the level of truth each process achieves and the level of harm
each outcome restores to victim, offender, and community. Within each of the different
approaches to justice, he draws our attention to the inequities and traumas suffered by
individuals disenfranchised from the system because of their social status; he advocates
for a model that will correct such systemic imbalances. Godwin suggests reform through
a criminal justice model anticipating contemporary restorative practices “that aims at
offender accountability, full participation of both the victims and offenders and making
good or putting right what is wrong” (van der Merwe 27). By representing the truth and
partial reconciliation achieved in Caleb and Falkland’s final trial, he offers a possibility
for a more restorative model than the retributive or punitive paradigms that have
dominated since his novel’s publication.
I. REPRESENTATIONS OF JUSTICE
In order to underscore the benefits of a restorative model, Godwin first considers
the limits of other potential justice processes for individual and community. He begins
with a consideration of dueling, the lingering chivalric practice that was a remnant of premodern justice. Anthony Simpson discusses the practice Godwin depicts in “Dandelions
on the Field of Honor: Dueling, the Middle Classes, and the Law in Nineteenth-Century
England,” his article about the reemergence of dueling during the late eighteenth and

9

Michel Foucault famously examines this evolution from public spectacle to private punishment and
surveillance in Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (1979).
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early nineteenth centuries. Simpson helps clarify Godwin’s critique because he explains
how duels were practiced by members of the upper- (and burgeoning) middle-class as a
means to legitimate their difference from men of a lower rank; Simpson notes that
“aggressive and public displays of these exclusive institutions were…demonstrations of
continued privilege and power” (104). Godwin depicts the exclusivity of this premodern practice in his novel by limiting the characters involved in his dueling episodes to
“men of rank” (13). Rather than a system that could be widely applied to achieve
equitable justice, Godwin represents only his landed and aristocratic characters engaging
in the ritual.
Beyond its exclusivity, Godwin suggests that the dueling process fails to achieve
justice because it is irrational: it is both too rigid and too unregulated. A challenge can
not be refused regardless of the truth of the events or the severity or triviality of the
conflict. For example, when Malvesi challenges Falkland to a duel because he
mistakenly assumes that Falkland has romantic intentions towards Lucretia, Godwin
shows that even if a conflict is based on a misunderstanding, the duel process is more
focused on preserving honor than arriving at truth. Godwin also implies that even when
all parties might be satisfied through a peaceful resolution, the challenge of a duel can
forfeit such a possibility because men are “honour-bound to accept it, not matter how
trivial the circumstances” (Simpson 113). For example, Malvesi and Lucretia both want
to be together whereas Falkland entertains no long term interest in Lucretia, but this
outcome is almost ruined when Malvesi challenges Falkland to a duel. Falkland tells
Malvesi that “the laws of honour are in the utmost degree rigid; and there was reason to
fear that, however anxious I were to be your friend, I might be obliged to be your
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murderer” (18). When Falkland articulates this nonsensical obligation to duel’s law of
honour, Godwin highlights that regardless of how trivial, complicated, or uncertain the
circumstances, the process leaves little room for moderation or dialogue.
Further, Godwin suggests the cultural pervasiveness of dueling as means to
resolve conflict and the inevitable violence inherent in its outcome; although Malvesi and
Falkland manage to resolve their dispute, Tyrell and Falkland’s results in fatality.
Despite Falkland’s attempts to reason with Tyrrel repeatedly, and despite the
community’s attempts to intervene and outcast Tyrrel through public censure, both men
fall back on this extra-legal means of justice: Tyrrel comes back to the public assembly to
fight Falkland, and Falkland, too mired in cultural beliefs that promote public
demonstrations of honor, stabs and kills Tyrrel after he leaves the assembly house,
forsaking collective justice for individual, fatal revenge (141). Simpson describes the
cultural values undergirding Godwin’s representation: “Duels were simply
‘fought,’…Their object was not to encourage men to humiliate or punish their enemies.
It was to permit a man who felt slighted an opportunity to demonstrate to the public that
he possessed ‘the total absence of fear requisite to a gentleman’” (114). In Tyrell’s
provocative return to the assembly after the public’s condemnation, Godwin implies that
if any change in an approach to justice were to succeed, it would require some
codification or limitations so that gentlemen with status, like Tyrrel, would not be able to
ignore and overpower community consensus. Further, it would require processes the
community would be committed to protecting, so that individuals, like Falkland, would
not fall back on culturally promoted, self-centered correctives.
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If Godwin shows that the chivalric process fails to achieve truth or justice because
it is limited to men of rank, anti-rational, without a just measure of punishment, arbitrary
in its application, and inevitably violent in its outcomes, he also attacks the utility of such
a system for both individual and community: Mr. Collin’s speech against “the modern
duellist,” implies the harm dueling poses and the selfishness motivating the practice:
“Duelling is the vilest of all egotism, treating the public, who has a claim to all my
powers and exertions, as if it were nothing, and myself…as if [I] were entitled to my
exclusive attention…when I refuse any danger or suffering by which the general good
may be promoted, then brand me for a coward” (102). Godwin’s representation of
dueling reveals its limitations in achieving justice for both individual and community.
Just as Godwin points to problems with this pre-modern, extra-legal justice
method, he also points to problems with an unrealized anarchic vision of justice. Caleb
Willaims’ critique of the thieves’ informal, unwritten code shares similar elements with
the novel’s critique of dueling – with no positive law or formal justice system there are
no constraints or agreed upon methods to resolve offenses, resulting in an uneven and
inequitable system of justice. Godwin’s episode with the thieves implies that in such an
unchecked society, even individuals with good intentions may become a menace; Caleb
explains of the thieves that:
The persons who composed this society had each of them cast off all control from
established principle; their trade was terror, and their constant object to elude the
vigilance of the community…Accustomed to exercise harshness towards the
subject of their depredations, they did not always confine their brutality within
that scope. They were habituated to consider wounds and bludgeons and stabbing
as the obvious mode of surmounting every difficulty. (227)
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In Caleb’s characterization of the thieves, Godwin shows how insufficient limits can lead
to violence and to a less destructive, perhaps equally harmful outcome: energy wasted or
energy spent on taking from the community rather than giving back. Caleb says of the
thieves misapplied energy, ingenuity, and fortitude: “I could not help recollecting how
admirably beneficial such qualities might be made in the great theatre of human affairs;
while in their present direction they were thrown away upon purposes diametrically at
war with the first interests of human society. Nor were their proceedings less injurious to
their own interest than incompatible with the general welfare” (235). In the thieves’
lawless and unconstrained behavior, Godwin again underscores the individual and
collective loss that is the consequence of an ineffective justice system; without restraint
the thieves hurt themselves as well as the community. He implies, however, that the
thieves’ untapped resources could be harnessed, given a reform (227). Godwin’s critique
of dueling and the lawless behavior of the thieves, therefore, reveal that despite
assumptions about his desire for a society without government regulations, his vision of
criminal justice was not to be found in nostalgic revisions of pre-modern justice or
unrealized projections of future anarchism.10
Godwin’s critique of chivalric and anarchic justice systems implies a commitment
to positive law, the need for an agreed upon process for adjudicating it, and alternative
outcomes to resolve criminal conflict; however, his critique of modern criminal justice
processes and outcomes suggests that his desire for an alternative was not to be found in
10

We see this assumption reflected in contemporary reviews for Caleb Williams like that found July 1794
in the government-funded British Critic, whose correspondent calls the novel “A most evil work, antiChristian and anti-law, which exalts the robber leader” (qtd in Hindle x). Current scholars, such as
Kenneth W. Graham, acknowledge this radical characterization of Godwin too, suggesting that Godwin’s
perceived anarchism may have contributed to dismissing his ideas. Graham says, “While too powerful a
novel to be ignored, [Caleb Willimas] shared some of the ignominy and neglect suffered by its author,
William Godwin, who advocated political and social reforms too openly at a time of widespread alarm at
the power and success of the French Revolution” (1).
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the modernizing punitive system either. Godwin first critiques the modern system by
representing the way that law can be manipulated, distorted, and defined to serve the
interests of those with status or power. Cornwall echoes this position when he describes
that “Crime is…a matter of social as well as of legal definition…Many would insist, and
with some justification, that most definitions of crime are, to some extent or another,
political in nature, made by powerful groups with an interest in preserving the forms of
social order to which they subscribe” (20, emphasis his). Caleb Willaims suggests three
consequences to this sort of control within an inequitable retributive system: (1) certain
victims are ignored or overlooked because the nature of their crime has not yet been
legitimated or established as illegal; (2) certain offenses that arise from inequitable
distribution of social benefits are either defined as illegal or charged more severely; and
(3) certain crimes that are illegal are not prosecuted because they are committed by
people in power.
Godwin underscores the first of these effects – not legitimating certain crimes – in the
episode involving Emily Melville. As a woman with neither fortune nor family, Emily is
dependent on her cousin Tyrrel’s charity and also vulnerable to his abuses. When Tyrrel
makes Emily prisoner in his house because she refuses to marry the man he selects for
her, Godwin shows how the justice system allows certain crimes to occur undetected,
especially crimes which those in power choose to frame as “the concerns of any man’s
private family” (98). Godwin underscores the conceivable brutality of such crimes when
Tyrell essentially gives the suitor permission to rape Emily. Grimes tells her: “Your
consent was so hard to gain that squire thought it was surest asking in the dark” (67).
Although Grimes stops short of acting on Tyrell’s directive, Godwin represents a justice
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system that offers very little detection of, or prevention from, harms that might be
committed against women with a status such as Emily’s.
Godwin’s depiction of the episode between Emily and Tyrell also reveals that in a
system of private prosecution, which grants so little status to certain victims or defines
certain offenses as “private,” serious harms that are committed or attempted – such as
rape – may go unreported; Beattie explains that, “Only rarely did a servant or apprentice
thrashed by their masters…[or] a wife beaten by her husband…complain to a magistrate
and institute a prosecution” (124). Beattie cites the expense, the public embarrassment,
and the difficulty in getting a conviction as the reason why so few violent crimes, such as
rape, were even reported.11 As I will argue in my next chapter, Mary Wollstonecraft
echoes and extends Godwin’s concern with this limitation of justice in her novel Maria:
Or the Wrongs of Woman (1798). She reconsiders Emily’s plight in her character
Jemima, a rape survivor, representing how Jemima is overlooked by the justice system
because of her gender, class, and the nature of the offense perpetrated against her.
If Godwin focuses our attention on disenfranchised victims, however, he also
suggests that certain interpretations of what is considered criminal affect those accused of
a crime as well; he shows how offenses arising from inequitable distribution of social
benefits are either defined as illegal or charged more severely because the accused
becomes an inconvenience or subversive to those in power. In An Enquiry Concerning
Political Justice, Godwin describes how “robbery and other offences, which the wealthier
part of the community have not temptation to commit, are treated as capital crimes”
(I.iii.94). We see selective definition of crime in Caleb Williams in the way Tyrrel
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Beattie states that “over the period 1660 to 1800 a [rape] case came before the Surrey assizes on average
once every year and half and the Sussex courts only once every four years” (126).
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charges Emily with debt when she defies him. Even though she descends from the same
lineage as he does and, as Caleb explains, “In equity perhaps she was entitled to that
portion of fortune…which had gone to swell the property of the male representative,”
Tyrrel’s action is justified under the law (40). Godwin represents how Tyrrel has the
financial resources, legal access, and social status to charge her with debt, although her
only offense is hurting his pride. Moreover, when Emily dies in prison for this debt,
Godwin implies that the consequences of abusing power within an inequitable, punitive
system can be great.
Godwin also suggests this subjective interpretation of crime when Hawkins’ son is
charged severely for trying to protect his father’s property. When the younger Hawkins
illegally cuts down the obstruction Tyrrel intentionally puts up, Godwin underscores how
this relatively benign offense, committed in order to secure his family’s livelihood, could
be charged criminally and severely under the Black Act. E.P. Thompson explains that
the Black Act of 1723 was “the first to introduce the death penalty” and “Both in its
severity and in the loose and wholesale manner of its drafting…It provided a versatile
armoury of death apt to the repression of many form of social disturbance” (qtd in Hindle
376).12 In both Emily and Hawkins’ “offenses,” and even in the way Falkland
manufactures Caleb’s crime of theft upon which the action of the entire novel depends,
Godwin underscores the way the law could be defined and interpreted by those in power
to criminalize social disturbances by disenfranchised individuals; in a retributive system
rife with inequities – to fatal consequences.13

12

See Nancy E. Johnson’s The English Jacobin Novel on Rights, Property and the Law, 112-114, for a
more detailed analysis of Godwin’s critique of the Black Act.
13
We know that Godwin’s concern for such acts of imaginative legal interpretation by those in power was
also relevant in his own life. Although it was written six months after Caleb Williams, his non-fiction tract
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Aside from the defining crime so that certain abuses against disenfranchised victims
remain unprotected or ignored, as well as interpreting the law so that disenfranchised
offenders may be more severely charged, Godwin also suggests that the power to
delineate crime extends to decriminalizing offenses committed by those in power.
Godwin points out that certain crimes that are illegal are not prosecuted or charged
because they are committed by men of rank. Jenkins supports this analysis, noting that
in An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice Godwin also acknowledged “the tendency of
laws not to punish socially harmful acts by the rich” (123).
We see this decriminalization of the powerful in Caleb Williams when Tyrrel
intentionally destroys Hawkins’ crops and quite likely poisons his livestock (76). Like
Emily, Hawkins is a victim of a criminal offense committed by someone in power, but
whereas Emily never pursues prosecution because of her status as Tyrrel’s “possession,”
Hawkins reluctantly appeals to the law, believing that Tyrrel’s offense against him is so
blatant as to merit protection – even if he is poor. The narrator describes,
Hawkins had hitherto carefully avoided, notwithstanding the injuries he had
suffered, the attempting to right himself by legal process; being of the opinion that
law was better adapted for a weapon of tyranny in the hands of the rich than for a
shield to protect the humbler part of the community against their usurpation. In
this last instance however he conceived that the offence was so atrocious as to
make it impossible that any rank could protect the culprit against the severity of
justice. (76)

Cursory Strictures to the Lord Chief Justice Eyre to the Grand Jury (1794) addresses the way the court was
“imagining” treasonous acts in behaviors by members of the London Corresponding Society. Godwin
condemned the state’s interpretation as a manipulation, for using the law as “a mere trap to delude us to our
ruin, creating a fancied security, an apparent clearness and definition, the better to cover the concealed
pitfalls with we on every side are surrounded”(13) – another example of people in power defining crime to
serve their own interests. The notion of imaginative treason during the treason trials has been discussed
critically in John Barrell’s Imagining the King’s Death: Figurative Treason, Fantasies of Regicide (2000).
It has been discussed more specific to Godwin in Miriam Wallace’s “Constructing Treason, Narrating
Truth: The 1794 Treason Trial of Thomas Holcroft and the Fate of English Jacobinism” (2007) and Nancy
E. Johnson’s “Fashioning the Legal Subject: Narratives from the London Treason Trials of 1794.”(2009).
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Hawkins’ belief is quickly extinguished, however, as Tyrrel employs a lawyer to slow the
legal process down by “affaidavits, motions, pleas, demurrers, flaws, and appeals” (76).
Tyrrel distorts what is criminal by making the pursuit of justice so time consuming,
arduous, and expensive (even without a lawyer the time and travel needed to appear
“from term to term, and from court to court” would cause considerable expense) that his
offense is silenced, ignored, and overlooked. While these obstacles are more overt than
the lack of protection and prevention we see in Emily’s case, Godwin’s message
regarding the perversion of justice is the same: “Wealth and despotism easily know how
to engage those laws as the coadjutors of their oppression, which were perhaps at first
intended…for the safeguards of the poor!” (75). Godwin represents in these examples
that crime was defined and applied – that is, acknowledged or ignored, charged or
acquitted, heightened or reduced – based more on the status of the individuals involved
than fidelity to any stable legal definition. Tilottama Rajan describes that “To cast
political theory in narrative or dramatic form is to disclose the fictions of the political
world” (167). Godwin’s representation reveals and undercuts the fiction of a just
criminal system or a stable definition of crime; instead, by means of Emily, the Hawkins,
and Tyrrel he dramatizes how inequities within the criminal justice system shape the way
in which crime is defined and practiced. He suggests the far reaching implications to
disenfranchised individuals when these definitions are attached to punitive outcomes.
If Godwin points out these prejudicial interpretations and definitions of crime, he
also represents the people authorizing and maintaining the retributive criminal process –
officers of justice, lawyers, and Justices of the Peace (JPs) – as biased and inconsistent.
First, Godwin depicts how prison power dynamics create potentially abusive situations in
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which “officers of the peace” exert arbitrary control over prisoners. This arbitrary control
results in aggressive and inhumane treatment that extends well beyond protecting the
community or even keeping order in the prison. For example, after guards painfully bind
his injured leg in fetters, Caleb tells them: “You are to take care we do not escape; but it
is no part your office to call us names and abuse us” (204). As this situation reveals, the
disproportionate balance of power within the punitive system puts prisoners in an
extremely vulnerable position, without recourse to protection. Caleb asks, “To whom
shall the unfortunate felon appeal? To what purpose complain, when his complaints are
sure to be received with incredulity?” (187). Godwin implies that the only means for
prisoners to receive basic services, in such imbalanced conditions, is by bribery, such as
when Caleb gives his guard a shilling in order to receive medical services (205). Michael
Ignateiff supports Godwin’s critique: “Authority in prison…varied according to the
sobriety, dutifulness, and resolve of its enforcers. Unbounded by formal rule, it was by
definition arbitrary, personal, and capricious” (36).
Second, Godwin underscores that disenfranchised individuals not only suffered
without recourse in prison, they also increasingly faced an imbalance of justice with
regard to legal advocacy; lawyers prevented justice by slowing down the process and
making it expensive for the poor to pursue prosecution, as with Hawkins. They brought
harsher charges against the accused, as we see with Hawkins’ son. They also made equal
protection for the accused difficult, as Caleb articulates, “Where shall the poor wretch
reduced to the last despair, and to whom acquittal perhaps comes just in time to save him
from perishing, – where shall this man find leisure and much less money, to see counsel
and officers, and purchase the dear-bought remedy of the law?” (188). J.M. Beattie and
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John Langbein have traced the development of the adversarial system in England,
charting how many of the inconsistencies and imbalances Godwin highlights were being
addressed during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century through attempts to
codify evidence laws and allow lawyers into English criminal courts. Langbein theorizes
that the move from the “accused speaks” trial to an adversarial format led to the (1)
“combat effect,” in which “truth-impairing incentives” motivate “each adversary to win
the courtroom struggle,” and the (2) “wealth effect,” in which an “enormous advantage”
is bestowed “upon persons who can afford to hire skilled trial counsel” (1-2). Godwin’s
representation of “things as they are,” however, suggests that both of these defects were
already affecting individuals disenfranchised from the legal system prior to the complete
transition to an adversarial format. Further, as I will discuss in my final section, Godwin
implies that direct participation by the victim and the accused is important to the justice
process he imagines. Therefore, although Godwin may have appreciated legal reform of
any sort, the model he represents in his novel suggests that reducing participation by
introducing further legal intervention would not have been the sort of reform he would
have endorsed.
Third, Godwin also portrays how the arbiters of justice, appointed primarily based
on their status in the community rather than any special credential, could lead to a
miscarriage of justice. Langbein supports this notion, explaining that “The JPs were
mostly local gentlemen active in civic affairs. They were commonly drawn from the
higher social orders…The incentive to serve came from the JPs’ interest in keeping local
order and in reinforcing their stature in the community through exercise of magisterial
authority” (46). Godwin shows the problem with such arbitrary requisites not only as it
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leads to prejudicial judgments, but also as it leads to a very uneven application of justice
since JPs might all approach their post very differently. For example, Godwin suggests
that different approaches might translate to different prerequisites for investigating
allegations against an accused – as is the case with the magistrate who tells Caleb that an
accusation against Falkland will not even be considered because of Caleb’s lower social
rank (287). Godwin implies that in other instances uneven application of justice might
result in the same accused being acquitted, unnecessarily imprisoned, or even convicted
to death. For example, in the case of the fatal fight between the peasants, Falkland, acting
as magistrate without rhyme or reason beyond his own personal experiences, dismisses
the case. Caleb tells us, however, that this same case is committed to trial when
persistently prosecuted by the victim’s brother, who finds “a magistrate, more scrupulous
or more despotic” (135). Although the peasant is finally acquitted, this difference of
opinion by the magistrate results in the peasants’ long imprisonment and could have just
as easily resulted in a guilty verdict. Godwin’s implication is that if one has the time,
effort, and means to pursue prosecution, a JP who agrees with a certain version of truth or
justice may eventually be found.
Godwin also implies that even when JPs attempt impartiality or try to stick to a
strict code of conduct, as with Forester presiding over Caleb’s robbery trial, too often
justice is determined by a magistrate with some connection to the more powerful party or
who has a vested interest in deciding the case a certain, predetermined way. For
example, when Caleb insinuates that Forester may not be the most neutral of magistrates
to determine his case since he is a relative of Falkland’s, Forester admonishes him and
claims he has remained unbiased (175). As Mr Raymond later summarizes: “[Falkland’s]
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relation, who as justice of the peace made out the mittimus, and who had the folly to
think he could be impartial, gave it on his side with one voice” (232). In each case of
impartial, inconsistent magistrates, Godwin suggests that within an inequitable,
retributive system, outcomes are determined by those too narrowly invested in individual
self-interest or collusion with rank.
While Godwin points out the shortcomings of criminal justice administrators, he also
points out the limits of the processes in place to achieve justice, showing how judicial
procedures maintain social abuses through inequities and inconsistencies. He begins this
critique by depicting multiple inconsistencies regarding pretrial detention. In some cases,
the accused is apprehended and held as he or she awaits trial, as with Emily (88) and the
younger Hawkins (77). In other cases, the accused is simply asked to appear for trial, as
with Falkland (103). In still other cases, the accused is apprehended and detained, but
then simply let go without explanation, as happens to Caleb (289).
Godwin suggests in the disparity of these cases that the pretrial process has less to do
with the harm inflicted by the alleged offense, or the evidence and degree of probable
cause available to detain an individual, than with the status of the accused. In the case of
Falkland, he is not apprehended even though he has a known history of conflict with the
murder victim and there are several witnesses to their dispute the night of the crime.
When Caleb is held for the charge of mail theft, his impoverished appearance and Irish
accent are enough to detain him, even though none of his other physical features match
the description on the deposition (251) and he earlier tells us that “three fourths of those
who [are detained awaiting trial]…are persons whom, even with all the superciliousness
and precipitation of our courts of justice, no evidence can be found to convict” (189). In
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this disparity of pretrial detention procedures, Godwin underscores how individuals with
a lower rank are held with a lesser degree of evidence and suffer from more severe
retribution, even before conviction.
Legal history supports the inconstant pretrial procedures Godwin depicts. John
Beattie describes the growing authority of magistrates to independently determine
whether or not to charge a case during the late eighteenth century, as well as the manner
in which their discretion was largely influenced by the “respectability” of the parties
involved: “a magistrate could not dismiss a charge that had been sworn to on oath by a
respectable prosecutor. But in other circumstances magistrates were thought entitled by
the eighteenth century to discharge a man or woman brought before them for
examination” (275). He underscores the significance of this discretion since the
allegation of an offense by a community stakeholder would ensure certain custody:
“commitment to jail to await trial was the most certain prospect of those charged with
felonies if the magistrate sent the case to court” (Beattie 281).
If procedures regarding whether or not the accused is held, and what evidence is
necessary to hold him, shift, Godwin also suggests inconsistency regarding the amount of
time the accused is detained awaiting trial. In some cases, the accused is allowed to
appear for trial at the next assizes (young Hawkins), in other cases, and for no apparent
reason, the accused is “suffered to stand over six months longer” until the next assize
(Caleb). John Langbein supports Godwin’s representation; he explains “Because the
provincial trial courts (assizes) sat only twice a year, in the spring and late summer, it was
possible for an accused who was committed to pretrial detention just after the summer
assizes to spend eight and a half months in jail awaiting the next sitting of the court” (49).
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Godwin suggests that what is perhaps even more frustrating than unpredictable
procedure is the lack of accountability for such inexplicable treatment. We can see this
lack of accountability when Caleb explains that “I could never discover with certainty
whether this delay were owing to any interference on the part of the prosecutor, or
whether it fell out in the regular administration of justice, which is too solemn and
dignified to accommodate itself to the rights or benefit of an insignificant individual”
(196). Related to this lack of accountability toward the accused is the state’s practice of
withholding its reason for detention: regarding his son’s detention, Hawkins “was even
uncertain as to the issue of his imprisonment” (78) and Caleb tells us that “I was totally
ignorant of the charge to be advanced against me” (169). Godwin implies that wrongly
detaining an alleged offender was usually of little consequence since “they felt little
apprehension of a suit for false imprisonment from a poor man” (252). He reminds
readers of the inhumane conditions and inconsistent practice that results from a punitive
system administered and regulated by too few people with too much power.
Godwin’s representation of detainment without accountability may be critical of
lingering pretrial practices, which “gave the prisoner few rights…he was not to be told
precisely what the evidence was against him,” a practice which Beattie maintains
“remained very much intact…into the eighteenth century” (271-2).14 It certainly
anticipates the June 1794 suspension of habeas corpus that Godwin would witness
applied to political prisoners in which, “Pitt and his ministers found it more convenient to
14

Beattie identifies this as the Marion pretrial procedure, noting that “the magistrate was more of a
policeman than a judge…a view of the magistrate’s examination as a search not for the truth of the charges
laid and denied but for the strongest evidence that proved the prisoner’s guilt” (272). He explains that “by
the early eighteenth century, however, attitudes toward the accused at this stage of criminal procedure were
beginning to change” (273). Godwin’s representation shows the lingering presence of the earlier attitude
(little consideration for the rights of the accused), particularly concerning practice toward indigent
individuals accused of a crime.
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confine political prisoners...than bring them to trial” (Ignatieff 121). In either case,
Godwin’s point remains the same: accountability to the accused regarding the reason for
his custody could be forfeited, particularly if the offender was indigent or deemed a threat
to social order.
Godwin also suggests that rank plays a role in trial procedure regarding evidence
and truth. Aside from the disparities created by unevenly allowing legal advocates, as
noted earlier, he also suggests the truth finding process favors the wealthy because it
depends heavily on subjective proof, and, by paying for prosecution witnesses, it
encourages perjury. First, Godwin underscores an imbalance in the contrast he represents
between Falkland and the Hawkins, both on trial for the murder of Tyrrel. Falkland’s
acquittal is based entirely on his public reputation and his assertion of his own innocence.
He calls no witnesses and neither disputes nor enters any evidence. Evidence that hints at
his guilt, for example his history of feuds with the murder victim or the witnesses who
saw the conflict the night of murder, is never addressed. The Hawkins, however, are
wrongly convicted based on the certainty of “accumulated evidence” including clothes, a
knife handle, and the alleged sighting of the men on the night of the murder (108).
Evidence that suggests their innocence is never addressed (121). 15

15

Alexander Welsh’s important study Strong Representations (1992) argues that literary texts during this
era, such as Fielding’s Tom Jones, favored circumstantial evidence as being more accurate and certain (“the
evidence that holds up in Tom Jones is nearly all indirect and the evidence that misleads is mostly direct”
57). Jan Melissa Schramm’s Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Theology (2000)
also discusses the manifestation of contemporary skepticism toward direct testimony in fiction. In contrast
to their arguments, however, Godwin’s fiction seems to represent how both direct and indirect testimony
are subject to manipulation given the status of those on trial. Mary Shelley returns to and extends
Godwin’s discussion of circumstantial evidence and truth in trial in Frankenstein (1818). Despite
recognizing the obstacles to achieving truth in trial, both seem concerned with imagining a justice process
in their fiction that might include direct participation by victim and accused.
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Second, Godwin suggests that witnesses and direct testimony can also be wrong,
such as when Robert, Falkland’s servant, testifies to seeing Caleb by the scene of the
crime “standing there with every mark of perturbation and fright,” which may have been
true, but not because he was guilty (173). Direct testimony can be fabricated within a
system that pays for the conviction of wanted offenders, such as with Grimes or the
officers of justice holding Caleb for mail theft, even though they know he’s not the
suspect (252). Langbein describes the problems that “thief-takers” like these posed for
determining the truth: “the government launched a sustained effort to increase the levels
of criminal prosecutions by offering monetary rewards for the successful prosecution of
offenders…The reward statutes called forth a mercenary proto-police, the
thieftakers…The reward system turned out to be fraught with incentives for false
witnessing”(109).

Grimes represents just such a false witness. Confirming Godwin’s

depiction of the way this system unfairly penalized accused of the lower class, Langbein
notes that “many of the victims of these false prosecutions were commonly too poor to
afford counsel” (157).
II. PROCEDURAL AND OUTCOME-BASED HARMS RESULTING FROM FAILURES OF
RETRIBUTIVE JUSTICE
In his representation of the criminal justice system, Godwin shows how state
administered processes not only fail to achieve justice or repair harm, but may actually
contribute to augmenting harm for both the individual and community. Godwin suggests
that an inequitable criminal justice process fails victims by not producing the truth;
therefore, it neglects certain crimes and falls short of discovering or holding true
perpetrators accountable. Further, the justice system fails victims by ignoring the
significance of the harms committed against them. This failure leads to further harm such
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as increased disenfranchisement, as with Hawkins (79). By silencing and overlooking
victims, Godwin depicts an increase in frustration and anger; victims turn away from
forbearance or benevolence and towards abhorrence, as Caleb does initially (284).
Godwin even hints that the continued oppression of disenfranchised victims may
eventually lead to revolution or violence against those in power (71). As I will show in
later chapters, concern for marginalized victims silenced by an inequitable justice system
becomes a significant preoccupation of other texts within the Godwin-WollstonecraftShelley family fictions: as mentioned earlier, Wollstonecraft’s Maria underscores the
significance of recognizing disenfranchised victims by means of her character Jemima.
Percy Shelley’s, The Cenci (1819), goes even further in suggesting the consequences that
can result from denying victims’ recognition and the space to testify – his character
Beatrice kills her offender.
In administering the law unequally and creating trial procedures that fail to
disclose the truth, the process also harms falsely accused individuals by not protecting
them and actively suppressing them. Godwin suggests that in an aggressive retributive
system bent on closure, legal processes can actually be abusive, as is the case with Caleb
or the men who are acquitted after suffering in pretrial detention. In some cases, the
process harms falsely accused individuals by contributing indirectly to their death, as
with Emily and Brightwel. This concern also becomes a preoccupation within Mary
Shelley’s Frankenstein. Shelley revisits harms against falsely accused individuals
marginalized by the system in Justine Mortwitz’s trial. Like the Hawkins’, Justine’s false
accusation ends in her wrongful conviction and execution.
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Godwin also demonstrates how failures of the criminal justice process are harmful
to individuals who perpetrate crimes as well – even if they are not found guilty. Godwin
suggests that for privileged offenders and skilled criminals who escape criminal
conviction, averting accountability leads to suffering and alienation, rather than happiness
or relief. As a free man guilty of murder but not held responsible for the crime, Falkland
changes from a well-adjusted, involved community member to a paranoid, spiteful
recluse. Caleb states about him, “His visage was haggard, emaciated, and fleshless…His
eyes were red, quick, wandering, full of suspicion and rage…Life seemed hardly to be
the capable inhabitant of so woe-begone and ghost-like a figure” (291). As I will discuss
in Chapter Three, in both Frankenstein and Falkner (1837), Mary Shelley, like Godwin,
explores the significance of the harm exasperated when guilty individuals lack a forum to
confess their crime.
If victims, falsely accused, and undiscovered offenders suffer within the
procedures administered by this criminal justice system, Godwin implies that individuals
supporting its legal and penal institutions are compromised too; they lose their virtue and
autonomy in order to serve an imbalanced system bent on punishment. Godwin
represents how otherwise decent individuals behave aggressively or inhumanely because
they are hired to do so within a retributive system. For example, Caleb’s prison keepers
abuse their power and the officers of justice forcibly take Emily into custody even though
she has committed no wrongs and would be better suited for a hospital than a prison (87).
Godwin also suggests that the process corrupts good people by tempting them to sabotage
reciprocal relationships, and sacrifice benevolent individuals, for money that can be
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gained by prosecution. Godwin exemplifies this corruption when Mr. Spurrel, who at
first acts as a friend, turns Caleb in for compensation (283).
Moreover, Godwin shows how such criminal justice procedures harm the overall
wellbeing of the community. The miscarriage of justice under Caleb’s system allows
dangerous individuals who are willing to commit further harm to remain at large, thereby
posing a threat to the rest of the society; Falkland attests, “There is no crime so
malignant, no scene of blood so horrible, in which the object cannot engage me” (143).
The novel implies that the system’s focus on prosecution and retribution creates a climate
of surveillance that encourages commitment to the community for the sake of greed or
vengeance, rather than for the sake of mutual protection or altruism: Caleb describes, “A
numerous class of individuals…would be induced to look with a suspicious eye upon
every stranger…The prize of one hundred guineas was held out to excite their avarice and
sharpen their penetration” (279). Rather than creating conditions for a secure, safe
community, Caleb’s passage here underscores the way the system instigates doubt,
skepticism, and even injustice.
If Godwin represents the way an inequitable state run criminal justice system
contributes to further harm, he also critiques the punitive outcomes towards which his
critiques lead. He represents how imprisonment – whether during pretrial detention, as a
long term solution, or as a means of deterrence from future crime – is ineffective and
harmful to individuals.16 First, pretrial detention prevents potentially innocent people

16

Godwin’s critique of penal reform was part of a larger cultural debate as criminal justice transitioned
from corporeal punishment to incarceration. He was certainly aware of texts coming out of the “Classical”
school, influencing this transition – Jeremy Bentham’s The Panoptican (1791), Ceseare Beccaria’s Dei
Delitti e pene (Of Crimes and Punishments) (1764), and John Howard’s The State of Prisons (1777).
Godwin mentions the latter two in his Enquiry. However, as this section elaborates, important aspects of
his philosophy differ substantially from these reformers.
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from being useful members of the community during their detention – as Caleb tells us,
three quarters of the prisoners who are detained are acquitted. Second, pretrial detention
also ruins falsely accused people, preventing them from being functional in society after
custody: it may damage individuals held emotionally and psychologically – such as with
the peasant who, after being acquitted, was “turned loose to wander a desolate and
perturbed spectre through the world” (206); or it may inadvertently kill individuals in
custody – such as Emily and Brightwel who perish because of illness brought on by
prison conditions.
If short-term imprisonment harms individuals by isolating them and
psychologically damaging them, Godwin suggests that imprisonment as a long term
outcome of the justice system also fails. As a more humane form of punishment – a less
bloody, less public retribution – incarceration falls short. Caleb describes how the secret,
mental torture of imprisonment is just as barbaric as whipping, branding, or hanging:
“We talk of instruments of torture; Englishmen take credit to themselves for having
banished the use of them from their happy shore! Alas! he that has observed the secrets
of prison, well knows that there is more torture in the lingering existence of a criminal, in
the silent intolerable minutes he spends, than in the tangible misery of whips and racks”
(187). Caleb’s remarks dispel the illusion that the English are a more civilized,
progressive nation; instead, they underscore how abuses have just become more
cloistered.
Further, rather than achieving reform or rehabilitation, as Godwin’s contemporary
John Howard suggested prisons might, incarceration increases a propensity for criminal
behavior if anything. While Howard posited that prisons could be rehabilitative or that
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solitary confinement could be reformative, in An Enquiry Concerning Political Justice
Godwin tells us that “Man is a social animal…To be virtuous, it is requisite that we
consider men, and their relation to each other…. Solitude, absolutely considered, may
instigate us to serve ourselves, but not to serve our neighbors” (677-8). On this point,
Ignateiff notes that for Godwin, “Reformation was a social process, a matter of
persuasion and example rather than force” (118). We see this critique of imprisonment
repeatedly throughout Caleb Williams, particularly through the plight of our narrator:
after being imprisoned for over six months, experiencing physical and emotional abuse,
and losing all faith in the justice system, Caleb plots an illegal escape rather than face the
prospects of a trial he believes will be a “sequel” to the unjust treatment he has already
suffered (190). 17 Godwin proposes that retributive outcomes do not serve the truth or
leave individuals in a condition to contribute positively to the community.
Since Godwin believed that reformation “was a matter of persuasion and example
rather than force,” he also differed from Bentham and Beccaria in their emphasis on
punishment as a way to deter or their “‘authoritarian’ attempts to ‘improve’ people,”
through imprisonment and surveillance (Iganteiff 118). Godwin suggests that instead of
reducing crime, criminal activity simply becomes more covert: Caleb uses disguises to
remain a free man, Tyrell hides his abuses of Emily within the privacy of his own home,
the thieves move themselves to the outskirts of the community, and savvy criminals like
Grimes actually find ways to profit from the punitive system. After two hundred years of
experimentation with prisons as a means of deterrence, Cornwall assures modern readers
of Godwin’s argument: “If there is any certainty within our understanding of penology, it
17

Henry Fielding had famously asserted in his 1751 tract An Enquiry into the Late Increase of Robbers
and Related Writings that prisons were “seminaries of vice and sewers of nastiness and disease” (qtd. in
Ignateiff 52). By the time Godwin writes his Enquiry he refers to this as “a proverb” (7.6.676).
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is that prisons do not reduce crime, and may actually increase it” (76). Godwin’s novel
exposes this assertion.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM: RESTORATIVE JUSTICE
If Godwin critiques the law’s application, trial procedure, and the purposes and
administration of Caleb’s punitive system, he also offers readers another, more
restorative, criminal justice model in Caleb Williams. In crafting Caleb and Falkland’s
final trial as well as episodes involving conflict resolution throughout the novel, Godwin
imagines a more democratic, participatory process that requires the use of the law to limit
offenders, but which largely places responsibility and resolution into the hands of
victims, offenders, and community. By representing a process that seeks accountability
and reconciliation, rather than judgment and punishment, he suggests a model in which
greater truth, healing, and change can be achieved. As we will see, the model that
follows – Godwin’s justice model – resonates in the fictions his family produces.
First of all, Godwin suggests the need for some form of positive law as a
significant requirement of a fair justice system. As suggested earlier, in the breakdowns
of the anarchic and chivalric models he depicts, Godwin implies that criminal justice
requires the limits of formal, written law. He shows the consequences of not having an
agreed upon system to resolve conflict and suggests the reasons why he feels laws are
necessary: to protect individuals, to keep the powerful in check, and to keep the
community as safe as possible in order to create conditions conducive to security and
happiness. In his ideal model, the original intention of these laws would be reclaimed; as
the narrator describes, “laws…were perhaps at first intended…for the safeguards of the
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poor” (75). Godwin suggests that agreed upon, if flexible, codes are an important place
to start in achieving these protections.
Second, Godwin considers the role of arbiters in a just system. He suggests that
in order to safeguard against the loss of individual reason to the demands of the sovereign
or collusion with the dominant class, application of the law should be equitable,
democratically instituted, and cognizant of circumstances contributing to an offense.
Arbiters of justice should have knowledge of the precedents and statutes, but in order to
avoid maintaining social disparities, they should be unconnected to the parties involved;
Mr. Forester has the right idea when he says “It is a wise principle that requires the judge
to come into court uniformed of the merits of the cause he is to try,” but Forester falters
in overlooking his own interest in the case of Falkland and Caleb (169).
Caleb Williams indicates that in order to avoid inequitable interpretations of the
law, arbiters should consider the circumstances that contributed to the crime as well as
the conditions for disclosing them. Although Mr. Forester believes that “it is right to be
severe and inflexible in the treatment of offenders,” too much rigidity prevents him from
relying on his own reason when Caleb begs him to question the probability of the charges
against him (174); his rigidity blinds him to the inconsistencies of the case against Caleb
in his desire for certainty (175). Godwin also underscores that Forester’s rigidity to the
system and “things as they are” precludes him from realizing that Caleb is afraid to tell
the truth and publicly shame his master within a legal process that does not protect those
less powerful.
Godwin implies that an arbiter should be firmly convicted in the pursuit of justice,
but should also be able to acknowledge the origin of the conflict and perhaps even shared
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responsibility: as Mr. Clark tells Falkland, “Mr. Tyrrel is boisterous, rugged, and
unfeeling; you are too passionate, too acutely sensible of injury” (37). Furthermore, a
good arbiter should have a goal of repairing as much as reproving harm; for example, Mr.
Clark can “[point] out to men their mistakes with frankness and unreserve…but without
uneasiness in the party to whom they were addressed: they felt the instrument that was
employed to correct their irregularities, but it never mangled what it was intended to
heal” (26). Finally, a good arbiter of justice needs to be unintimidated by status; when
Mr. Clark dies, the narrator tells us that his death “removed the person who could most
effectively have moderated the animosities of the contending parties, and took away the
great operative check upon the excesses of Mr Tyrrel” (39). Godwin suggests a reasoned,
sympathetic mediator can do a great deal to prevent harms or at least reduce future
conflict; Clark’s death significantly contributes to the situation escalating between
Falkland and Tyrrel, resulting in the murder and false accusation.
Third, Godwin downplays the role of lawyers within his ideal system. His
representation of Mr. Clark as an effective moderator is probably not only intended to
imply the superiority of poets,18 but also to suggest that considerable power should be
granted to community members and non-specialists. This principle implies minimal
intervention by lawyers in legal trials or truth processes. Of the episodes in the novel in
which truth is most likely revealed – the conflict between Malvesi and Falkland, the early
confessional scene between Falkland and Caleb, the trial between the peasant and the
victim’s brother, the public assembly at which Tyrrel is sanctioned, and the final trial –
18

Schramm identifies the way fiction writers in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century saw
themselves competing with lawyers for “the right to provide an authoritative account of the ‘facts’ of an
event” and provide an “exploration of repressed material” (16). Godwin seems to uphold and dramatize this
trend in his depiction of Clark; the poet who penetrates the truth and maintains peace much better than
agents of the legal system.
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no lawyers intervene. Instead victims, offenders, and the community participate in these
successful processes. Van Ness and Strong suggest the parallel principle undergirding
contemporary restorative justice paradigms when they describe that one of three
fundamental propositions of restorative justice is that “Those most directly involved and
affected by crime – victims, offenders, and community – should have the opportunity to
participate as fully in the response as they wish” (41). As Langbein and Beattie have
concluded, and representations within the novel reveal, legal advocates were slowly and
informally becoming more typical during Godwin’s lifetime. Despite this shift,
Godwin’s novel gestures as the unhelpful, inequitable intervention of lawyers – instead
favoring a process that seeks disclosure of truth by directly engaging victim and offender.
Godwin not only suggests that legal minimalism may lead to a more truthful
outcome, however. Fourth, he also indicates that participation in the justice process can
be helpful for victim, offender, and community on other levels. Participation in the
justice process contributes to a sense of self worth by granting an individual recognition;
we see how important this recognition is when Caleb demands justification for being
denied it. He asks Falkland: “What is it that casts me at such an immense distance below
you, as to make every thing that relates to me wholly unworthy of consideration?” (293).
For Caleb, to be heard is to be acknowledged, to be alive, to be part of something beyond
the self. Without this recognition Caleb describes his isolation and hopelessness: “ ‘I
called aloud; but there was none to answer; there was none that regarded.’ To me the
whole world was unhearing as the tempest, and as cold as the torpedo. Sympathy, the
magnetic virtue, the hidden essence of life, was extinct” (318). Caleb’s plea underscores
that acknowledging individuals as fellow creatures by giving them the space to speak and
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participate during the process, regardless of their status or role in an offense, is critical to
the family’s vision of justice.19
Godwin also represents how participation can be restorative in recovering from
trauma, whether for victim or offender. After Brightwel listens to his story, Caleb tells us
“He heard my story…understood, and…loved me” (200). He explains the cathartic
nature of telling one’s version, describing “one of the motives which induced me to the
penning of this narrative was to console myself in my insupportable distress” (129).
Participation by the accused can also be restorative because accountability can help
clarify the offense and provide closure – as when Falkland tells Malvesi “the original
blame was mine…I ought not…to have been so assiduous in my attendance upon this
enchanting woman” (17). Participation may help the accused accept responsibility for his
transgression as well, as when Falkland finally admits to the murders, telling Caleb “I
bless the hand that wounds me” (335). Significantly, Caleb’s “wounding” of Falkner is
neither disciplinary nor vengeful; rather it is dialogic and seeks responsibility.
Godwin implies that participation by victim and accused is also a far more
effective means to achieve reform and deterrence. If punishment is coercive and
therefore ineffective, then learning the effects of the harm you have caused is an
experience that appeals to both individual reason and emotion. Godwin dramatizes the
force of participating during the peasant’s trial for murder, when the narrator states that
“While the accuser was giving in his evidence, the accused discovered every token of the
most poignant sensibility” (133) and when Caleb describes that during his trial, Falkland
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Both Wollstonecraft and Mary Shelley return to the benefits of a participatory justice process in their
novels. Wollstonecraft focuses primarily on the benefits of creating space for victim testimony, while
Shelley primarily focuses on the benefits of creating space to hear offenders. My subsequent chapters
consider the significance of these aspects within their representations of restorative justice.
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“saw my sincerity; he was penetrated with my grief and compunction. He rose from his
seat...and – to my infinite astonishment – threw himself into my arms” (335). In his
Enquiry Godwin articulates this idea as well:
Tell a man what will be the solid and substantial effects of his proceeding, how it
will affect his neighbours, and what influence it will have upon his happiness, and
you speak to the unalienable feelings of the human mind. But tell him that…it is
sufficient that he has promised a certain conduct, or that, if he have not expressly
promised it, he has promised it by implication, or that, if he have not promised it,
his ancestors a few generations back promised it for him; and you speak of a
motive that scarcely finds a sympathetic chord in the human breast, and that few
will so much as understand. (3.2.228)
Godwin suggests here, and his examples in Caleb Williams demonstrate, that hearing the
harm that has been done and seeing its effects on an individual, on a neighbor, is a more
active and experiential means to accountability and restoration than forcibly imposing
reform on a an unreceptive offender; but further, realizing the harm caused to another
person is a method that may reach beyond barriers of time or life experience, whereas
written codes or abstract expectations may not.20
Direct participation by victim and accused may lead to a fuller disclosure of truth
as well as move parties closer to recognition of harm caused, but Godwin also suggests
the value of community involvement in criminal procedures. Van Ness and Strong again
echo Godwin when they describe that a second fundamental to contemporary restorative
justice is that “While the government is responsible for preserving a just public order, the
community’s role in establishing and maintaining a just peace must be given special
significance” (42). Godwin demonstrates that civilian involvement is important on
multiple levels.

20

Shelley depicts the obstacles to this aspect of the family’s vision of justice in Victor and the community’s
failure to acknowledge the monster as a fellow creature or neighbor, as I will discuss in my third chapter.
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Civilian involvement allows the public to learn of the abuses occurring in their
community. Godwin represents the significance of this exposure in “the accidental
spectators” who are present at the peasant’s trial (133) and the public assembly that
gathers to hear of Tyrrel’s mistreatment of Emily. He invokes the significance of this
exposure in his readers who learn of the wrongs and injustices inflicted on Caleb and his
peers. Godwin implies that to hear the experiences of a “solitary individual” is an
important part of a society striving for equality because as Caleb describes, “looking on
the other side of the picture” helps us find others “when properly understood…worthy of
our reverence and love” (122). In Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature,
and Theology, Jan Melissa Schramm supports the significance of community members
hearing testimony of the oppressed. She says, “Reliance on testimony…carries great
ethical weight. The narrative of the eye-witness often records the experiences of people
expelled from their own communities by those who wield power and privilege” (4). It is
in the community’s self–interest to make space for the disenfranchised so that abuses can
be exposed and corrected.
Civilian involvement in the justice process also encourages engagement and
involvement with the community rather than ignorance about the plight of others or blind
obedience to the norms of the sovereign. Godwin suggests that when a community
member participates in the justice process and recognizes the realities of others, she is
being held accountable too. Hearing may translate to action and social change, as when
Caleb notes that “though wealth and hereditary elevation operate as an apology for many
delinquencies, there are some which so irresistibly address themselves to the indignation
of mankind, that, like death, they level all distinctions” (95). Godwin suggests that
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community participation in the justice process encourages this recognition and, when
appropriate, indignation and action.
Godwin proposes that community participation is additionally important because
just as seeing the effects of harm may produce more of an effect on an individual than
coercion, so too might the retributive aspects of social disapproval or disgust from the
community. The narrator describes the effect of this sort of non-coercive, and physical
force-free retribution on Tyrell: “In the indignation of all around him he found a ghost
that haunted him with every change of place, and a remorse that stung his conscience and
exterminated his peace…There was scarcely a human being upon whom this sort of
retribution could have sat more painfully” (96). Godwin suggests that public censure has
a significant result on Tyrrel’s behavior.
Fifth, the value of community involvement underscores another aspect of the
model Godwin advocates – setting. The setting of criminal processes should not be too
private. Godwin suggests the reasons why too private a process is dangerous when, after
Falkland privately confesses to murdering Tyrrel, his treatment of Caleb actually
becomes worse because too much privacy simply insulates crime and leads to no
accountability. This lack of accountability means that the offender may not experience
any relief from guilt or may not feel obliged to change his behavior. Further, a procedure
that is too private not only cheats the victim of wider recognition that he has been
harmed, but, as we see with Caleb, also fails to provide protection from future harms.
Instead the criminal process should be open, transparent, and (at least) semipublic, as Caleb and Falkland’s last trial is. Caleb tells Falkland “meet me as an open
accuser in the face of day” (167) and Falkland tells Tyrrel “the public scene is the only
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place where I can have anything to say to you. If you would not hear the universal
indignation of mankind, you must not come into the society of men” (98). In these
passages, Godwin appropriates the discourse of duels. He taps into their esteemed
aspects, such as their public nature and their connection to the law of honor. By shifting
their process and outcome of achieving justice to a less bloody resolution, however, he
manages to connect this rhetoric to a more restorative, peaceful paradigm.
Godwin also implies that while public, the setting should be unthreatening enough
so that both victim and accused can participate without fear of telling the truth. In
Enquiry Concerning Political Justice, Godwin suggests that some of this fear may be
alleviated by altering the expectations of outcomes, and as his most restorative episodes
in Caleb Williams indicate, truth telling should not automatically be annexed to
punishment (315). Van der Merwe describes the adoption of this belief in modern
restorative justice practice; he says that
Truth is relevant in both the accountability and retributive approach to justice, but
serves a different function in these two approaches. Under retribution, truth is
about criminal investigations to find out who is responsible for what exact act in
order that they may be prosecuted and to decide appropriate punishment. Under
accountability, truth is an understanding of why things happened. It is about
understanding the context, the chain of events, the motives involved, and how
people could justify to themselves what they did. (42)
Additionally, conditions must be such that community member, listeners, and jurors,
need to not be afraid of the ramifications of acknowledging a truth that threatens those in
power. As Mr. Collins tells Caleb “The justice of proclaiming your innocence? You
know the consequences of that” (320). In Collin’s reluctance to support Caleb, Godwin
highlights the manner in which a retributive system dominated by individuals with power
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and status can create conditions that are detrimental to justice, and he seeks alternative
conditions.
Finally, although in Caleb and Falkland’s final trial we learn that the ideal
outcome of the justice process should be the disclosure of truth, accountability, and
reconciliation, Godwin also hints that some offenders may need to be detained for the
protection of the community. This detention, however, should not be with the intention
to reform or deter. We might hate the crime, but we should not hate the criminal.
Describing the thieves, Caleb explains, “My habits of thinking were such that gave me an
uncontrollable repugnance to the vocation of my hosts. I did not indeed feel that aversion
and abhorrence to the men which are commonly entertained. I saw and respected their
good qualities and virtues…But, though I did not cease to love them as individuals, my
eyes were perfectly open to their mistakes” (235). Godwin implies that deterrence may
be necessary in certain extreme cases then, in order to prevent further harm.
IV. JUSTICE?
If restorative justice is a means to healing the harms inflicted, then I argue that
Godwin imagines such a model in the last scene of the novel – Falkland and Caleb’s trial.
But why have so many readers felt dissatisfied with the level of justice achieved? Or felt
frustrated by its resolution? Some readers feel the final trial is a victory for truth, while
others suggest that Caleb is corrupted because he appropriates “the language of false
honour and servility demonstrated by Falkland” in order to achieve acquittal (Schramm
91). Other readers express frustration and indignation that Falkland ends up suffering for
his crimes very little, while Caleb ends up feeling mildly guilty for making Falkland
admit publicly to his crime.
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Debates about the novel’s resolution have also included comparisons of the
novel’s only recently discovered (mid-twentieth-century) original ending in which Caleb
is defeated and sent to prison while Falkland goes free. Many critics wonder why
Godwin would have published the more optimistic resolution after more than three
hundred pages of pointed critique. Maurice Hindle suggests that by full disclosure of the
truth and less tragedy, Godwin makes the novel less realistic, but closer to his ideology
(xxxviii). Alternately, Gary Handwerk claims that the original ending clearly shows how
status leads to a miscarriage of justice, while the revised ending reveals the limits of
impartiality and reinscribes power relations since Caleb assumes guilt and continues to
valorize Falkland. Gary Kelly says that the original ending was too melodramatic and
roused the feelings rather than raising the “roots of…social protest” (190). He claims that
the more optimistic, published ending gave readers hope that the revelation of truth was
possible in a time of oppression. Kenneth Graham argues that the rewritten conclusion is
more aesthetically pleasing and “demonstrates Godwin’s suspicion of simplistic
interpretations of any human action” (43). Others suggest that what appears to twentyfirst century readers as Caleb’s defeat is represented as victoriously and realistically as
possible for late eighteenth-century expectations – particularly involving an individual
with such a humble status as Caleb.
Possibly, the ambiguous ending accomplishes several tasks, all of them in line
with the principles of restorative justice Godwin imagines. First, as Rajan has observed,
the incomplete reconciliation makes the community – the reader – more participatory by
urging us to “read beyond the ending.” By showing the possibility of restoration, but not
its manifestation, Godwin holds the community accountable for justice: he “passes on to

54
us the task of applying in our own lives the insight that comes too late to help characters”
(187). He has taught us throughout the novel to recognize injustice and by the time we
reach Caleb’s final acceptance of guilt for exposing Falkland, we know that before true
resolution can be achieved, the disparate power dynamics need to be better balanced.
Second, the discord in consensus about the level of justice achieved may reflect
an ongoing, and deeply-rooted, cultural belief in “the need for prosecution and
punishment” (van der Merwe 44). This need was revealed in the recent studies done with
participants of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission because “while the TRC pushed
for a form of justice that would facilitate reconciliation, survivors demanded justice as a
right in itself – both in the form of restorative and retributive justice” (44). Perhaps
readers’ reflect this desire, in their uneasiness, for Falkner’s punishment as a right in
itself. Discordant opinions on Caleb Williams’ final resolution may also underscore a
healthy skepticism about adopting one model of justice wholesale, or at the very least,
acknowledgment of the complicated, multilayered goal of striving for an idealistic
paradigm that must also be pragmatic and possible. Audrey Chapman describes how in
even the TRC’s report, a section entitled “reconciliation without forgiveness,”
“acknowledges that a weak or limited form of reconciliation, without apologies by those
responsible or forgiveness by victims may be the most realistic goal toward which to
strive” (89).

The ambiguity around Godwin’s two conclusions, and even skepticism

about the optimism represented by the published version, reflects a reasoned investment
in thinking about, and being critical of, the justice process. Suspicious of any sort of
group think and a staunch promoter of individual reason, Godwin would have applauded
such skepticism in his readers. Further, as Chapman notes, some doubt or
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disappointment might merely reflect awareness of the flaws that emerge whenever we
take the risk and apply a theory in reality. Godwin’s novel offers that this risk is worth
taking.
V.

CONCLUSIONS

In Caleb Williams Godwin intervenes in his cultural debate regarding criminal
justice by critiquing chivalric and anarchic models of justice. He makes a thorough and
scathing evaluation of the modern criminal system as well, highlighting the ways in
which disenfranchised individuals suffer from unfair legal definitions of crime, impartial
arbiters, inconsistent processes, and ineffective punitive outcomes. Throughout each of
these critiques he draws his readers’ attention to the harms this criminal justice system
poses to individual and community alike. He suggests a more democratic, participatory
alternative to the adversarial and retributive system his novel critiques, imagining a
justice process which seeks disclosure of social imbalances that contribute to criminal
behavior, recognition of victims’ experiences, and inclusion of the community in
determining outcomes and solutions to crime.
Despite its arguably hopeful ending, Godwin’s novel eschews a black and white
rendering of criminal justice. Instead, it confronts its murkiness. Down to the single
units of language he chooses, Godwin makes readers aware of the blurry and sometimes
elastic nature of truth, forgiveness, guilt and blame: on any given page, open up the novel
and note how frequently some variation of the nearly visually identical words “persecute”
and “prosecute” appear in close proximity – their closeness in shape causing us to pause,
reflect, and question the distinction of their meanings and manifestations. While Caleb
Williams does not always clarify concretely where the meaning of one starts and the other
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ends, Godwin’s novel asks readers to listen and be aware of imbalances, instead of
encouraging certainty for the sake of closure.
Godwin encourages us to listen to Caleb’s first-person narration throughout the
novel, so that even if we cannot be sure of the complete veracity of Caleb’s account, as
readers we are invited into the literary work, as Martha Nussbaum tells us in Poetic
Justice, “to imagine the concrete ways in which people different from oneself grapple
with disadvantage” (xvi). The novel asks us to put ourselves in Caleb’s place and
consider his experiences of suffering and injustice, but further, by folding Caleb’s
testimony into a novel promoting a criminal justice model that privileges participation
and recognition over certainty and punishment, Caleb Williams asks us to be part of a
broader social change in the way we think about justice – as the first of many active
agents in its pursuit. In describing the significance of the imagination to public life,
Nussbaum says that we need “the construction of institutions, and institutional actors,
who more perfectly embody, and by institutional firmness protect, the insights of the
compassionate imagination” (xviii). With Caleb’s story and the restorative justice model
dramatized in his novel, Godwin offers readers the possibility of institutions built upon
the compassionate imagination and seeks to transform us into actors committed to
achieving and maintaining it.
In a letter to his friend in January of 1794, just five months before he finished
Caleb Willaims, Godwin wrote to LCS radical Joseph Gerrald in jail, capturing this desire
for compassionate actors committed to justice and revealing his faith in a public forum
for achieving it. He tells Gerrald:
Your trial, if you so please, may be a day such as England, and I believe the
world, never saw. It may be the means of converting thousands, and
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progressively, millions, to the cause of reason and public justice….Never forget
that juries are men, and that men are made of penetrable stuff: probe all the
recesses of their souls…Stand up to the situation – be wholly yourself… Above
all, let me entreat you to abstain from harsh epithets and bitter invectives. Show
that you are not terrible, but kind, and anxious for the good of all. Truth will lose
nothing by this. Truth can never gain by passion, violence, and resentment. It is
never so strong as in the firm, fixed mind, that yields to the emotions neither of
rage nor fear. It is by calm and recollected boldness that we can shake the pillars
of the vault of heaven… my whole soul goes with you. You represent us all. (C.
Kegan Paul 358)
Godwin’s optimism, his stirring prose, and the imaginative possibilities his novel
articulates, remain powerful inspirations in the continued search for a means to truthful
and restorative justice.
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Chapter Two
Testimony, Trauma, and a Space for Victims: Mary Wollstonecraft’s Maria: or the
Wrongs of Woman
Why should we listen to an accused felon? Or a prostitute? What did eighteenthcentury novelists like William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft imagine their readers
could gain from hearing about the experiences of such social outcasts – those of Caleb
and Jemima – and how are their voices still relevant today?
My previous chapter argues that in William Godwin’s novel Caleb Williams
(1794), Godwin differs from his contemporaries of the eighteenth-century “Classical”
criminal justice school – such as Bentham, Beccaria or Howard – by imagining a less
punitive, more restorative criminal justice model. Focused on the plight of Caleb as an
innocent person falsely accused of a crime without the status to counter the accusation,
Godwin’s novel highlights the ways in which Caleb (and other) disenfranchised
individuals suffer from unfair legal definitions of crime, impartial arbiters, inconsistent
processes, and ineffective punitive outcomes. Throughout each of these critiques
Godwin draws his readers’ attention to the harms this corrupt criminal justice system
poses to individual and community alike and the ways in which punitive measures (such
as incarceration or solitary confinement) neither deter crime nor reform criminals. I posit
that in the novel’s final trial scene, Godwin imagines a justice process which seeks
disclosure of social imbalances that contribute to criminal behavior, recognition of both
the victim’s and the accused’s experiences, and inclusion of the community in
determining outcomes and solutions to crime. In depicting a justice process that allows
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both Caleb and Falkland to participate, Godwin also underscores the restorative effects of
giving testimony.
Mary Wollstonecraft – not only Godwin’s wife and intellectual companion, but
also an author writing at the turn of the eighteenth century about individual rights,
citizenship, and the reform of social institutions – likewise intervened in cultural debates
regarding justice in her fiction. Seeking to disclose the “misery and oppression, peculiar
to women, that arise out of the partial laws and customs of society,” Mary Wollstonecraft
develops and extends Godwin’s criminal justice concerns by focusing on the legal
disadvantages of women in her unfinished novel Maria: or the Wrongs of Woman (1798).
By depicting Maria’s incarceration as an effect of coverture, which excluded women
from owning property, making laws, being tried by a jury of their peers, or entering the
legal profession, Wollstonecraft emphasizes the legal disadvantages of gender. Further,
while Godwin lays out restorative processes and outcomes in his novel by focusing on the
plight of individuals unfairly accused based on class, Wollstonecraft draws readers’
attention to Jemima – a victim marginalized by the justice system because of her class,
gender, and the nature of her crime. By means of Jemima’s confessional narrative,
Wollstonecraft builds on Godwin’s depiction of the restorative value of testimony as
integral to an equitable justice process.
Just as Godwin’s contributions to criminal justice are significant because, first,
they are rooted during the historical era of reform that shaped Western criminal justice
paradigms for the next two hundred and fifty years and, second, they diverge from the
dominant punitive model by advocating for more restorative ideals only validated
relatively recently, Wollstonecraft’s attention to victim testimony is significant in similar
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ways. Like Godwin’s, Wollstonecraft’s contribution in Maria also comes at a historical
period instrumental to the future role of victims within the criminal justice system.
Further, in her recognition of a victim marginalized from the justice process and her
advocacy for the restorative value of testimony, she anticipates the demand of modern
victims’ rights advocates for increased victim participation within the justice process.
Modern criminal justice scholars support the claim that Wollstonecraft’s historical
era was instrumental in shaping the role of the victim in justice processes. In James
Dignan’s Understanding Victims and Restorative Justice (2005), he explains that the late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century is often referred to in modern criminal justice
discussions as the “era of disenfranchisement” (63). According to Dignan, this
‘disenfranchisement’ stems from the era’s changes in trial format: As discussed in my
previous chapter, the shift from the “old” to “new” trial format meant that victims and
accused participated less in the justice process as legal advocates were gradually
introduced into the trial. Greater reliance on circumstantial evidence and less trust in firstperson direct testimony to prove the facts of a case, also contributed to this reduced
participation by both victim and accused.
Dignan explains how these changes had an impact on victims: as “crime
henceforth came to be viewed principally as an offence against the state…The subsequent
neglect of victims during the era of disenfranchisement came to be reflected in terms of
their status, role and entitlement to redress” (64). Further, he argues that the “distancing
and disempowerment” of victims initiated during Wollstonecraft’s historical period has
had far reaching consequences for Anglo-American justice today. Dignan says that by
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largely removing victims from the process, the criminal justice system has failed in
multiple ways:
First, it has failed to acknowledge the special status of victims arising from the
fact that they have personally suffered harm of some kind as a result of the
offence. This failure has been compounded by a withholding of relevant
information and a reluctance to provide victims with appropriate support.
Second, it has denied victims any formal role in the proceedings except on the
limited occasions when they were needed in order to pursue criminal justice
goals, in which case their involvement was purely instrumental. Third, it has
failed to provide any material redress for the personal harm that victims might
have sustained. As a result, all victims were for many years disenfranchised from
the system, and many felt disempowered, exploited or even traumatized as a result
of their experience. (65)
But if Dignan and other victims’ rights advocates claim that since the formal changes to
trial practice the criminal justice system has failed to acknowledge victim’s suffering,
denied them a formal role in proceedings, and essentially added to the trauma of their
victimization by furthering their feeling of powerlessness, what about victims who were
already disenfranchised leading up to formal changes? What can we learn from
individuals, writing during the midst of these changes, who were concerned about such
marginalized victims and who sought an equitable, participatory justice system even
before the intervention of legal advocates?
Just as Godwin’s restorative ideals of recognizing the disenfranchised, attending
to social causation of crime, and participating in the justice process come at a moment of
historic change perhaps fueled by his belief in the democratic principles of the French
Revolution, Wollstonecraft’s intervention into criminal justice, rooted in similar
democratic ideals, also seeks equitable and restorative reforms. Specifically, via Jemima,
she draws readers’ attention to marginalized victims of crime. She establishes the value
of testimony as integral to acknowledging an individual’s autonomy regardless of social
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status, while she also demonstrates that the opportunity to speak about private abuse, and
be heard, aids in an abused individual’s conception and recovery of self. Finally, she
anticipates the need for a public space to acknowledge abuse in order to expose and
correct legal and social injustice.
Wollstonecraft’s representation of victim testimony offers a text with a unique
perspective relative to other critical discussions surrounding this era of legal change.
While the effects of the transition from the “old” to “new” trial format have been
considered from interdisciplinary perspectives, many studies have focused primarily on
its effects to the accused. For example, Beattie’s and Langbien’s legal histories have
considered how these shifts empowered professional agents of the state, thereby silencing
the voice of the accused during trial. Welsch’s and Schramm’s literature and law studies
have examined the way eighteenth-century novelists replicated and problematized the
initial fascination with circumstantial evidence in their realism, gradually giving way to
the value of individual experience by giving voice to the accused in their Victorian-era
fiction. While these studies underscore how professional advocates altered the
participatory role of the accused and reduced the significance of first person testimony,
the significance of changing attitudes towards victims’ testimony – and fictional authors’
responses to the change – has not been critically addressed. Wollstonecraft’s novel
Maria offers one entry point for such reflection.
Further, although Godwin’s contribution to the criminal justice debate has been
considered more seriously within the last decade, critical consideration of
Wollstonecraft’s legal contributions have been more limited.21 Nancy E. Johnson’s The

21

For example, Kenneth’s Graham’s The Politics of Narrative (1990) discusses the role of trials in Caleb
Willaims as “an emblem of the open society he advocated, an environment where truth may emerge despite
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English Jacobin Novel on Rights, Property and the Law: Critiquing the Contract (2004)
examines Wollstonecraft’s political views and her perspective on law and rights theories,
claiming that Wollstonecraft “saw in the potential reconstitution of the individual’s
relationship to the law, through a comprehensive theory of rights in a protective social
contract, a strengthening of the individual distinct from the family and preparation of the
individual endowed with agency for political participation” (55). Johnson discusses
Maria in connection with Wollstonecraft’s concern for women’s political agency and
legal recognition, but her discussion focuses mainly on Wollstonecraft’s central character
of Maria, only touching on Jemima’s role and not considering her representation as a
victim or the significance of her testimony within criminal justice debates.
Adam Komisaruk and Elaine Jordan both discuss Wollstonecraft’s critique of
criminal conversation in Maria.22 But while both articles suggest Wollstonecraft’s
interest in legal matters, they are also concerned primarily with Maria’s role in the novel
and limit discussion to the civil action of criminal conversation, rather than focusing on
marginalized victims in the criminal system. Hal Gladfelders’s Criminality and
Narrative in Eighteenth-Century England: Beyond the Law (2001) comes closest to
examining Wollstonecraft’s contribution to criminal justice debates. He notes

confusion and prejudice” (33). Hal Gladfelder’s Criminality and Narrative in Eighteenth Century England:
Beyond the Law (2001) places Caleb Williams among texts working to subvert an ideology of punishment,
arguing that it “ultimately permi[ts] a radical critique of the law itself as an instrument for the enforcement
of oppressive gender and class relations” (xii). Jonathan Grossman’s The Art of Alibi: English Law Courts
and the Novel (2002) considers how Caleb Williams’ form and subject matter shifted along with legal
changes during the nineteenth century, particularly in terms of a structured, suspenseful plot and its
connections to the genre of criminal biography. Nancy E. Johnson’s The English Jacobin Novel on Rights,
Property, and Law (2004) devotes a section to discussing agency, status, and the right of property as means
to granting legal autonomy in Caleb Williams.
22

Jordan defines criminal conversation as the “name of the action in common law by which a husband
could claim damages from the seducer of his wife: money in compensation for his lost honour, and all the
benefits of cohabitation with his wife” (223).
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Wollstonecraft’s use of the novel’s final trial scene as a form that “allows the airing of
oppositional and often dangerously popular ideologies whose articulation is otherwise
suppressed” and validates Maria’s use of “the legal mechanism set in motion to restrain
her, to call for a radical overturning of the laws to which women and the poor are so
peculiarly subject” (218). Despite the value of Gladfelder’s discussion of Maria, it takes
up just a third of the epilogue within his larger study of eighteenth-century criminal
discourses and the political messages they promoted. Further consideration of
Wollstonecraft’s representation of Jemima, as a marginalized criminal victim, and her
discussion of the restorative value of testimony, would add to our understanding of the
way writers imagined criminal justice reform in their fiction. These critical
considerations confirm what Moira Ferguson notes, that, “the maid Jemima…is so often
passed over by critics” (13); neglect of Wollstonecraft’s representation of Jemima
suggests a critical gap that needs to be filled.
Wollstonecraft’s contribution to criminal justice has perhaps been limited because
scholars believed her knowledge of criminal justice to be minimal. While neither
Wollstonecraft’s political tracts nor her fiction engage directly with criminal justice
debates as Godwin’s do (he directly addresses both Howard and Beccaria), she does seem
to have had factual knowledge of criminal legal issues, as well as social and economic
conditions, effecting disenfranchised individuals. Gary Kelly notes that
Wollstonecraft may have used sources such as the Newgate Calendar and
Bladon’s Trails for Adultery…and Maria includes much factual material
appropriate for a continuation of A Vindication of the Rights of Women: on the
legal situation of women; their property and marriage rights; divorce and child
custody; employment opportunities; wages and working conditions; prostitution
and policing; charitable institutions; control of the poor through parish relief and
workhouses; crime and punishment” (211).
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Aside from this knowledge, which perhaps shapes her representation of Jemima, we also
know from her reviews in Joseph Johnson’s periodical, the Analytical Review, that she
both read and commented on texts that addressed legal and penal reforms.
For example, in the Analytical she reviewed Speculations upon Law and Lawyers;
applicable to the manifest Hardships, Uncertainty, and abusive Practice of the Common
Law (Volume II, 1788). Just as Godwin’s restorative model advocates for minimal legal
intervention in criminal processes because of rampant professional abuses, her review
tells us that “The principal object of the author, as he informs us in the introduction ‘is to
point out a variety of glaring abuses, preposterous proceedings, oppressive measures,
scandalous fictions, enormous exactions and increasing evils to the subject and to the
state, arising from infamous practice.’” Minimal legal intervention in favor of more
direct participation by those involved in legal conflict both supports Godwin’s claims in
Caleb Willaims as well as anticipates modern restorative justice ideals, which grant
greater agency to victim and offender.
Beyond her knowledge of critiques aimed at lawyers and legal
professionalization, she also reviewed literary works addressed at issues of penal reform.
Her reviews of Verses to John Howard, F.R.S. on his State of Prisons and Lazarettos
(Volume VI, 1790), The Prison, a Poem (Volume VII, 1790), and Juvenile Poems, with
Remarks on Poetry, and a Dissertation on the best Method of punishing and preventing
Crimes (Volume X, 1791) indicate her awareness of debates surrounding prison
conditions and the move toward rehabilitation through solitary confinement put forth by
John Howard. Aside from these fictional works, her review of A View of England
towards the Close of the Eighteenth Century (Volume IX, 1791) comments in particular
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about a section entitled “On the English Laws, Courts of Judicature, and the Manner of
Administering Justice,” stating that “After some just encomiums the author adds a few
strictures on some obvious abuses which strike every thinking mind; -- the carelessness
or the levity with which oaths are taken and administered in English courts; the sanguine
complexion of our laws; and the manner of executing criminals.” Finally, her review of
On the Prevention of Crimes, and on the Advantages of Solitary Imprisonment (Volume
XIII 1792) suggests a skepticism shared by Godwin regarding solitary confinement as a
means to deter crime and reform criminals. Wollstonecraft’s review observes,
The humane writer of this tract recommends solitary imprisonment as the best method
to prevent crime. Much may be said on this subject, which comes home to every
bosom; but to confine ourselves to the present point, we shall submit a few hints to
the consideration of those who are concerned in the regulation of prisons. We have
always doubted, expecting in the case of murder, whether solitary imprisonment
would effect any permanent reformation, unless the offender were taught some trade.
Like Godwin, Wollstonecraft seems to doubt the reformative power of solitary
confinement because she sees isolation as further alienating, rather than used as a means
for rehabilitation. Rather, we see her belief in the social nature of repairing harms in the
way she depicts Maria, Darnford, and Jemima, a community healing through listening to,
and interacting with, each other.
Although Wollstonecraft leaves behind less evidence than Godwin’s political
manifesto, which explicitly lays out criminal and penal reforms in An Enquiry
Concerning Political Justice (1793), therefore, her entries in the Analytic Review suggest
her exposure to criminal justice debates. Further, her investment in individual rights,
citizenship, equitable political opportunity, and greater legal inclusion for the
marginalized – all aspects critical to a restorative, participatory criminal justice system –
is documented in her political tracts A Vindication of the Rights of Men (1790), A
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Vindication of the Rights of Women (1792), and An Historical and Moral View of the
Origin and Progress of the French Revolution (1794). Wollstonecraft’s fictional
intervention into the legal abuses practiced against women, Maria: Or the Wrongs of
Woman, blends her knowledge of criminal justice debates and her desire for political
reform by drawing our attention to a lower-class woman marginalized and silenced by the
criminal justice system. Nancy Johnson explains that “The novel enabled her to reveal
the impact of legal abuses on women who are unprotected by rights to reach an audience
that might not have had exposure to [her] essays” (14). In her representation of Jemima,
Wollstonecraft imagines a space to recognize and give voice to the disenfranchised. She
underscores the significance of recognizing victims within the justice process, and she
suggests the restorative possibilities of testimony for individual and community alike.
III. HISTORICAL CONTEXT: PROPERTY, INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS, AND AUTONOMY
MARIA

IN

Before beginning consideration of Wollstonecraft’s representation of Jemima, it is
first important to understand how Jemima’s testimony fits into the novel’s larger critique
regarding legal abuses, and then to connect her episode to the novel’s demand to expand
individual rights to women. Wollstonecraft saw individual autonomy, regardless of
gender, as critical to a healthy community. Wendy Gunther Canada explains that
“Coming of age in an era of democratic revolution, Mary Wollstonecraft was the first to
make an explicit and systematic argument for women’s political rights as autonomous
citizens with duties to themselves and their countries” (10). Wollstonecraft saw
autonomous citizens as individuals with developed subjectivities as well as duties to the
larger community. In her earlier non-fiction tract, A Vindication of the Rights of Women,
Wollstonecraft proposes that greater autonomy can be granted to women through
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educational reform. Not only in order to be good wives and mothers, but also in order to
be good citizens, women should not be educated as romantic, impractical flirts, but rather
women should be encouraged to develop subjectivities rooted in reason and civic duty.
While she proposes education as a means to achieve this in A Vindication of the Rights of
Woman, her fiction puts forward another way in which Wollstonecraft envisions
translating this theory of autonomy and civic duty into practice – by granting women the
opportunity to take part in the justice process.
In Maria: Or the Wrongs of Woman, Wollstonecraft represents the autonomy that
should be granted by giving women greater legal and political rights. She attacks “male
primogeniture as the principal support for political rights,” thereby highlighting the
injustice of denying individuals the opportunity to claim legal rights because they are
denied the opportunity to claim ownership of property (Falco 9). As Nancy Johnson has
suggested, Wollstonecraft examines the links between autonomy and individual rights in
her novel by means of Maria’s demand to be heard in the justice system, despite her
exclusion based on gender, and therefore, her ability to claim legal status as an owner of
property. Johnson describes how in Wollstonecraft’s critique of the individual rights
denied to women based on property ownership, she attempts to extend an understanding
of property to include a form of ownership of the self beyond mere ownership of material
goods: “In Wrongs of Woman, Wollstonecraft argues that without an inalienable claim to
ownership of the self, recognized by civil society, women were not only excluded from
the process of justice but unable to ‘own’ – that is, direct the management of – property”
(140).23 Johnson claims that Wollstonecraft implies a definition of “property” that would

23

Johnson grounds her discussion of agency and property in eighteenth-century conceptions of social
contract theory as espoused by Locke, Sidney, and Rousseau. She claims that Jacobin novelists “had to
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allow women greater individual rights and political recognition, a definition in which
“property” implies autonomy and ownership of self.
One of the ways that Wollstonecraft suggests this ownership of self can be
acknowledged and granted, throughout her novel, is through institutional admission of
individual experience. Wollstonecraft stresses the importance of being heard by means
of Maria’s personal history to her daughter, which makes up a large part of the novel, as
well as by means of Maria’s insistence on submitting a written testimony, which she asks
to be read to the court, detailing the abuses of her marriage in the novel’s final scene.
Although both Adam Komisaruk and Elaine Jordon have acknowledged the validity of
the criminal conversation suit brought against Darnford at the novel’s unfinished
conclusion, both have also noted Wollstonecraft’s fantastical construction of Maria’s
written testimony – since in criminal conversation cases neither the plaintiff nor the
defendant was allowed to testify. Komisaruk describes the “confidence with which she
defies convention by insisting that her voice be heard” (11), and Jordan adds that
“Maria’s self-representation offers two vindications of a woman…It’s important that one
of these vindications fantasizes a woman able to speak judiciously in public” (224).
Rather than making the episode less important, because it is fantastical, Wollstonecraft
makes the episode more significant in her imaginings – she dramatizes granting a woman
the autonomy to be recognized in a public forum.
By insisting that Maria’s story be told and be heard, Wollstonecraft emphasizes
the legal value of allowing women’s narratives to be disclosed and acknowledged as a

address the fact that while contract theory was a means to expanding the body politic not everyone was
considered a free agent qualified to enter into a binding agreement. Thus, they went in pursuit of agency
that would bolster ‘the ‘individual’ as owner’” (110). She analyzes how Jacobin novelists react to this
exclusion in their fiction.
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critical element to granting individual autonomy. Moreover, by also including Jemima’s
private narrative, she extends the notion of autonomous subject by recognizing the stories
of women even further removed from legal or propertied status. Nancy Johnson supports
the value of private experience to autonomy when she explains that “Because subjectivity
was essential to enfranchisement, private history became an important component of the
English Jacobin novel” (17). Wollstonecraft indicates in Jemima’s private narrative that
recognition of subjectivity is essential to enfranchisement, but it is also essential to
individuals regardless of social status. Perhaps even more importantly, it is essential to
victims of crime. While Maria suggests the value of granting women legal autonomy in a
civil justice system, then, Jemima draws attention to the value of granting victims the
opportunity to participate and receive recognition in a criminal justice system.
IV. REPRESENTATIONS OF JUSTICE: UNACKNOWLEDGED VICTIMS AND JEMIMA’S
MARGINALIZATION
Jemima’s narrative is significant, generally, because it draws attention to the
plight of a woman even further disenfranchised than Maria. When Wollstonecraft
constructs and includes Jemima’s narrative within her novel, to “show the wrongs of
different classes of women,” as she says in her Preface, she underscores the value of
women’s autonomy, regardless of status. Nancy Johnson acknowledges that, even in
other English Jacobin texts, Jemima is “one of the few lower-class characters of central
importance” (148), and, while Vivian Jones recognizes her story as part of fairly common
“eighteenth-century prostitution narrative[s],” she also grants Wollstonecraft credit for
avoiding the sentimentalism typical of the genre and giving Jemima more agency than
was typical of this “redeemable victim” trope. Jones locates Jemima’s agency in her
“independent skepticism rather than...passive sensibility – and never in abject penitence”
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(211). Importantly, she also notes that “Maria, the middle-class audience for Jemima’s
narrative, is both present in the novel, and similarly, though not equally, the object of
abuse…drawing attention to the similarities – and the negotiated differences – between
speaker and listener” (211). Wollstonecraft’s inclusion of Jemima’s narrative
underscores the different abuses women of lower social status suffered in the legal and
criminal justice systems. As we will see, it also underscores the value of community
recognition of such disparities.
Jemima’s narrative is significant, specifically, because it draws attention to the
multiple crimes unacknowledged, and seemingly permissible, for working-class women
victims within Wollstonecraft’s social and judicial system; she suffers beatings from her
father, she is raped – repeatedly – by her master, she is physically assaulted by her
master’s wife, she is subjected to harassment and bribery by the police, and she is forced
to undergo experimentation by the medical community. Throughout each of the crimes
Jemima lacks the status to protect herself. Ferguson explains the validity of these crimes:
“The list of specific misfortunes Jemima faces may be implausibly long. But the
individual misfortunes were all common enough and real enough so that she is a
compelling composite picture of the plight of poor women in Wollstonecraft’s time” (15).
Wollstonecraft’s depiction of Jemima’s rape by her master becomes particularly
important in our discussion of victims marginalized from the criminal justice system and
serves as one example of the way Wollstonecraft suggests lower class women were
legally disenfranchised and oppressed.
Godwin hints at inequities based on a victim’s social status in Caleb Williams –
he depicts the way Hawkins’s case is dismissed because Barnabas Tyrrel commits the
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crime and not only has the social status to intimidate the court, but also has the financial
means to hire a lawyer. Godwin also represents Grimes’ near rape of Emily, which goes
uncharged. Anna Clark supports Godwin’s depiction of these disparities in the
eighteenth-century legal system, explaining that the “legal system served the interest of
the propertied classes by ensuring the submissiveness of working people” (46).
Wollstonecraft extends Godwin’s discussion of disparities towards victims in Maria and
draws readers’ attention to the way gender and the nature of the crime – as well as social
status – factor into inequities in the justice system. Like Godwin, she unpacks culturally
influenced legal definitions to reveal their failure to fairly protect certain individuals.
Wollstonecraft’s depiction of Jemima’s silent suffering – her rape unreported,
unacknowledged, and unpenalized by the justice system – represents a realistic
representation of what happened to many victims of sexual crime during the eighteenth
century. In her important study, Women’s Silence Men’s Violence (1987), historian Anna
Clark looks at over one thousand cases of sexual assault between 1770 and 1845 in
London and the Northeast of England (15).24 Her study helps us better understand justice
processes and outcomes for victims of rape, which a woman such as Jemima would
confront, as well as reveal the way that Wollstonecraft emphasizes the harmful
repercussions women faced regarding legal definitions of property.
Just as Maria’s abuses stem largely from legal definitions of property (not only is
she denied political opportunities, all that she materially owns and even her right to make
decisions about her own body is subsumed by her husband), so too is Jemima
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Clark looks at court transcripts, depositions, and local newspapers. She notes that “from 1796, the Old
Bailey Court began to suppress the publication of transcripts of sexual crimes” (17). This suppression
underlines the dominant attitude toward silencing and marginalizing victims of rape, which Wollstonecraft
depicts.
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marginalized and abused by attitudes regarding property rights. Attitudes about the
nature of rape as a crime were strongly related to a woman’s right to claim ownership of
her body. Clark explains that, although,
rape was a capital crime up until 1841…the justice system only punishe[d] rape if
it infringe[d] on another man’s property rights in a woman…if a man believed he
had a right to sex from a woman, and she refused, he could rape her, seeking
sexual satisfaction and violent revenge despite her lack of consent. Men did not
rape because they had an uncontrollable sexual urge; rather, men who raped
believed that sex involved the ‘taking’ of women and that they had a right to
women’s sexuality…the notion of women’s sexuality as property…blocked
women’s efforts to articulate rape as a crime committed against them. (6-8)
This attitude toward women’s bodies was harmful to women of all classes – as we see
with Maria, “husbands could sue their wives’ lovers for ‘criminal conversation’;
fathers…could sue their daughters’ seducers, ostensibly for loss of services” (Clark 48).
As pointed out earlier, Wollstonecraft stresses her critique of this definition of property,
which stripped women of control over their own bodies, when Maria insists on her own
agency in her affair with Darnford, during the final trial. If she suggests the injustice that
this definition presented for middle-class women, Wollstonecraft also underscores how
legally defining women’s sexuality as men’s property was particularly harmful to a
woman of Jemima’s status.
Jemima’s narrative suggests that working class women faced greater danger and
less legal protections as victims of rape. The relationship between sexuality, property,
and class placed working-class women in greater danger because their sexuality was less
valued and considered by some as a shared commodity. Clark explains that “everyday
rapes of labouring women stirred little sympathy…For some men, the low value placed
on chastity of poor women, and public indifference to their fate, may have encouraged
libertinism which excused rape” (21-2). Jemima’s rape by her master reflects the attitude
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that laboring women’s sexuality could be exploited (Clark 22). She is vulnerable to
attack because she is a subordinate in her master’s home; Clark says “most young
working women were domestic servants…Masters seemed to believe that they had a right
to their servants’ or apprentices’ sexual favours, a right that they would claim by force if
their servants did not acquiesce” (40).25 When Jemima recounts her rape, she confirms
the vulnerability of her status within her master’s house, explaining
My master had once or twice caught hold of me in the passage; but I instinctively
avoided his disgusting caresses. One day however, when the family were at a
Methodist meeting, he contrived to be alone in the house with me, and by blows –
yes; blows and menaces, compelled me to submit to his ferocious desire…I was
obliged in the future to comply, and skulk to my loft at his command, in spite of
increasing loathing. (57)
Wollstonecraft’s representation of Jemima’s rape demonstrates the way that attitudes
about laboring women’s bodies placed them at higher risk of abuse: her master exploits
her sexuality because of her status as his servant. Wollstonecraft’s representation of
Jemima’s fervent resistance to this sexual abuse additionally serves to belie notions that
working-class women placed less value on their sexuality than women in the middle rank.
Jemima’s rape by her master also underscores Wollstonecraft’s suggestion that
lower class women faced less protection from, or legal redress against, such abuses.
Clarks says that “Gentlemen could rape poor women without impunity” (40). Not only
does her master’s crime go unpunished, Jemima is turned out of doors – pregnant, beaten,
and destitute – once her mistress finds out that Jemima “had wheedled her husband from
her” (58). In her mistress’s mistreatment of Jemima, Wollstonecraft underscores how
cultural attitudes about lower-class women’s sexuality also shaped middle-class women’s
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Clark reports that “Twenty-per cent of the Old Bailey rapes…involved masters and servants” (40).
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perceptions of rape – her mistress blames Jemima for being “born a strumpet” (58), rather
than seeing her as a victim of her husband’s aggressive sexual advances.
The pervasiveness of these cultural attitudes towards working class women’s
sexuality impacted criminal justice processes and outcomes regarding rape. The
discourse of shame surrounding rape and the devaluation of women’s sexuality meant
that many victims never reported the crime at all. Of the women who did feel strongly
enough to report the crime, most rapes were never prosecuted (50). Charges on behalf of
laboring women were even less likely to be prosecuted, since, for judges and juries “they
considered that such women did not have chastity worth damaging” (Clark 56). The
reality of working-class women’s limited redress as victims of rape is substantiated by
Clark’s claim that “no master was punished for rape in the eighteenth-century records
[she] examined” (41).26 Attitudes that deemed women’s sexuality the property of men, as
well as criminal justice processes and outcomes that served the interest of the ruling
class, failed to protect women with a social status such as Jemima’s.
While other literary works of the time often upheld and maintained prejudicial
attitudes toward women’s sexuality, Wollstonecraft’s depiction of Jemima performs a
different function. Unlike authors, such as Richardson, who used rape as a literary motif
to encourage women of the middle-rank to protect their sexuality, Wollstonecraft’s
representation of Jemima’s rape draws readers’ attention to the way working-class
women often had little means for such protection (Clark 21). Unlike the prostitution
narratives, which sought “to contain the prostitute as redeemable victim,” Wollstonecraft
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However Clark’s findings regarding guilty verdicts for rape, regardless of the status of the victim, don’t
suggest much higher rates. She reports that “In the London Old Bailey Court between 1770 and 1800, out
of forty-three men tried for rapes of females over twelve, only three were found guilty (and two of them
had raped fourteen-year-old-girls)” (58).
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depicts Jemima as a victim of crime, but as a survivor of rape – she is not abject, helpless,
or prone to vice (Jones 215). Instead, as a woman who shares the crimes perpetrated
against her, Jemima educates readers as to the institutional and systemic causes
contributing to her status and victimization. Wollstonecraft empowers her as an agent
that gains autonomy throughout the novel. Finally, rather than representing Jemima’s
victimization as an apparatus to attack the aristocratic libertine, as Clark argues many
Jacobin authors do (15), Wollstonecraft makes Jemima the subject of her own experience
and exposes the far reaching abuses practiced against working-class women.27
Further, as the next section demonstrates, by giving Jemima ownership of her own
narrative, Wollstonecraft suggests the restorative value of giving testimony – the way in
which the opportunity to speak about private abuse, and be heard – aids in a victim’s
conception and recovery of self. By applying contemporary trauma theory – theory that
considers how subjectivity is (re)gained through testimony – we can begin to understand
how Jemima’s narrative demonstrates the process, and the significance, of testimony as a
means to achieve individual autonomy after being the victim of abuse or crime. We can
see how, as Godwin does in Caleb Williams, Wollstonecraft advocates for a restorative
27

Related to these criticisms, Cora Kaplan combines and extends them in her article, “Pandora’s Box”
(1991), when she argues that nineteenth-century middle and upper class women authors, such as
Wollstonecraft, “understood and represented their own being” by “projecting and displacing on to women
of lower social standing and women of colour…all that was deemed vicious and regressive in women as a
sex” (871). She claims middle class women authors depicted characters such as Jemima as either
corrupting agents or brutalized victims in order to distinguish their own identity and behavior from these
social “others.” I agree with Kaplan that Wollstonecraft does sometimes convey these attitudes about
working-class women in both her private writings and her Vindication. Less than a desire to differentiate
herself, I think these sentiments are an unfortunate reflection of her cultural and historic era as well as a
rhetorical move to instigate a reaction. Furthermore, Wollstonecraft indeed is representing Jemima as
victim, but she is doing so in order to represent actual social and legal injustices that were occurring, and
differently affecting women of different classes. Finally, as mentioned, Wollstonecraft represents Jemima
as a survivor, not only a victim; she appropriates her voice but not in order to further objectify her. Rather,
by representing the first-person testimony of a working-class woman, Wollstonecraft highlights the need to
make legal space available that would recognize the subjectivity and autonomy of women of all classes, as
this chapter hopes to demonstrate.
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criminal justice model that seeks to repair harm by providing individuals recognition and
the space to be heard.
V. TESTIMONY AND TRAUMA: RESTORING JUSTICE BY MAKING SPACE FOR
VICTIMS
Irene Kacandes describes the different ways to apply trauma theory to fiction
when she explains that “with various levels connected through the medium of narration
itself in mind, we can think about narratives ‘of’ trauma, but also narratives ‘as’ trauma”
(56). In Diane Long Hoeveler’s reading and analysis of Maria, she considers narrative as
trauma. Or, to put it another way, she considers the ways the narrative form and content
of Maria reveal the author’s own recurring trauma. Hoeveler describes how
Wollstonecraft’s fictions “provide one test case for revealing the cognitive value of
trauma as a source for literary creativity” and claims that “[Wollstonecraft] attempted in
Maria…to reshape and replay her life and its major crises almost as if she were turning
an object around in her hand, looking at her wounds from different angles in order to
understand and control them” (388). In the context of understanding Wollstonecraft’s
preoccupation with victim autonomy and restorative justice processes, it is also possible
to read Jemima’s private testimony as a narrative “of” trauma – that is, an attempt by a
character within her text to “understand and control” past experiences. Wollstonecraft
depicts this process in several ways that are significant to restorative justice. First, she
underscores the effects of the harm caused by the crimes perpetrated against Jemima and
acknowledges the severe trauma they inflict on her. Next, she dramatizes the process of a
survivor’s recovery through the restorative possibility of testimony.
First, Wollstonecraft depicts the effects of the harms inflicted on Jemima. She
represents the way the crimes have traumatized her and damaged her sense of self.
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Wollstonecraft suggests from early in the novel that Jemima’s behavior reveals a
disconnect from human relationships. For example, Jemima is in the unique position, as
a servant, of being in control of someone who would normally be superior to her in
status, but rather than taking advantage of this position of power, she barely asserts any
sign of agency at all. Susan Brison notes that such dejected behavior may be one
consequence of trauma; she says, “When the trauma is of human origin and is
intentionally inflicted…it not only shatters one’s fundamental assumptions about the
world and one’s safety in it, but also severs the sustaining connection between the self
and the rest of humanity” (40). Jemima’s initial behavior – her apathy towards her
unlikely power position – suggests this severed connection.
Wollstonecraft highlights this withdrawal from human relationships in other ways
as well. Her characterization of Jemima represents the behavior of a victim-survivor
suffering from an unacknowledged trauma. For example, Jemima is mistrusting of
people and isolated; the narrator says that “[Maria] failed immediately to rouse a lively
sense of injustice in the mind of her guard, because it had been sophisticated into
misanthropy” (28). She describes Jemima as “an insulated being…she despised and
preyed on the society by which she had been oppressed, and loved not her fellowcreatures” (31). She suggests that Jemima’s emotion exists buried under the surface, but
due to previous experiences, her emotion has retreated beyond reach of human contact;
the narrator says, “[Maria] discovered in [Jemima] a strength of mind, that excited her
esteem, clouded as it was by the misanthropy of despair” (31). She depicts Jemima’s
frequent shift between a desire to trust Maria and a complete withdrawal from human
affection, such as when we are told, “when [Jemima’s] heart appeared for a moment to
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open, some suggestion of reason closed it before she could give utterance to the
confidence Maria’s conversation had inspired” (34). Jemima’s withdrawal in Maria
parallels Falkland’s withdrawal in Caleb, and although the two are diametrically opposed
in rank, gender, and status as victim/offender, Godwin’s and Wollstonecraft’s points are
the same: alienation from the community neither repairs harm to victims nor serves to
reform offenders – it removes individuals from being functioning members of society,
exasperating the trauma caused by the initial crime.
Beyond withdrawal, Wollstonecraft represents how the resultant harm from
unresolved trauma can lead to a fractured sense of self for victims, potentially leading to
community wide repercussions. For example, Jemima explains that at times she resorted
to stealing, lying, and yielding her body to men she detested as mechanisms for survival.
She confesses, “To save myself from these unmerciful corrections, I resorted to
falsehood” (54), “I picked the pockets of the drunkards who abused me” (59), “became a
thief from principle” (68), and “Detest[ed] my nightly occupation, though valuing, if I
may so use the word, my independence, which only consisted in choosing which street to
wander” (60). Wollstonecraft suggests, as Godwin had with Caleb, that one result of an
inequitable justice system that fails to address harm may be a desperate turn toward
criminal activity; Jemima’s behavior changes after her victimization and she acts out in
destructive ways in order to survive. Moreover, Jemima’s confessions here parallel what
Ernst Van Alphan describes in victims of trauma as “uncertainty [that] results in an
ambiguous, battered feeling of subjectivity…neither subject nor object” (29).
Wollstonecraft reveals the conflicted autonomy felt by individuals repeatedly abused
because, as Jemima describes, they are unable to determine where their responsibility and
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agency begins and where their victimization and subjugation by others ends. After her
trauma, Jemima reflects this conflicted subjectivity; for example, she acts with agency
when she steals or employs her sexuality as a means of income, but at the same time, her
sense of shame for her dishonesty and her awareness of her exploitation reduce her to an
abject status.
Wollstonecraft further underscores the manifestation of harm in victims when she
details Jemima’s emotional state. Jemima exhibits what Brison describes as another stage
of conflicted subjectivity experienced by victims of crime; Brison explains “trauma can
obliterate one’s former emotional repertoire, leaving one with only a kind of
counterfactual propositional knowledge of emotions…the inability to feel one’s former
emotions, even in the aftermath of trauma, leaves the survivor not only numbed, but often
without the motivation to carry out the task of reconstructing an ongoing narrative” (44).
Jemima testifies to this numbness, displacement of emotion, and desire for death several
times throughout her narrative as she recounts not only the trauma of her rape, but the
traumas induced by her social circumstances. She describes numbness after her first
severe taunting by peers when “sullen pride, or a kind of stupid desperation, made me at
length, almost regardless of contempt” (56). After her rape she explains her changed
outlook and displaced emotions: “The anguish which was now pent up in my bosom,
seemed to open a new world to me: I began to extend my thought beyond myself” (57).
After she is abandoned again, she tells that “To be cut off from human converse, now I
had taught to relish it, was to wander a ghost among the living” (63). Finally, she reveals
what Brison refers to as a loss of interest in “reconstruct[ing] and ongoing narrative,”
when she wishes for death after her abortion (59). In each of these representations of
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Jemima’s post traumatic stress, Wollstonecraft underscores the suffering inflicted on
victims of trauma.
While Wollstonecraft constructs a detailed picture of the extent of harms inflicted
on Jemima, and the consequence of leaving these harms neglected, she also imagines the
restorative possibility of giving space to victims so that these harms can be at least
partially repaired. In the retelling of these traumas, about half way through her narrative,
Jemima pauses for a moment of reflection. Before she considers the causal effects of her
early traumas, she says, “Allow me to make one observation. Now I look back…” (56).
In this instance, Wollstonecraft draws our attention to the significance of Jemima’s
process of testimony and its value in helping Jemima to (re)gain a sense of self. Brison
notes that “Narrative memory is not passively endured; rather, it is an act on the part of
the narrator, a speech act that defuses traumatic memory, giving shape and temporal
order to the events recalled, establishing control over their recalling, and helping the
survivor to remake a self” (40). Therefore, by giving Jemima control of her narrative,
Wollstonecraft not only suggests the value of the autonomy achieved by granting women
the agency to tell their story, she also reveals the restorative power of testimony as a
means for a victim to recover a sense of self and experience. By allowing victims to put
in order, shape, and reflect on their trauma, they can begin to contain traumatic
experiences and regain a sense of their own subjectivity. Jemima’s process of testifying
allows Wollstonecraft to emphasize all that is potentially lost by marginalizing victims
from the justice process; preventing the act of testimony prevents the act of regaining
control over past traumatic events, and thereby over a victim’s subjectivity. Katherine
van Wormer underscores the benefits to making space for survivor testimony in
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contemporary restorative justice practice; she explains “[s]uch conferencing can attend to
the psychological as well as the physical abuse a survivor has experienced and counter
her sense of helplessness by involving her as an active participant in the process” (111).
She helps us understand how Jemima’s testimony is restorative not only in terms of the
emotional subjectivity she regains but also in terms of the empowering potential of
becoming the subject of her own experience again, after her agency has been taken from
her. Wollstonecraft represents the significance of active participation by a victim in
seeking to repair harm.
As part of this restorative process, Wollstonecraft also emphasizes the relational
nature of giving testimony in Jemima’s narrative. In underscoring the significance of
Maria and Darnford’s willingness to listen, she makes us recognize the value, and need
for, a space in which victims can speak and be heard. First, she establishes the previous
lack of space Jemima had to tell her story. Jemima explains, “I was the filching cat, the
ravenous dog, the dumb brute, who must bear all; for if I endeavored to exculpate myself,
I was silenced, without any inquiries being made” (56, my emphasis). Wollstonecraft
underscores the neglect of disenfranchised victims in Jemima’s passage, but she further
highlights the active suppression of their experiences. After she has become forcibly
impregnated by her master and has nowhere to go, Jemima tells that “One of the boys of
the shop passing by, heard my tale, and immediately repaired to my master…he touched
the right key – the scandal it would give rise to if I were to repeat my tale to every
enquirer” (58, my emphasis). Jemima’s explanation here reveals the reason for her
suppression – to protect the reputation and social standing of her ruling class offender.
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Wollstonecraft suggests how this silence is maintained at little cost when Jemima’s
master extends temporary and conciliatory help in order to prevent her from talking.
Wollstonecraft suggests that even those without self-interest in silencing
marginalized victims, often times find momentary monetary charity less taxing than
actually taking the time to acknowledge a victim. For example, later, when Jemima’s
more kindly master dies and leaves her nothing, she approaches one of his companions
for help. But she says, “without waiting to hear me, he impatiently put a guinea into my
hand” (63, my emphasis). When Jemima recounts how little this guinea actually fulfills
her needs, Wollstonecraft implies that extended recognition – such as the receptive,
socially aware, supportive community of Maria and Darnford – is a better long term
solution than misguided reparation accompanied by no acknowledgment. Finally, when
Jemima is hospitalized and subjugated to experimentation by medical doctors and
students, she “thought of making [her] case known to the lady-like matron; but her
forbidding countenance prevented [her],” plus, “the nurses knew the hour when the visits
of ceremony would commence, and every thing was as it should be” (67). In Jemima’s
description of her caretakers, Wollstonecraft emphasizes how even in a facility of
healing, the sort of help that might aid in a survivor’s recovery – recognition and listening
– is also not available.
Brison explains the consequences of these moves to silence an individual already
struggling to establish autonomy post-trauma; she says that “A further obstacle
confronting trauma survivors attempting to reconstruct coherent narratives is the
difficulty of regaining one’s voice, one’s subjectivity, after one has been reduced to
silence, to the status of an object” (47). Wollstonecraft suggests by means of Jemima’s
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silencing, that by denying victims the opportunity to testify to the harms perpetrated
against them, social and judicial systems contribute to, and extend, their traumas.
Modern victims’ rights advocates refer to this frustration at being silenced or ignored by
the system as “secondary victimization” (Dignan 23). Wollstonecraft depicts this
secondary victimization when Jemima continues to be victimized by her community’s
and social institutions’ suppression of her traumas.
Wollstonecraft’s careful depiction of the way Jemima’s story is silenced, and her
traumas ignored, helps us to better understand her “misanthropy” and alienation at the
novel’s beginning. It also emphasizes why Maria’s and Darnford’s willingness to listen
critically helps Jemima (re)gain a sense of self because, “how (and even whether)
traumatic events are remembered depends on not only how they are initially experienced
but also how (whether) they are perceived by others, directly or indirectly, and the extent
to which others are able to listen emphatically to survivor’s testimony” (Brison 42).
Dismissal of Jemima’s previous experiences makes her reluctant to trust any audience.
She tells them in the midst of her confession “I will not attempt to give you an adequate
idea of my situation, lest you, who probably have never been drenched with the dregs of
misery, should think I exaggerate” (55) and “Not to trouble you…with a detailed
description of all the painful feelings…” (65). Because no one acknowledged or
perceived her traumas before, Jemima has trouble disclosing her experiences, even given
a willing audience. In Jemima’s initial mistrust and misanthropy, Wollstonecraft again
underscores the far reaching consequences that the lack of space granted to victims can
have for individuals and community.
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Despite her reluctance to share her story, Maria and Darnford act as patient, open
witnesses to her trauma. In their receptiveness, Wollstonecraft implies the value of
bearing witness as a necessary element within a justice process that seeks to repair harm
to a victim. Wollstonecraft allows the majority of the chapter to be controlled and told by
Jemima, but at key points her audience interrupts – to comment, acknowledge her
experiences, and then encourage her to continue, such as when Maria tells her “But pray
go on” (65). Brison explains the value of being a witness to a victim’s trauma as we see
it unfold in Maria: “In order to construct self-narratives we need not only the words with
which to tell our stories, but also an audience able and willing to hear us and to
understand our words as we intend them” (46). Maria and Darnford’s willingness to hear
Jemima profoundly affects her attitude, behavior, and sense of self. At the conclusion of
Jemima’s confession, the narrator intervenes to explain “Maria took her hand, and
Jemima, more overcome by kindness than she had ever been by cruelty, hastened out of
the room to conceal her emotions” (69). In Jemima’s reaction, Wollstonecraft suggests
how the process of testifying and bearing witness can help victims to reintegrate and
move toward recovery. Brison helps to explain what Wollstonecraft reveals in this
moment of connection between Jemima, Maria, and Darnford; she says,
The act of bearing witness to the trauma facilitates [a] shift, not only by
transforming traumatic memory into a coherent narrative that can then be
integrated into the survivor’s sense of self and view of the world, but also by
reintegrating the survivor into a community, reestablishing connection essential to
selfhood...[providing] support for a view of the self as fundamentally relational –
vulnerable enough to be undone by violence and yet resilient enough to be
reconstructed with the help of others. (39-40)
We see this shift and reintegration in the way Jemima experiences a positive change in
attitude, begins to trust Maria, and begins making decisions about her future.
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Wollstonecraft also underscores the significance of the reciprocal healing process
Jemima, Maria, and Darnford share. Both Maria and Danford disclose their experiences
and traumas as well – with each other, with Maria’s disembodied daughter, and with the
legal counsel at the novel’s end – still unwilling to bear witness. In their relational,
restorative process, Wollstonecraft suggests the value of allowing victims the opportunity
to testify to their trauma as a means to repair harms.
VI. THE VALUE OF MAKING PUBLIC SPACE TO ACKNOWLEDGE PRIVATE ABUSES
Wollstonecraft’s depiction of Jemima’s restorative process underscores that
repairing harm cannot occur in solitude. Jemima’s testimony and the role of her
witnesses reveal “the ways in which the self is formed in relation to others and sustained
in a social context” (Brison 40). In order for an individual or a community suffering
from trauma to heal and move forward, Wollstonecraft implies that the process must
ideally be enacted in the company of others. She additionally suggests the significance of
this shared space in Maria’s final unprecedented legal testimony. In Maria’s testimony,
Wollstonecraft enacts the possibility she presents among Jemima, Darnford, and Maria
within a formal setting, extending the vision to an open public forum. Given these
community processes, Wollstonecraft’s representations in Maria seem to advocate for a
public space in which to provide wider recognition of women’s and victim’s experiences
– not only for the benefit of individuals, but also for the benefit of social and legal
systems seeking justice.
As Godwin’s final trial had suggested, allowing both victim and accused to
participate in justice processes may have benefits beyond fairness and equality. Allowing
victims to disclose the trauma they have undergone as a result of a crime forces an
offender to take direct responsibility for the suffering he has caused. This accountability
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and recognition of responsibility may instigate more repair of harm, or reform of an
offender, than solitary confinement or incarceration alone can accomplish. In his recent
study Restorative Justice, Self Interest and Responsible Citizenship (2008), Lode
Walgrave explains the sequence of emotions offenders may feel when confronted with
victim testimony in an ideal restorative process:
…the victim tells his story of harm and suffering, fear and anger. In doing so, the
victim shows the suffering to which he has been subjected…Most offenders,
confronted with that, will be touched with compassion and begin to sense the
invitation to apologise. It is an important transformation. The initial shame,
focused on one’s own discomfort under the regard of the other, will be completed
by compassion, which is focused on the discomfort of the other…But it is not only
compassion they will feel. They will recognize that their own behaviour has
caused the suffering. (115, his emphasis)
Walgrave’s description reminds us of Falkland’s acknowledgment of his crimes and his
recognition of the harms he caused Caleb at the end of Godwin’s novel. Noticeably,
Wollstonecraft does not depict this direct confrontation with victim and offender in her
novel, though she does represent a relational restorative process.
One possible reason for this difference may be the cultural reality – by restricting
representation of Jemima’s testimony to a private setting, Wollstonecraft underscores the
infrequency of victims actually appearing in court for crimes of rape or offenders being
held accountable. Kathleen Daly, contemporary restorative justice scholar, explains that
the sort of process Wollstonecraft depicts can still be reparative, even without the
offender. She explains that “It is useful to keep in mind that restorative processes need
not involve face-to-face meetings of victims and offenders…Restorative processes can
also be used for victims alone, when for example, an offender can not be identified” (77).
While Jemima’s offender can be identified, Wollstonecraft’s representation implies that
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because of his gender and status, Jemima’s offender would not need to be accountable;
nevertheless, Wollstonecraft imagines a successful restorative process without him.
Another possibility for this more private setting may be closer to what
contemporary restorative justice experts are finding, particularly concerning crimes of
sexual violence. In cases of sexual violence, experts explain that maintaining a victim
centered, restorative approach with a crime of such deeply entrenched power dynamics
can be a challenge (van Wormer 113). To counter this challenge, practitioners have
developed different models – some involving victim and offender, such as the victimoffender conferencing Walgrave refers to above – but others involve a closed setting
closer to the restorative process Wollstonecraft depicts. Van Wormer explains that in this
model, referred to as a healing circle, “people who are involved in some form of
victimization are seated in a circle to provide personal support following the trauma
caused by a crime of violence…communication and healing are the central focus” (110).
In this practice, the victim need not confront the offender if that reality is too threatening
or retraumatizing, but the process still allows the victim to benefit from recognition. It
additionally still permits the community to become aware of private abuses.28

28

I need to acknowledge that even in contemporary justice practice, restorative paradigms involving sexual
crime are still only very recently being attempted. Because of the sensitive and violent nature of the crime,
Umbreit explains that such cases “require longer case preparation for all participants, with special attention
paid to their expectations and feelings about the encounter; greater professional skills of facilitators;
negation with correctional officials; and clarification of boundary issues” (qtd. in van Wormer 110).
Additionally, as Daly cautions, such processes provide an opportunity for repairing harm, not necessarily
its success, and practitioners “do not expect that participants will want to reconcile or that victims can ever
forgive the offender or even that offenders will feel remorse for their actions” (83). Despite these greater
complications and potential obstacles, however, research in the early stages of these models suggests that
“the process was well received by both victims and offenders” (van Wormer 113). Rozee and Koss report
the following advantages to the process: “strengthening community trust; empowerment of the victimsurvivor; [and] release of legal authorities from pressure to take action under difficult circumstances [hard
to obtain legal conviction]” (qtd. in van Wormer 112). These findings underscore the significance of
Wollstonecraft’s depiction, even centuries removed.
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Although Jemima’s process does not dramatize conferencing with her offender, as
Godwin’s model had, perhaps instead Wollstonecraft intends a portion of accountability
to extend to her readers. By providing Jemima the space to narrate her experience,
Wollstonecraft opens up a literary space to disclose a trauma otherwise likely denied to
most women by the justice system. Certainly, within her audience Wollstonecraft hopes
for Jemima’s narrative of abuse to perform its own sort of “discomfort” and “regard of
the other,” as Walgrave describes it. Jemima’s narrative calls on individual readers to
reflect on their own responsibilities. If not in active mistreatment, then at the very least, it
calls on her audience to reflect on their role within the social institutions they uphold and
benefit from, which marginalize and ignore abuses practiced on working-class women
like Jemima. Barbara Taylor reminds us that for Wollstonecraft,
The right minded-citizenness is the woman who, her natural sympathies elevated
into universal benevolence, equates her personal interests with the general good.
She is, in other words, a true patriot in the Jacobin sense, that is ‘a citizen of the
world’ who, committed to universal justice and happiness, purveys this ideal to
others…Duty wedded to right is Wollstonecraft’s formula for all this…As rightsbearing citizens, women have duties to undertake, public services to render, a
civic mission to perform. (219)
One of the duties Wollstonecraft’s novel seems to be suggesting for all citizens, men and
women alike, is recognition of disenfranchised individuals within their communities and
awareness of the rampant abuses they may suffer at the hands of legal and social
institutions. She highlights the significant demand – the duty – placed on individuals and
communities when they are seeking justice which repairs harm.
Wollstonecraft reveals the need for listening to victims because Jemima’s
narrative exposes the traumas she experienced, but it exposes problems and injustices of
the social and legal systems as well. Jemima’s narrative discloses abuses of the justice
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system, which instead of protecting and defending defies these principles; Jemima says,
“You can scarcely conceive the tyranny exercised by these wretches considering
themselves as the instruments of the very laws they violate” (60). She reveals private
charity’s inadequacies by describing how the men who had formerly treated her as a
companion overlooked her and refused her help when she approached them (63). She
exposes the wrongs of workhouses, which are “but prisons, in which many respectable
old people, worn out by immoderate labour, sink into the grave in sorrow, to which they
are carried like dogs” (68). And she shows the shortcomings of a medical system that,
rather than being “expressly endowed for the reception of the friendless,” conducts
“experiments on the poor, for the benefit of the rich” (67). In describing these systemic
problems, Jemima’s narrative reveals the need for a space in which to disclose private
abuses because they also illuminate and demand the need for public reforms.
Wollstonecraft’s earlier writings perhaps reflect why she felt hearing about
individuals’ stories first hand was an effective method to promote citizen reflection and
action; the dialogic nature of the restorative process she represents is a major aspect of
her philosophy on the most effective way to learn. For example, in her children’s text,
Original Stories From Real Life (1787), she represents the pedagogical ideals
undergirding restorative justice and the benefits of victim testimony. The work depicts
two young people gaining understanding from “real life” – from the individuals they
encounter who share their stories, including a prisoner, a harper, and a shopkeeper. Alan
Richardson describes that “As in Original Stories and other didactic children’s books
written in the wake of [Rousseau’s] Emile, hands-on learning, active problem solving,
and ‘socratic’ dialogues are the preferred form of instruction” (36). We see
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Wollstonecraft’s application of this hands-on, active, dialogic method of understanding
transferred to criminal justice paradigms when she depicts the value of allowing victims
to testify and be heard. She implies that in this exchange understanding is gained; lessons
about suffering and compassion may be learned. Further, in her An Historical and Moral
View of the French Revolution (1794) she tells us that “From the social disposition of
man, in proportion as he becomes civilized, he will mingle more and more with society.
The first interest he takes in the business of his fellow-men is in that of his neighbor; next
he contemplates the comfort, misery, and happiness of the nation to which he belongs…”
(qtd in Sapiro 36). Maria and Jemima dramatize this process as they begin to take an
interest in each other’s welfare. Moreover, Wollstonecraft attempts to enact this interest
in her readers: in giving us the experiences of one victim, she hopes to help us reflect on
this victim’s place within the larger community that oppresses her.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
Although Wollstonecraft died before finishing Maria, she nevertheless leaves
readers a rich text to appreciate, which contributes her own unique addition to the
family’s intertextual vision of justice – the need to listen to and incorporate victims.
Nancy Johnson tells us that “By encoding the political principles and controversies in
narrative events and characterizations, the English Jacobin authors were able to show the
dire need for everyone (but especially the most vulnerable) to claim individual,
inalienable rights because everyone requires protection against a government comprised
of fallible systems of law” (17). Wollstonecraft’s belief in individual rights, her desire
for reform of “partial laws,” and her recognition of the trauma women’s stories help to
expose and contain, collide in Jemima’s testimony. In this collision, Wollstonecraft
seems to anticipate and demand a public space for disclosing victim’s stories – in order to
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help individual and system alike. Susan Brison, trauma theorist and herself a victim of a
murder attempt and sexual-assualt, reinforces this demand; she describes,
…after my assault I experienced moments of reprieve from vivid and terrifying
flashbacks when giving my account of what happened – to the police, doctors, a
psychiatrist, a lawyer, and a prosecutor. Although others apologized for putting
me through what seemed to them a retruamatizing ordeal, I responded that it was,
even at that early stage, therapeutic to bear witness in the presence of others who
heard and believed what I told them. Two and a half years later, when my
assailant was brought to trial, I found it healing to give testimony in public and
have it confirmed... (46)
Jemima’s fictional narrative suggests to us the many actual victims of trauma who were
never given the opportunity to tell their stories or have their experiences and identities
confirmed. It underscores Wollstonecraft’s commitment to rational and emotional
methods of reform. And it reminds us of how important it is to continue advocating for
victim participation in the justice process – to create a public space in which to tell
private stories, for the benefit of both spheres. Robin West, contemporary legal scholar
and supporter of “the relevance of storytelling (and story listening) to the larger project of
changing law to make it a more just and humane social world” (10), describes that “by
forcing into the public discourse descriptions of women’s subjective, hedonic lives, the
conception of the human being assumed by that discourse…might change so as to
actually include women” (247). Remarkably, West’s notion seems intimately aware of
Wollstonecraft’s strategy, which forced Jemima’s narrative into the public space of the
novel more than two hundred years ago. Furthermore, she also seems to anticipate
modern criminal justice reforms and restorative justice ideals, which seek greater
recognition of victims’ experiences. If Wollstonecraft anticipates and reminds of us this
need, as we will see in future chapters, her justice system does not respond in kind.
Instead, as Percy Shelley shows us in his text, The Cenci (1819), the justice system would
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require greater and more urgent reminders of the consequences that can result from
denying victims the space to testify as legal and penal systems continued reforms in the
early nineteenth century.
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Chapter Three
Monstrous Crimes and Offender Accountability in Mary Shelley from
Frankenstein to Falkner
Why should we listen to a “monster”?
Beginning in 1997, Pumla Godobo-Madikizela held a series of interviews with
Eugene de Kock at Pretoria Central Prison. Godobo-Madikizela is a psychologist who
served on the Human Rights Violations Committee during South Africa’s Truth and
Reconcilation Commission (TRC). She grew up in a black township and, as a child,
witnessed apartheid’s violence. De Kock is a former commanding officer who was
responsible for state-sanctioned murders under the apartheid government. He is currently
serving a 212-year sentence for these crimes against humanity. In her analysis of their
interviews, A Human Being Died That Night (2004), Godobo-Madikizela articulates the
conflict between holding de Kock accountable and moving toward forgiveness. She says:
Connecting on a human level with a monster…comes to be a profoundly
frightening prospect, for ultimately, it forces us to confront the potential for evil
within ourselves. Compassion toward and hence forgiveness of people who have
left a gruesome trail in their wake in effect brings ‘innocent’ victims and wicked
men together to share at a single common table of humanity, and that prospect is
unpalatable. (123)
De Kock’s monstrosities are not the fabricated materials of fiction: they represent the
horrific violence that human beings are capable of inflicting on one another. Yet
Gobodo-Madikizela suggests the real-life possibility of practicing justice that, in
attempting to repair harm, seeks restoration and compassion rather than merely revenge
or retribution. She acknowledges, however, that it may be unpalatable or even obscene to
many.
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As I argued in my last two chapters, William Godwin and Mary Wollstonecraft
constructed novels advocating for the model of justice Gobodo-Madikizela, now, two
hundred years later, practices. Rooted in different cultural and historical contexts than
Godobo-Madikizela, Godwin’s novel Caleb Williams and Wollstonecraft’s novel Maria
also offer visions of restorative justice. Published in the wake of the violence and
democratic possibilities offered by the French Revolution, as well as amidst the legal and
penal reforms taking place within the late eighteenth-century English criminal justice
system, their novels acknowledge institutional disparities within the criminal justice
system. They imagine inclusive, democratic processes that seek restorative outcomes in
order to correct these disparities and repair harm. Their novels provoke this restorative
possibility by allowing a falsely accused felon and a disenfranchised victim to narrate
their experiences of social and judicial trauma. Through Caleb’s and Jemima’s
testimonies, Godwin and Wollstonecraft alert readers to the value of giving voice within
the criminal justice system to individuals who are marginalized and abused.
Twenty years removed from the publication of their novels, however, it is their
daughter Mary Shelley who first asks readers to consider “connecting on a human level
with a monster.” Developing a more substantial focus on the offender– literally a
monster in her first novel – Mary Shelley takes up and extends her parents’ restorative
justice ideals in Frankenstein (1818), as well as her last novel, Falkner (1837). 29 By
drawing a connection between perpetrators of apartheid violence and Shelley’s creature, I
do not mean to equate the qualities of the two. Rather, I mean to show how Shelley
advocates for a strategy of acknowledging and listening to individual stories, experiences,

29

I will be referring to Shelley’s original 1818 edition of Frankenstein, rather than her revised 1831
version.
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and motivations in order to recognize and better understand them. As I will elaborate,
less than an attempt to dismiss or condone harms, such a strategy seeks to arrive at the
root of such behavior, hold individuals accountable, and attempt to prevent future harm.
Shelley’s strategy is commensurate with the goals of South Africa’s TRC and other
advocates of Restorative Justice; however, as Krueger underscores, in a situation of
transitional government, such a strategy is often a means by which marginalized groups
attempt to deal “with their own victimization by powerful people imposing a pathological
ideology” (private). I do not wish to dismiss this critical distinction: as indicated in my
Introduction, I draw on events both past and present in an effort to show the historic and
contemporary relevance of the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley family ideas about
justice.
Shelley draws attention to justice and develops it in three ways from Frankenstein
to Falkner. First, she continues to critique and comment on judicial processes and
outcomes in both novels, although in her later novel her critique mellows considerably.
Second, she recognizes the role of an offender and considers the balance between
individual and systemic responsibility in the evolution of criminal behavior. Her
emphasis on the role institutions play in contributing to a criminal’s development shifts,
and she focuses more on individual accountability. Third, she returns to and extends the
possibilities of restorative processes; she conveys the obstacles standing in the way of
restorative justice in Frankenstein and imagines potential solutions to these barriers in
Falkner. The significance of recognizing an offender’s experiences through testimony is
underscored throughout both novels.
VIII. SHELLEY’S HISTORICAL CONTEXTS AND INFLUENCES
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Although my argument for Shelley’s representation of restorative justice is based
primarily on textual evidence, I would briefly like to consider her potential motivation
and inspiration for writing about criminal justice in these two novels, while at the same
time acknowledging the enormous scale of attempting to do so. The task is enormous
since the period of their composition stretches over a wide swath of time, and, thus,
encompasses an array of private and public changes. She began writing Frankenstein in
1816 and completed Falkner in 1837; during this more than twenty year period, the legal
and penal reforms that began during her parents’ era were expanding and passing into
official legislation, the relatively recently popularized literary form of the novel was
evolving and shifting to include “subgenres of the literature of crime” appealing to
readers’ tastes (Pykett 19), and Shelley was personally experiencing radical changes in
her private life. Among these factors, which may have been most significant to Shelley’s
representation of justice in these novels?
For starters, culturally, the debates about legal and penal reform began during
Godwin’s and Wollstonecraft’s era continued. In terms of criminal trial processes,
scrutinized so closely in Caleb Willaims, John Beattie describes that “between 1821 and
1836, bills to grant accused felons the right to counsel were introduced on ten occasions”
(250). Debates about the right to counsel finally culminated in the Prisoners’ Counsel
Act of 1836, which granted both the prosecution and the defense the right to an advocate
during felony trials. This shift from the old “accused speaks” format to the new
adversarial format, was helpful in granting representation and aid to the accused,
particularly given the increased professionalization of the legal field. However, as my
last chapter argues, this shift had other, less positive implications; professional legal
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intervention moved individuals involved in the offense further and further from direct
participation in their justice process. Godwin and Wollstonecraft’s texts represent the
value of allowing victim and accused to participate in criminal trials prior to this formal
legal shift. As we shall see, Shelley’s texts further explore the benefits and implications
of direct testimony to a just criminal process.30
While Godwin and Wollstonecraft leave behind more evidence of active engagement
with the earlier stages of these criminal justice reforms, Shelley’s journals do indicate her
interest in politics and that she occasionally attended Parliament. For example, Shelley’s
letter to Maria Gisborne notes that she “went to the House of Lords the other Night &
heard the Debate on the Tithe Question” and that she was “very angry with [Lord
Brougham – the Lord High Chancellor] for his speech on the poor laws” (LMWS II 212213). Noting this interest, Betty Bennett describes her as “a sophisticated observer of the
political scene…aware of the influence of politics in almost every aspect of her life”
(LMWS II xix). Criminal justice reforms were numerous and certainly culturally
pervasive during her lifetime. But Shelley seems to have been even more influenced by
notions of justice alive in her parents’ texts, than shaped by the particular criminal justice
reforms of her own era. Julia Saunders agrees that, “It was the ideas of the radicals of the
past, rather than those of her own era, that formed her intellectual milieu. By the time she
wrote Falkner, the radical agenda of her parents’ generation had become muted and
30

Other notable changes in criminal justice reform include Robert Peel’s “abolition of capital punishment
for some minor offenses and his consolidation of the criminal law into four major statutes between 1827
and 1830” (Beattie 257). Peel also established the Metropolitan Police Office in 1829; formally creating
one of the first modern police forces. Additionally the Prison Act in 1835 “established inspectors of
prisons on the model of factory inspectorate” (Pykett 22). Concerning these reforms, Godwin’s texts show
the most awareness and engagement with the issue of improving penal conditions and practices. In
Falkner, Shelley treats prison conditions both more briefly and favorably than Godwin, as I will later
address. Interestingly and anecdotally, it should also be noted that despite his conservative reputation at the
time, Shelley felt very warmly toward Peel since he helped maintain government compensation to her
father, after the Whigs had tried to revoke it (LMWS 223).
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mutated in the work of the daughter, but its presence is still felt in both form and content”
(211). We can glean the radical agenda that shaped Shelley’s notions of justice by
considering those texts written by her parents.
Shelley’s reading list and journal make obvious that she was deeply influenced by all
of her parents’ texts. In the two years leading up the writing of Frankenstein, Shelley’s
journal documents repeatedly consulting the works of social and criminal justice that my
project is concerned with: she notes reading Godwin’s Political Justice, Caleb Williams,
and Cursory Strictures on the charge delivered by Lord Chief Justice Eyre as well as
Wollstonecraft’s Maria: Or the Wrongs of Woman and A Vindication of the Rights of
Women repeatedly from 1814 to 1822 (JMS 649,684). These works would have provided
the early foundation of her ideas about justice, alerted her to the structural and systemic
abuses within legal and penal institutions, and conveyed to her the restorative value of
allowing victim and accused to participate in the justice process.
In addition to this devotion to her parents’ texts in her early writing development,
Shelley’s later interest in Godwin’s criminal justice texts may have contributed to her
representation of justice in Falkner. For example, Graham Allen argues that while
Shelley was composing the novel, she reread and wrote about Godwin’s contribution to
the 1790s treason trials. Graham explains that Shelley studied these texts as she prepared
to write the “Life of William Godwin” following her father’s death in 1837. He says that
Shelley spends a considerable amount of time in 606 [Shelley’s manuscript of her
memoir of Godwin] dealing with the treason trials of 1793 and 1794 in which the
defendants were placed on capital charges for what were, at the very worst, no more
than acts of seditious libel. She describes the build-up to these trials in great detail,
and transcribes liberally from Godwin’s correspondence and particularly from his
Cursory Strictures on the Charge Delivered by Lord Chief Justice Eyre. (“Public and
Private” 230)
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Shelley’s attention to these trials as well as Godwin’s political tract would have
contributed to her understanding of the legal process. It would have revealed to her
Godwin’s critique of the way positive law and legal procedures could be manipulated by
those in power. It also would have demonstrated his engagement in civic debate about
matters of justice, and, finally, it would have also underscored his belief in the power of
defendant participation and testimony.31
Beyond the potential influence of this political tract on Shelley’s notion of justice,
other scholars have commented on the possible inspiration which Godwin’s last novel,
Deloraine (1833), may have provided. Deloraine’s plot, similar to that of Falkland,
involves a man pursued for the crime of murder. Deloraine flees with his daughter to the
continent, never admitting to the offense or being tried in a legal setting.32 Noting the
novels’ shared storylines, Pamela Clemit suggests that Falkland proves: “their
relationship developed into a creative partnership, based on reformist beliefs” (286).
While the protagonist does not take responsibility for his crime in Godwin’s novel,
whereas the criminal admits his guilt and is legally tried in Shelley’s, both novelists
clearly continue to be engaged in themes of offender accountability and criminal justice.
33

31

See Godwin’s letter to Joseph Gerrald in Chapter 1, in which Godwin emphasizes the power of
testimony, for a further example of this idea. Godwin visited Gerrald in prison and encouraged him to
speak passionately of his experiences to his jury. Hindle tells us that Mary Shelley says Godwin “always
spoke of Gerrald with affectionate admiriation” and she describes that “To render his advice more
impressive, he wrote to him” (qtd in Hindle 355).
32
I am indebted to Pamela Clemit (“Political Partnernship”), Graham Allen (Mary Shelley), and Katherine
Hill-Miller (“My Hideous Progeny”) for this summary of Godwin’s novel.
33
Clemit argues that by this stage in Shelley’s writing the influence was reciprocal. She says that “the
traffic of ideas in these novels is by no means all one-way: Godwin also drew on information supplied by
Shelley” (289). Among evidence of shared ideas, Clemit cites Godwin’s letter to Shelley on 13 April 1832,
when he describes his stalled writing and asks for a “single spark, now happily communicated” to “set the
whole in motion and activity” (289). Hindle supports this reciprocal influence (Deloraine “Intro” vi).
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Writing a novel that depicted criminal perpetrators during the 1830s was not
unique to Godwin and Shelley. Aside from the criminal justice reforms and the influence
of her parents’ texts, Shelley depiction of justice may have also been a response to
popular trends in reading taste, particularly when she composed Falkner. Lynn Pykett
explains that “The Newgate novel” was a “sub-[genre] of the literature of crime, which
enjoyed a relatively brief but quite extraordinary popular success in the 1830s and 1840s”
(19). She characterizes the conventions of these crime novels as typically representing
criminal protagonists, oftentimes “focusing on their motivation or psychology…
representing them as the victims of circumstance of society” (20). Shelley would have
been acquainted with these types of novels since Caleb Williams is often cited as one of
the genre’s originators (Pykett 19, Tyson 3). Further, Edward Bulwer was one of the
superstars of the genre and was her father’s friend and admirer. According to Nancy Jane
Tyson, Bulwer had also named his first novel Falkland (1827) to signal Godwin’s
influence and he had acknowledged Godwin’s inspiration on his immensely popular
Eugene Aram (1832).34 Shelley’s letters and journal indicate she read Bulwer’s first
Newgate novel Paul Clifford in 1830 (JMS 660), as well as Eugene Aram in 1831 (LMWS
II 151). She tells John Bowring that Eugene Aram “is a wonderful and divine book –
though so very sad” (LMWS II 155). Her letter to Maria Gisborne, just prior to beginning
Falkner, mentions again that she “admired his novels so much” (LMSW II 261). The
Newgate Crime novels, with their focus on generating sympathy for criminals, therefore,
also potentially shaped her representation of justice, crime, and reconciliation.
Despite the abundance of scholarship written about Mary Shelley’s novels, no
34

Pykett describes how Bulwer’s novels evolved from the Godwinian move of challenging “readers
assumptions about the nature and causes of crime and their prescriptions for punishment” in Paul Clifford
(1830) to depicting a man who justifies his crime as reasonable in Eugene Aram (22-25).
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critical work has been done that follows the representation of restorative justice from
Frankenstein to Falkner or traces the evolution of Godwin’s and Wollstonecraft’s notion
of justice in Shelley’s works. 35 Jonathan Grossman explains that “Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein, so well known as both gothic and science fiction, has never registered as a
particularly legal story” (62). Among the critics who have looked at issues of legality or
justice in the work is Patrick Vincent, who focuses on Rousseau’s birthplace as the
novel’s geographical setting in “ ‘This Wretched Mockery of Justice’: Mary Shelley’s
Frankenstein and Geneva” (2007). He suggests that this setting allows Shelley to depict
her disappointment with the “mockery of justice” and arbitrary rule of law practiced in
Geneva because she depicts a much more codified, succinct justice process via the
novel’s trial of Victor in England. Rather than suggesting a positive depiction, however,
my argument seeks to prove that Shelley depicts Victor’s trial as representative of a
biased and unbalanced administration of justice when compared with the novel’s other
legal trial. Grossman also devotes a chapter to justice in Frankenstein in his larger work
The Art of Alibi: English Law Courts and the Novel (2002). Grossman’s chapter notes

35

Frankenstein has been analyzed from Reader-Response, Psychoanalytic, Feminist, Marxist, and Cultural
studies perspectives. For articles that document an overview of its critical tradition see Diane Hoeveler’s
“Frankenstein, feminism, and literary theory” and Lawrence Lipking’s “Frankenstein, the True Story.”
Falkner has only more recently been critically assessed. Among these assessments, the vast majority have
dealt with the father-daughter relationship, whether thematically or psychoanalytically (see Ranita
Chatterjee, “Filial Ties: Godwin’s Deloraine and Mary Shelley’s Writings”; Anne K. Mellor, Mary
Shelley: Her Life, Her Fiction, Her Monsters; Mary Poovey, “Fathers and Daughters: The Trauma of
Growing up Female.”; Katherine C Hill-Miller, My Hideous Progeny: Mary Shelley, William Godwin, and
the Father-Daughter Relationship. For the novel’s treatment of mother-daughter themes, see Lisa
Hopkins, “‘A Medea, in more senses than the more obvious one’: Motherhood in Mary Shelley’s Lodore
and Falkner.” and Sharon L. Jowell, “Mary Shelley’s Mothers: The Weak, The Absent, and The Silent in
Lodore and Falkner.”
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the influence of Godwin and Wollstonecraft, but focuses more heavily on the way
Shelley’s personal interaction with the law may have shaped her novel.36
For my purposes, the theme of justice in Frankenstein has been examined most
usefully in three studies. The first is Colene Bentley’s “Family, Humanity, Polity:
Theorizing the Basis and Boundaries of Political Community in Frankenstein” (2005).
Bentely’s article is valuable in examining Victor and the creature’s episode on
Montanvert and arguing that “Shelley suggests that societies need to consider themselves
from the perspective outside their closed purviews in order to reflect on matters of
identity and justice” (347). Bentley argues that Frankenstein promotes extending the
notion of community in order to achieve justice, an analysis that is helpful to my
understanding of Shelley’s vision. Despite this consensus, I disagree with her claim that
Shelley goes against Wollstonecraft in arguing for diminished or distanced fellow feeling
in order to achieve justice. Rather, I agree more with Jeanne M. Britton and David
Marshall who offer two readings that consider fellow feeling in Frankenstein from a
context of deeper recognition with another; unlike Bentley, they consider fellow feeling
and its relation to justice in the context of early nineteenth-century conceptions of
sympathy. In this vision of fellow feeling, justice is achieved by seeking to transcend
barriers to perception or understanding.
In “Novelistic Sympathy in Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein” (2009), Britton reads
the novel through Adam Smith’s theory of sympathy.37 Britton argues that Shelley
36

Grossman notes that Mary was writing the novel during the custody proceedings for Percy Bysshe
Shelley’s children and says that the “novel amplifies an ideological, novelistic conception of modern
subjects as necessarily – even in their affective and familial bonds – subject to and produced by the law
courts” (81). Grossman’s study is largely concerned with how the changing nineteenth-century legal
culture – shifting from gallows to trial – motivated a shift in how novels defined themselves thematically
and formally (6).
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sought to overcome visual and auditory barriers to sympathy by dramatizing the
possibility of achieving it through “third-person summary” (22). She says that Shelley
hoped to show that novels, in their third-person form, could allow readers the best means
to experience sympathy for another. My argument is more invested in thinking about
how Shelley imagines realizing justice within the criminal system, and how this vision
extends and develops her parents’ conception of restorative processes; however, Britton
helps to identify Shelley’s concern with the best method to achieve recognition of
another’s experience, which is a central component of the restorative justice process.
Marshall’s consideration of fellow feeling in Frankenstein is part of his larger
study of The Suprising Effects of Sympathy (1998) in late eighteenth- and early
nineteenth-century texts. Like Britton, he reads the novel through Smith’s theory of
sympathy, but places more emphasis on Rousseau’s influence. Moreover, Marshall’s
claim, that “Mary Shelley is working through Godwin’s and Wollstonecraft’s inquiries
into the effects of the failure of sympathy and the recognition of others as fellow
creatures with fellow feelings that sympathy seems to depend on” is most helpful to my
consideration of restorative justice in Frankenstein (202). I will build upon and extend
his analysis of Shelley’s representation of fellow feeling as it was influenced by her
parents and demonstrate how it is critical to their vision of the justice process.
As noted earlier, critical considerations of Falkner have been more limited. None
have considered Shelley’s extension of criminal justice from Godwin and Wollstonecraft
through Frankenstein and Falkner. Despite this dearth, four studies that consider the
political implications of Falkner help to inform my argument. Betty Bennett’s “Mary
37

She draws on Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) “which defines sympathy as an abstract system
of shifts in perspective juxtaposed with sensory, embodied response….the stages of a process by which one
person comes to experience the suffering of another” (3,8).
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Shelley’s Reversioning of Elizabeth, from Frankenstein to Falkner” (2000) focuses
mainly on the evolution of the persona of Elizabeth, but she also briefly points out
Shelley’s desire for reform of the justice system and the ideal of forgiveness as central to
this reform. Julia Saunders’ “Rehabilitating the Family in Mary Shelley’s Falkner”
(2000) argues that Mary Shelley’s last novels maintain the reform agenda of her parents’
generation, but do so less radically via reform of the individual and the family. I hope to
build on her claim that despite this less radical stance, Shelley’s last novel does advocate
for change. Neither of Graham Allen’s “Public and Private Fidelity: Mary Shelley’s
‘Life of William Godwin’ and Falkner” (2000) nor “Falkner, a novel” (2008), look
specifically at justice, but both provide helpful readings of Shelley through Godwin’s
influence.
Finally, I wish to build upon Melissa Sites’ convincing argument in “Utopian
Domesticity as Social Reform in Mary Shelley’s Falkner” (2004). Sites argues that
Shelley complicates essentialist gender readings in the novel; she calls attention to the
way that Shelley ascribes traditionally feminine and masculine virtues to both male and
female characters. As part of this advocacy of feminine qualities, she claims that Shelley
extends Godwin’s vision of justice in Caleb Williams by inserting the character of
Elizabeth to carry forth an ethics of “domestic utopia.” This ethic shares similar traits to
those of restorative justice, as I hope to show, by promoting ideals of sympathy,
compassion, and disinterested duty regardless of blood relations. I will consider how
Shelley suggests that victim, offender, and community can benefit from these ideals
within the criminal justice system.
IX. REPRESENTATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN FRANKENSTEIN
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In order to show that in Frankenstein Shelley follows her parents by critiquing
inequities against disenfranchised individuals in the justice system, I will begin by
examining the coerced confession and wrongful conviction of Justice Morowitz.
As family servant to the Frankenstein family, Justine shares the underprivileged position
represented by other wrongfully accused or unrepresented individuals within the family’s
repertoire. As is the case with Caleb, Emily, the Hawkins, Maria, and Jemima, this
position makes her vulnerable to abuses within the justice system. In Justine’s case,
Shelley represents inequities practiced against disenfranchised individuals in the justice
system in three ways: manipulation of circumstantial evidence, misuse of the accused’s
reaction to condemn or absolve, and coercion of confession. In pointing out these
inequities, Shelley anticipates arguments in favor of granting legal protection to the
accused. Because I believe the family deemed direct participation by victim and accused
to be of critical value to achieving justice, I am not suggesting that Shelley sought to
replace this participation with legal intervention. I am hoping to show that, at the very
least, Shelley draws attention to the problems and power dynamics confronting
marginalized individuals’ testimony in criminal trials. Many of these problems would
also become concerns highlighted by nineteenth-century proponents of legal rights.38
Shelley’s first criticism of the justice process deals with the arbitrary use of
material evidence. Justine is first charged based on material evidence that makes her
appear guilty of killing William, Victor’s younger brother. Like the Hawkins’ storyline
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Beattie states that “The notion that the accused had rights that should be safeguarded emerged perhaps
under the twin stimulation of the day-to-day work of defense lawyers, and the wider English debate about
crime, the criminal law, prosecution procedures, and punishment that emerged in the late eighteenth and
early nineteenth centuries” (248). Beattie notes that among the rights proposed during the Prison Counsel
Act debates was “a form of legal aid: that defendants who could not afford counsel would be provided
one…[but that] That was too astonishing of an act to survive the final act” (251).
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in Caleb Williams, Shelley’s episode demonstrates that logical details and “proof” can be
used to convict a disenfranchised defendant, but that both can be created in order to
construct false narratives. As we have seen, in Godwin’s version, the father and son are
wrongly convicted of Tyrell’s murder, which wealthy and respected Falkland actually
commits. They are convicted based on the certainty of “accumulated evidence” against
them, including clothes, a knife handle, and the alleged sighting of the men on the night
of the murder.
In Shelley’s version, a similar result occurs in the case of Justine’s framing. The
creature describes the way he composes the false narrative: “I perceived a woman passing
near me…I approached her unperceived, and placed the portrait securely in one of the
folds of her dress” (97). The creature’s “mischief” produces evidence that Justine’s
judges, and even Victor’s family, believes. Victor’s brother describes the first reason
people suppose Justine committed the crime: “several circumstances came out, that have
almost forced conviction upon us” (50). Like the spectators of the Hawkins’ set-up who
are swayed by the material evidence against them, people are willing to believe Justine
murdered William because she’s found with the miniature of Victor’s mother. Beth
Newman offers the following explanation: “the evidence that links Justine to the murder
is circumstantial, which means that it assumes a narrative form: a series of apparently
related events is distributed into a pattern of cause and effect, and so into a single,
coherent plot; this plot being narratable, is plausible, and being plausible begins to seem
true” (173). Just as with the Hawkins’, Justine’s guilt is practically confirmed because the
story makes sense and, according to some, the evidence incriminating her is both
“glaring” and “decisive” (55).
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In Justine’s and the Hawkins’s wrongly presumed guilt, Godwin and Shelley
reflect the “conflicting views of the criminal trial that had been emerging over the past
half century” (Beattie 252). These conflicting views stemmed from a growing skepticism
toward trial practice that used the plausible ordering of a narrative’s events supported by
“proof” to determine the truth of a crime.39 Shelley’s and Godwin’s depiction of this
method’s failure anticipates the arguments laid out in the legislative debates of the 1820s
and 30s regarding legal advocacy, whose proponents argued that “the ‘facts’ of a case
arose from circumstantial evidence [and] [i]n setting out this evidence, prosecuting
counsel inevitably drew inferences from it and…proved the guilt of the accused” (Beattie
255). Godwin’s representation of the Hawkins and Shelley’s representation of Justine
indicate that they were aware of the manner in which testimony could be manipulated,
putting unprotected defendants at a disadvantage.40
Aside from the system’s manipulation of circumstantial evidence, Shelley
suggests that determining guilt based on the defendant’s behavior following an
accusation can also be a problematic, and potentially abusive, method for arriving at
conviction. Disproving the theory that an individual’s honest reaction could help prove
her innocent of the crime, Shelley emphasizes how Justine’s accusers use her sincere
surprise as a reason to condemn her. Earnest tells Victor that, aside from the picture, “her
own behavior has been so confused, as to add to the evidence of facts a weight that, I
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As mentioned previously, for extended studies of circumstantial evidence and direct testimony in
eighteenth- and nineteenth-century literature see Alexander Welsh, Strong Representations (1992), and Jan
Melissa Schramm, Testimony and Advocacy in Victorian Law, Literature, and Technology (2000).
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As noted in Chapter One, while Alexander Welsh’s Strong Representations (1992) argues that literary
texts, like Fielding’s Tom Jones, favored circumstantial evidence as being more accurate and certain (“the
evidence that holds up in Tom Jones is nearly all indirect and the evidence that misleads is mostly direct”
57), Godwin’s and Shelley’s main point seems to be that both direct and indirect testimony are subject to
manipulation given the status of those on trial.
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fear, leaves no hope for doubt” and, again, “the poor girl confirmed the suspicion in a
great measure, by her extreme confusion of manner” (50). Justine’s authentic
astonishment fuels suspicion and her simple, unrehearsed defense – “I rest my innocence
on a plain and simple explanation of the facts which have been adduced against me; and I
hope the character I have always borne will incline my judges to a favourable
interpretation” – does nothing to exonerate her (53). Shelley suggests conviction or
acquittal depend more on the class status of a defendant than the legitimacy of her
reaction; Justine’s honest response to the evidence against her is futile in exonerating her
within an inequitable system seeking retribution.
By proving the “simple and innocent” defense theory false, Shelley again
anticipates the legal rights debate. Opponents of legal advocacy used the “simple and
innocent” theory to fuel the belief that no legal protection was necessary. Beattie
explains that dating back to the early eighteenth century, individuals opposed to legal
protection argued that “the innocence or guilt of accused felons was made abundantly
clear by their natural responses to evidence as they heard it for the first time” (223).41
Shelley counters this belief by showing that the theory fails; Justine is innocent and she
reacts sincerely – nevertheless, her reaction is used against her.
Shelley underscores the inequity and arbitrary nature of the system later in the
novel when the accusation against Victor comes to a completely different conclusion than
Justine’s. Like Justine, Victor is innocent of Clerval’s murder; nevertheless, the
circumstances against him are similar. Witness testimony and material evidence against
him is substantial. He is found the morning after the murder with no alibi. A half dozen
41

Beattie refers to William Hawkins A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown (1716-21). Langbein also notes
that “Into the eighteenth century it was confidently asserted that…If falsely charged, the accused would
clear himself through ‘the Simplicity and Innocence’ of his responses” (3).
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men come forward as witnesses against him, including one who places him and his boat
at the scene of the crime (121). Like Justine, Victor’s reaction is closely monitored for
signs of his guilt; his response to the accusation and evidence appears criminal to anyone
with “common sense.” For example, when he first sees Clerval’s body, he actually
appears to confess to the crime; draping himself over the corpse he says, “Have my
murderous machinations deprived you also, my dearest Henry, of life? Two have I
already destroyed; other victims await their destiny” (122). In what appears to be a guilty
stupor, he calls himself “the murderer of William, Justine, and of Clerval” (122). Despite
all of these elements working against him, Victor is exonerated based on “its being
proved that [he] was on the Orkeny Islands at the hour” of the murder – an interesting
piece of evidence since he was alone, dismembering the body of the female creature in
secret, at the time of the crime (126). Shelley hints at an equal pretrial detention since
Victor is incarcerated for three months prior to the assizes, but even in this regard she
indicates that he seems to be favored. The magistrate secures for him “the best room in
the prison,” writes to Victor’s father for his support, and assures him that, despite
everything against him “doubtless, evidence can easily be brought to free you from the
criminal charge” (124). In this blatant display of double standards, Shelley emphasizes
the disparities of the justice system based on a defendant’s gender and class. She echoes
Godwin’s depiction of Falkner’s effortless exoneration for murdering Tyrell, and she
builds on Wollstonecraft’s critique of legal disadvantages practiced against Maria and
Jemima.
While Shelley shows skepticism towards legal procedures that can be manipulated
in order to convict a vulnerable defendant, she goes further than Godwin in representing
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how a justice system that demands closure can contribute to coercing confessions for the
sake of certainty. Shelley suggests the appeal of confessions when an official of the court
tells Victor that Justine had confessed and he is “glad of it” because “none of our judges
like to condemn a criminal upon circumstantial evidence, be it ever so decisive” (55).
Shelley implies that the system seeks a confession, beyond material evidence, because it
assures legitimacy and authority. However, she also suggests that the desire for this
legitimacy leads to abuse; in order to obtain the finality and authenticity her confession
provides their system, Justine tells Elizabeth officials “crush[ed],” “besieged,”
“threatened,” and “menaced her,” until she gave in (56). The coercion of Justine’s
confession underscores the power relations that threaten truth and equity in the criminal
justice system.
Beyond these critiques, Shelley draws attention to the disturbing ways in which
individual motivations can influence testimony; she shows how Justine makes a false
confession not only because she is coerced, but also out of a desire to be loved, accepted,
and forgiven. For example, Justine explains to Elizabeth why she professes her guilt: “I
confessed, that I might obtain absolution…I almost began to think that I was the monster
that he said I was” (56). Justine’s statements here reveal, first, that she confesses due to
her desire for absolution – to be forgiven. Her following statement that she, herself, has
been temporarily convinced of the false narrative and now fears she may be perceived as
a monster, hints at her second motivation. She next tells Elizabeth, “He threatened
excommunication and hell fire in my last moments…I had none to support me; all looked
on me as a wretch doomed to ignominy and perdition” (56). Justine confesses not only
for religious absolution, but because she fears dying as an outcast, abhorrent, or a
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“monster.” Her desire to be accepted and loved by “all,” contributes to her false
confession.
Peter Brooks describes the way these motivations can impact admissions of guilt:
“confession as a plea for love redirects us to the status and nature of the truth involved in
confessions – not only those that are compelled by interrogation or required by religious
belief but those that are apparently freely offered” (46). Compelled to confess in her
desperation to be loved and accepted, Justine is momentarily willing to confess to
anything. As a result, she makes a confession that is a plea for approval, rather than a
statement of truth. By depicting the complicated motivations behind Justine’s act, Shelley
casts serious doubt about this act’s ability to guarantee truth in a trial setting. She asks us
to be mindful of the power dynamics surrounding a confession’s transmission and
consider the motivation and vulnerability of the confessant. In particular, she cautions
against using confessions to acquit or condemn – especially if conviction is followed by
high stakes retributive consequences like Justine’s execution.
X. RECOGNIZING THE OFFENDER IN FRANKENSTEIN
Yet if Shelley casts doubt about testimony’s ability to guarantee truth –
particularly when it’s linked to retributive outcomes – she does not dismiss testimony’s
value outright. By including the victim’s (Victor’s) and the offender’s (the creature’s)
first-person testimony, Shelley’s narrative form underscores her parents’ belief in
restorative justice in three ways. First, by encompassing the narratives of Walton, Victor,
and the creature, the novel’s frame structure attempts to achieve the restorative possibility
of involving victim, accused, and even community (Walton) in the justice process.
Second, despite acknowledging this value, her form dramatizes the limited space
available for testimony of disenfranchised individuals. She highlights the depravity of the
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creature’s marginalization by positioning his account within the frame of both Victor’s
and Walton’s narratives; her form reproduces the way the creature’s disenfranchised
voice is subsumed by those with more social status. She further underscores the limits of
institutional space afforded to marginalized individuals in the same way that
Wollstonecraft does in Maria. Just as Wollstonecraft depicts these limits by relegating
Jemima’s testimony to the private tribunal of Maria and Darnford, Shelley depicts the
creature’s only opportunity to be heard within an informal setting composed of a single
witness. As her parents do, Shelley tries to compensate for these limits by giving the
creature space to speak; just as Godwin allows Caleb first-person ownership of his
experiences, and Wollstonecraft permits Jemima to narrate, Shelley, too, grants the
creature his own voice in Volume II. Third, and perhaps most importantly, Shelley’s
narrative form also follows and extends values espoused by her parents’ notion of the
justice process because she highlights the significance of the offender’s account.
Whereas Caleb Williams gives voice to a falsely accused individual, and Maria gives
voice to a victim, Frankenstein gives voice to a perpetrator.
The testimonies of each marginalized individual in the family’s repertoire suggest
different reasons for greater inclusion. Godwin shows through Caleb’s testimony that
silencing the disenfranchised within the criminal justice system limits the community
from full knowledge of events and leads to inequities. Wollstonecraft shows through
Jemima’s testimony that this silence prevents certain crimes from ever being
acknowledged at all. In Frankenstein, Shelley emphasizes through the creature’s
testimony that silence can reduce the community’s ability to understand and remedy what
factors lead to crime. Percy Shelley’s review of the novel, published posthumously,
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articulates this evolution of crime: “Treat a person ill, and he will become
wicked…divide him, a social being, from society, and you impose on him the irresistible
obligations – malevolence and selfishness” (186). The creature’s testimony exposes
institutional and parental factors that may lead to criminal behavior.
When the monster narrates the chronology of his abandonment by Victor and his
abhorrence by the community – he is not only rejected and ridiculed, but actually shot at
– his testimony identifies his transition from benevolent creature, to victim, to criminal.
Godobo-Madikezela explains one position regarding the nature and evolution of violence,
which is similar to that which unfolds in the novel; she says,
certain individuals are predisposed toward becoming evil as a result of early
childhood experiences of violence that made them suffer shame and humiliation,
leaving them with unresolved anger. According to this view, the dynamics of evil
that evolve from childhood psychological history often explain the roots of
revenge, where anger and hatred resulting from the trauma suffered in the past are
carried inside until the feelings of aggression can be enacted toward another in
what becomes the individual’s moment to reclaim the ‘honor’ lost during the
shaming experience. (55)
The creature’s abandonment by Victor and his mistreatment by every community
member he confronts lead to his harmful acts. Anne Mellor points to the scene of the
creature’s first murder as a depiction of the “abused child” paradigm (11), and certainly,
the creature’s shame in his repulsed attempt to gain affection ultimately explodes in his
first heinous act.
Shelley suggests that understanding what leads to criminal behavior is a benefit of
making space for defendant testimony, but she also suggests that it may be the very
absence of this space that further contributes to criminal behavior. For example,
Katherine Hill-Miller points us to the moment in which the creature is denied a witness as
the moment in which he determines to seek revenge. Referring to the moment when De
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Lacy terminates his dialogue with the creature, she explains: “De Lacey’s refusal to
provide the creature human sympathy touches off the chain of violence and vengeance
that eventually destroys both the ‘monster’ and the original rejecting father, Frankenstein
himself” (72). While Hill-Miller’s argument concentrates primarily on the issue of the
father, I would argue that De Lacey’s refusal also represents the refusal of the community
to listen to, and recognize, the creature. This refusal echoes the invisibility and silencing
that both Caleb and Jemima experience as marginalized individuals, but here Shelley
emphasizes the destructive consequences this silencing can have for one already
criminally disposed.
After the creature tells De Lacey that he was afraid he wouldn’t hear his story, De
Lacey says “Heaven forbid! even if you were really criminal; for that can only drive you
to desperation, and not instigate you to virtue ”(91). Shelley returns to her parents’ belief
in the critical significance of making space to listen to, and thereby recognize, individuals
who are marginalized and disenfranchised from criminal and social systems. Testimony
by perpetrators can help identify causes contributing to their crimes, but it can also help
to prevent them in the future. It isn’t only in this instance, before the monster’s first
offense, that he is refused; again and again, even after he commits murder, his
community refuses to hear him. This refusal leads to greater and greater consequences
for individual and community.
XI. POSSIBILITIES AND FAILURES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN FRANKENSTEIN
Although Shelley underscores the devastating effects of marginalizing and
silencing an individual already potentially vulnerable to committing criminal acts, her
novel also suggests ways to reduce crime, repair harm, and reconcile victim and criminal.
She signals the possibility of restorative justice in two ways. First, early in the novel, she
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depicts a reparative, engaged model of criminal reform reflective of her parents’ version
of justice. The creature tells Victor that he steals from the De Laceys for subsistence in
order to survive initially. However, when he witnesses the harm his actions cause the
family, and their kindness towards each other, he stops. He explains that, “They often, I
believe, suffered the pangs of hunger very poignantly, especially the two younger
cottagers; for several times they placed food before the old man, when they reserved none
for themselves. This trait of kindness moved me sensibly…when I found that in
[stealing] I inflicted pain on the cottagers, I abstained” (74). By changing his behavior
because he understands the suffering it causes, rather than because he is punished or
forced to do so, the creature reflects the non-retributive, non-coercive values of Godwin’s
vision. By gaining this understanding in a hands-on, experiential manner, rather than
learning by discipline or fear, the creature reflects the pedagogical method favored in
Wollstonecraft’s vision.
In the creature’s reform, Shelley adds the additional, restorative aspect of
reparation to her parents’ vision. Not only does the creature stop committing the crime,
and gain an understanding of its harms, he begins to actually help them and contribute to
their community; he explains how after he gathers firewood for the family “I observed,
with pleasure, that he did not go to the forest that day, but spent it in repairing the
cottage, and cultivating the garden” (74). When the creature recognizes the suffering his
crimes have caused, he tries to make up for it by giving back and seeking to mend it. His
new behavior actually adds to the well-being of the community. But if Shelley borrows
and builds on the restorative ideals of her parents in depicting the way the creature repairs
his harms, she also shows the repercussions of not creating conditions for this system.
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Later, when the family marginalizes and repels the creature, he not only returns to
criminal behavior but his crimes become infinitely worse.
Second, in the creature’s confrontation with Victor at Montevert, Shelley gestures
toward the sort of restorative justice process her father had imagined: victim and offender
engage in dialogue about the wrong committed in order to understand its effect and seek
to repair its resulting harm. The creature’s repeated pleas to be heard accentuate this
critical step in achieving recognition and justice. He tells Victor, “I entreat you to hear
me” (66) and “Listen to my tale: when you have heard that, abandon or commiserate me,
as you shall judge what I deserve. But hear me. The guilty are allowed, by human laws,
bloody as they may be, to speak in their own defense before they are condemned. Listen
to me, Frankenstein…listen to me” (67). Though both Jemima and Caleb express this
same need to be heard, this plea by the disenfranchised takes on greater urgency and it is
attached to greater consequences in Shelley’s novel; when the creature is not heard, he
acts out with radical violence against innocent individuals. Victor, at first, considers him
with anger and vengeance, denying him this dignity and articulating the very problem
that seems to have been an impetus for the creature’s crimes in the first place. He tells
the creature, “I will not hear you. There can be no community between you and me”
(66). But Shelley underscores the testimonial aspect of restorative justice again, when
the creature repeats: “Still thou canst listen to me…I demand this from you. Hear my
tale; it is long and strange” (67).
When Victor explains his rationale for finally bearing witness to the creature’s
story, he reflects many of the reasons participants in contemporary restorative justice
processes consent. He explains: “[I] determined at least to listen to his tale. I was partly
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urged by curiosity, and compassion confirmed my resolution. I had hitherto supposed
him to be the murderer of my brother, and I eagerly sought a confirmation or denial of his
opinion...I thought I might render him happy before I complained of his wickedness”
(67). While many contemporary victims consent to the process because they feel
removed from their perpetrator and frustrated by their alienation within current justice
processes, the fundamental motivations are similar. The shared motivations support the
need to create a space for such a process if possible – the need to know why, as well as
the desire for closure, and even a latent compassion rooted in the possibility that the
criminal’s actions may change and his life may be improved by realizing that victims,
too, are more than objects (“Restorative Justice: Victim Empowerment”). When the
creature’s tale is finished, restoration at first seems possible. Victor describes that “His
words had a strange effect upon me. I compassioned him, and sometimes felt a wish to
console him” (99). Victim and offender even arrive at an agreement that seems to resolve
the conflict peacefully. But restoration cannot hold; as Shelley shows, the process fails to
achieve the sympathy, benevolence, and compassion at the heart of restorative processes.
In the breakdown of the process, Shelley implies that restorative justice can fail in
several regards; in order for the process to succeed, a delicate balance needs to be
achieved on the part of the victim, offender, and community. First, the accused needs to
take responsibility for his actions. This responsibility goes beyond merely retracing or
exposing the crime – as the creature does during his testimony. It involves recognizing
the harm done to the victim and feeling some level of remorse for the offense. After
Victor has died, the creature tells Walton: “do you think that I was then dead to agony
and remorse? – He…[Victor] suffered not more in the consummation of the deed; -- oh!
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not the ten-thousandth portion of the anguish that was mine during the lingering detail of
its execution” (153). Even after Victor has died, and the creature has killed William,
Clerval, and Elizabeth, the creature’s pity for his own suffering continues to eclipse any
that he may have caused his victims.
The creature’s suffering is grave, and Shelley vividly and sympathetically
conveys the wrongs perpetrated against him. Nevertheless, his inability to acknowledge
the harms he has caused Victor makes restoration or forgiveness impossible. In the
context of a restorative process, even considering the creature as representative of a
disenfranchised individual denied dignity and, in many ways, fundamental rights, these
factors do not dismiss the need for him to acknowledge the harm he has caused his
victim. Desmond Tuto explains, “A gross violation is a gross violation whoever commits
it and for whatever motive” (107). The creature killed a child, a woman, and an innocent
civilian. Shelley may provoke sympathy for the creature by rightfully pointing out the
abuses that contribute to his actions, but in suggesting that he fails to take responsibility
or recognize Victor’s humanity, she provides one reason the restorative process fails.
Second, in addition to this failure, Victor also falls short. Shelley suggests that
Victor contributes to the process’s failure primarily because he refuses to recognize the
offender’s humanity. Critics, such as David Marshall, have identified Victor’s failure as
a failure of sympathy: “the failure to recognize others as fellow creatures” (213).
Marshall explains that this failure echoes the concerns of both Godwin and
Wollstonecraft. He reminds us of Caleb as “a being who is denied fellow feeling and cut
off from the human species” and Jemima as “an orphan or outcast who is denied fellow
feeling and sympathy” (Marshall 201) – not only because of her class but also her gender.
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What Marshall, and others, identify as fellow feeling is deeply rooted in early nineteenthcentury notions of sympathy. But a similar notion is also at the heart of the most famous
example of contemporary restorative justice practice, South Africa’s Truth and
Reconciliation Commission, and its ethics informs the process in other venues as well.
Desmond Tuto describes the African ethic of ubuntu:
Ubuntu is very difficult to render into Western language. It speaks of the very
essence of being human. When we want to give high praise to someone we say, ‘Yu,
u nobuntu’; ‘Hey, so-and-so has ubuntu.’…It is to say, ‘My humanity is caught up, is
inextricably bound up, in yours.’ We belong in a bundle of life. We say ‘A person is
a person through other persons.’ (31)
This notion of connectedness and recognition is critical to the process of justice espoused
by Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Shelley. These qualities of acknowledgment, duty, and
compassion link their nineteenth-century ideas of sympathy to Tutu’s twenty-first century
notion of ubuntu because they are crucial to achieving justice in both. Further, in
Victor’s failure to see his resemblance to the monster, or see him as a fellow creature,
Shelley suggests injustice can be maintained on several levels.
Victor’s inability to recognize the creature makes him ignorant of his own
privilege, or the ways this privilege has helped maintain the creature’s oppression. His
denial of his duty to the creature makes Victor partially accountable for creating the
misery that spurns the creature’s violence. His refusal to acknowledge the creature’s
experiences makes Victor responsible for suppressing abuses that may have been
resolved, and which, unresolved, contribute to crimes that make the creature a monster.
In these failures, Marshall says, Victor becomes “in fact a being like his creature” (208).
For if a human is a human through other people, as Desomnd Tuto expresses, then “to
dehumanize another inexorably means that one is dehumanized as well” (35). Shelley
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demonstrates that to consider criminals monsters, or not to consider them at all, is to
detract from our own humanity. Finally, Victor maintains injustice because by seeing the
creature as nothing more than a monster, he allows the creature to abscond from
responsibility. Godobo- Madikizela explains that,
…recognizing the most serious criminals as human intensifies it, because society is
thereby able to hold them to greater moral accountability. Indeed, demonizing as
monsters those who commit evil lets them off too easily…[dialogue] invites him, if
he can, if he dare, to negotiate the chasm between his monstrousness and the world of
the forgiven. It thus encourages him to stop denying the suspected truth: that all
along, he knew that he was human and knew right from wrong. The act of
humanizing is therefore at once both punishment and rehabilitation. (120)
Shelley, too, suggests that by dismissing the creature’s actions as those of a monster,
Victor in turn allows him to duck responsibility or avoid acknowledging that what he did
was wrong. He fuels the creature’s behavior by not holding him to the same standard of
moral accountability.
The testimony and dialogue that Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Shelley suggest is
imperative to achieving restorative justice can only succeed if victim and offender
recognize each other as fellow creatures. Shelley suggests, too, that recognition by the
community can help compensate when it fails on other levels; had De Lacey or his
family, the villagers, Walton, or the criminal justice system acknowledged and heard the
creature earlier, perhaps this level of injustice may have been prevented. Graham Allen
notes that sympathy is achieved within families in the novel (Mary Shelley 25), but
Shelley underscores the need for fellow feeling beyond these tightly packed domestic
structures. Her novel urges readers to see beyond their own prejudices and recognize the
humanity in even the most monstrous of criminals.
XII. REPRESENTATIONS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN FALKNER
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In her last novel Shelley returns to the issue of restorative justice. As
Frankenstein does, Falkner draws attention to its criminal protagonist and raises issues of
offender accountability and forgiveness. Bennett claims that, “the most dramatic direct
comparison – and variance – between Frankenstein and Falkner contrasts the systems of
justice in both novels” (12). Despite this assertion, no scholar has critically considered
this issue – even Bennett limits her discussion of justice to two pages and focuses instead
on the evolution of Elizabeth. One reason for this critical dearth is the relative obscurity
of Falkner. Graham Allen reports that “There is still no readily available paperback
edition, no scholarly edition along the lines of the Broadview Press editions of
Frankenstein, Valperga, The Last Man and Lodore, and the reader will find very few
discussions of the novel in the numerous collections of essays, journal articles and indeed
critical monographs on Shelley’s work published over the last thirty years or so” (Mary
Shelley 161). Falkner is worth considering because it extends and adds to the family’s
conception of restorative justice. Since the novel is less widely read, this brief plot
summary provides useful context.
In Falkner Shelley tells the story of a man who commits a crime of passion.
Falkner kidnaps the woman he loves, Alithea Neville, because he believes she is trapped
in an unhappy marriage. Almost immediately after he abducts her, he vows to return her
to her family. Before he can do so, Alithea drowns attempting to escape and return to her
children. Falkner and his accomplice, Osborne, bury her in an unmarked grave, and he
flees the scene intending to commit suicide. Just as he is about to pull the trigger,
Elizabeth Raby – a young orphan – prevents him. He determines to adopt her and
compensate for his crime but keep his guilty secret. The two flee England and travel the
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continent. Meanwhile, Alithea Neville’s jealous husband and her son’s father, Boyvill, is
convinced she has run away with another man. After some time spent looking for, he
applies for, and is granted, a divorce – assuring that Alithea’s name will forever be
tainted with disgrace. About ten years later, when Elizabeth is around sixteen, she and
her “father” Falkner happen upon Gerard Neville, Alithea’s teenaged son, for the second
time. (The first time, Falkner feels so guilty he decides to enlist as a soldier in the Greek
war of independence and seek his own death. He survives.) When they meet Gerard as
an adult, he is roaming the world looking for answers to his mother’s disappearance and
trying to redeem her honor – still holding out hope that she might be alive. Guilt and
remorse finally induce Falkner to admit to his offense. In a long narrative, written in the
first person, Falkner describes the circumstances of his upbringing and confesses to the
crime. Garver’s father, Boyvill, pursues prosecution for murder. Throughout the legal
process, Elizabeth stands by Falkner. She forgives him completely and sees Alithea’s
death as an accident rather than a murder. Gerard falls in love with Elizabeth, believes
the truth of Falkner’s account, and testifies in his favor during the trial. Boyville repents
his revenge of Falkner on his deathbed, and wishes to recant his accusation of murder.
Falkner is acquitted of murder, after a just criminal trial, and Elizabeth, Falkner, and
Gerard reconcile, forgive, and seek to live together.
As may already be apparent, twenty years removed from her first novel and
amidst the legislative reforms of the 1830s, Shelley’s critique of the justice system is
much less scathing than those in Caleb, Maria, or Frankenstein. Her most severely
disenfranchised character is Alithea, the wife of the aristocratic Boyvill. Alithea’s
marginalized status has less to do with her social status, as was the case for Caleb,
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Jemima, and the creature. Alithea instead is marginalized because of her gender. Shelley
suggests this inequity in the divorce proceedings held after Alithea’s disappearance.
Waged by her husband, a vengeful character who believes himself betrayed, the narrator
describes that “he might view his injuries with the eye of passion, and other, more
disinterested, might pronounce that she was unfortunate, but not guilty” (111). In spite of
this potentially hopeful characterization of the judicial process, Shelley shows again that
gender coupled with a believable narrative can be damaging. The judicial inquiry
rewards Boyvill a divorce, in effect criminalizing the victim and propagating a false story
that damages Alithea’s honor.
Despite this critique, Shelley revisits the tension between the traditional justice
system and the pre-modern, extralegal chivalrous system in a noticeably more balanced
manner than her father. On the one hand, she maintains that the traditional criminal
justice process is flawed. Generally, by association with Boyvill, she automatically
seems to detract from its positive potential; Boyvill’s use of the law is repeatedly
characterized, by himself as well as Elizabeth and Neville, as motivated by revenge and a
desire to inflict ignominy (30, 216, 236, 237, 257). She also maintains the critiques
implied in her parents’ novels relating to retributive systems – they don’t deter, they
don’t provide an atmosphere that encourages truth, and they don’t rehabilitate. More
particularly, she criticizes the legal practice of the “felony-murder” code.42 Shelley
seems to be arguing against this sort of an offense as a strict liability crime – that is, a
crime in which the defendant is guilty regardless of intent or harm. She depicts Alithea’s
death as an unintended consequence of Falkland’s actions. Rather than arguing that such
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an offense should be retributively punished as a murder, in order to deter future crimes
from occurring, she seems to emphasize its accidental nature and focus more on the best
means to repair harm once it has occurred.43
Shelley also suggests drawbacks to the traditional legal system, via Gerard
Neville, one of the novel’s most sympathetic characters. This critique deals with the
system’s appropriation of justice from the victim’s control. Neville says, “[the] crime
ought to receive its punishment from his own conscience, and at the hands of the husband
or son of the victim in the field” (261). He again emphasizes, “I am tied, forced to
inaction – the privilege of free action taken from me” (222). As opposed to the modern
legal trial, Neville frequently represents the duel as a chivalrous, honorable means to
avenge his mother’s death, which allows the victim’s family to take part in, and control,
the justice process. Julia Saunders explains that “in contrast to the disapproving
description of the ‘bourgeois’ criminal justice route chosen by Boyvill to prosecute his
wife’s destroyer, Gerard’s desire to meet Falkner ‘honourably’ in a duel is treated
sympathetically, almost with approval” (219).
I agree with Saunders’ claim. I also acknowledge Simpson’s historical account of
the resurgence of dueling during the early nineteenth century as a means for middle class
individuals to align with the aristocratic class.44 However, a more careful look at
Shelley’s representation of justice models suggests a closer alignment with Godwin’s
43
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negative perspective on dueling, as discussed in Chapter One. Like Godwin, Shelley
implies that duels are also vengeful, unmerciful, and, in their violence and suppression of
truth, fail to repair harm; Boyvill tells his son “[Falkland] will…refuse to meet you, or,
meeting you, will refuse to fire; and either it will end in a farce for the amusement of the
world, or you will shoot a defenseless man. I do not see the mercy of this proceeding”
(217). Shelley also reminds us of a duel’s certain violent outcome – and the futility of
justice they achieve – when Gerard thinks of how Elizabeth will suffer, no matter who
dies and when Boyvill tells Gerard “nor do I wish him to add the death of my only son, to
the list of injuries I have sustained” (217). Shelley underscores, as Godwin had, how
dueling does little to achieve justice or expose truth, but rather contributes to greater
harms for individual and community.
Although Shelley represents a rather ambiguous picture of both systems, she
ultimately favors the criminal justice system and suggests that, despite its flaws, it has
made strides. For example, in previous novels by the family, the justice system is almost
solely depicted as a corrupt tool of the aristocracy. While Shelley links legal prosecution
with Boyvill, the narrator also tells us that Elizabeth Raby’s biological father, a noble
character, is “called to the bar” (10). Their family lives in relative poverty near the law
courts in London until he eventually dies from consumption. This more humble,
humanized representation of the legal profession is not limited to Raby. Lawyers for
both the prosecution and the defense appear as customary, neutral figures. In fact “the
barrister who conducted the prosecution, narrated the facts rather as a mystery to be
inquired into, than a crime to be detected” – a marked difference from a manipulator of
circumstantial evidence as seen in Caleb and Frankenstein (286). The magistrates are
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justice driven, rather than merely seeking closure, since “the judges…at once admit[ted]
the necessity of waiting for so material a witness” (247). Shelley even underscores the
humanity of the jurors; Falkland describes that “All we have to do, is prove this in a sort
of technical and legal manner; and yet hardly that – for we are not to address the deaf ear
of law, but the common sense of twelve men, who will not be slow, [he] felt assured, in
recognizing the truth” (253). Shelley stresses the human control of the courts when
Falkland shifts from thinking in “technical” terms, to focusing on men. She suggests his
confidence when he expresses belief in their ability to discern the truth.
Aside from the legal agents, Shelley presents the trial process as relatively fair.
For example, Boyvill describes the prosecution process as a procedure of checks and
balances: “The truth will be sifted by three juries; this is no hole-and-corner vengeance;
….We shall not lie, nor pervert facts; we tell who it was revealed to us our mother’s
unknown grave; it rests with them to decide whether he, who by his own avowal placed
her therein, has not the crime of murder on his soul” (218). Aside from Boyvill, Neville
describes the community’s belief in the legal process: “all assert that the approaching trial
alone can establish the truth” (259). Shelley also depicts the perpetrator, Falkner, assured
that “he asked for justice, and he did not for a moment doubt that it would be rendered to
him” (287). When the jury arrives at an acquittal after few moments of deliberation,
Shelley suggests that the trial procedures ran smoothly and arrived at just outcomes. She
represents the prison somewhat favorably, since although Falkner hates being confined,
he is “in the best rooms that could be allotted to him, consistently with safe
imprisonment, and with such comforts around, as money might obtain” (241). She even
depicts the turnkey as sympathetic; the guard “looked on Elizabeth as an angel, and
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Falkner as a demi-god” (287). All in all, a very, very far cry from the sentiments and
conditions, regarding the justice system, conveyed in her parents’ texts as well as her own
earlier novel.
Bennett and Saunders help explain this shift. Noting the less fantastical nature of
the novel – as opposed to Frankenstein’s setting, plot, and characters – Saunders says that
“her last two novels represent a reconciliation of progressive ideas with the
possible…[they] continue to debate on a more humble scale, grasping from the jaws of
defeat small victories for radical ideas” (222) Saunders helps expose how Shelley’s novel
is still reformist, then, but more gradual and pragmatic. Bennett describes one reason
why this shift may have occurred. She explains “Falkner, recontextualized her
philosophy to reach an increasingly middle-class and materialist Victorian society, one
that had largely turned away from Romantic radical politics” (2). What neither Bennett
nor Saunders mention, however, is the possibility that the radical politics of Shelley’s
parents era had materialized in gradual legislative reforms, particularly during the 1830s.
Perhaps Shelley’s less scathing critique reflects optimism brought on by small steps
toward practical change.
XIII. RECOGNIZING THE OFFENDER IN FALKNER
In any case, perhaps as a result of this less severe critique, her novel places less
responsibility for the offense on social institutions and more responsibility on the
offender. Unlike Frankenstein, or other popular crime novels of this later era, there is
little attempt to justify or condone the perpetrator’s crime. Godwin’s later novel, for
example, Deloraine, follows this paradigm. Chatterjee explains how Deloraine never
fully takes responsibility, but rather seeks to justify his offense; she says “By novel’s end,
Deloriane’s tale is less a confession or a cautionary tale than a justification of his own
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crime” (31). This move to provoke sympathy for the criminal stemmed from the trend
begun in Caleb and modified in Frankenstein of holding institutions largely accountable
for crimes. For example, Pykett describes that Edward Bulwer’s famous Newgate novel,
Paul Clifford, “seeks to challenge its readers’ assumptions about the nature and causes of
crime and their prescriptions for punishment by demonstrating that the legal and penal
systems of Clifford’s day were oppressive, corrupt, inhumane and ineffective” (22). Part
of the way in which novelists accomplish these goals in the Newgate novels is by
suggesting that, due to such oppression, criminal behavior may be rational, excusable,
and thereby, somewhat exculpatory. Pykett explains that this trend went so far that by
the time Bulwer published Eugene Aram, who justifies his murder completely, critics of
the genre were complaining that the novelists “romanticized and glamorized
crime…[and] invited sympathy with criminals rather than with the victims of crime”
(20).
Shelley’s last novel intervenes in the literary representation of criminality as it has
evolved by the time of the Newgate novels.45 Like these popular novels, Frankenstein
and Falkner generate sympathy for offenders. However, unlike the Newgate novels,
Shelley draws attention to the criminal within a larger context of restorative justice
consistent with her parents’ concerns; rather than overlooking the victim at the expense
of the offender, Shelley’s last novel considers them both. She depicts the manner in
which Alithea continues to suffer after her death by the desecration of her reputation. She
suggests how Boyvill’s irresolution turns him into an even more bitter and spiteful man.
Perhaps most importantly, she shows how Alithea’s son Neville continues to wrestle with
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his mother’s mysterious loss and the grave pain and suffering the crime has caused him.
Beyond this attention to the victims, Shelley’s novel also begins to move away from the
trend of primarily blaming systemic abuses and looks more deeply at the restorative
effect of offender accountability.
In keeping with the more evenhanded tone of the novel, Falkner does not dismiss
circumstances that may contribute to crime. Like Frankenstein, Falkner’s first-person
testimony draws attention to certain aspects of the offender’s development that might
predispose him towards criminal behavior. He recounts his unmothered youth and his
abusive, alcoholic father who drinks himself to death. He describes how his next parental
figure, his uncle, treats him with no compassion, how his school master is punitive and
cruel, and how the boys with whom he boards taunt him and even try to kill his few
companions – a little family of mice. He almost seems to echo the creature when he
describes “No eye of love ever turned on me, no voice ever spoke a cheering word”
(158). Bunnell explains how, likewise, these social factors contribute to Falkner’s crime:
“While undeniably to blame for Alithea’s death, Falkner is indeed a victim of social
inequalities and customs” (284). Indeed, Shelley represents how Falker’s birth order in
the family places him in an unfair position in regards to inheriting wealth. She also
suggests that some of his destructive ideas about masculinity and control stem from his
family’s wealth and chivalrous mentality (Saunders 217). Despite these less than
desirable parental and institutional influences, Shelley also implies that Falkner is given a
chance to become benevolent.
Unlike Caleb, Jemima, or the creature, who have almost no opportunity to
overcome their social abuses, Shelley portrays a less oppressive situation in Falkner. In
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doing so, she seems to imply that some offenders have a chance to overcome
circumstances that may contribute to criminal behavior. For example, when Falkner’s
uncle sends him to live with Mrs. Rivers and her daughter Alithea – friends of the family
– Falkner describes how he is loved, accepted, and valued. He learns compassion,
benevolence, and forgiveness, and these qualities are practiced towards him. When he
gets into trouble at school, or almost finds himself in a worse predicament because he
hurts a man trying to prevent him from harming his mice, Mrs. Rivers and Alithea
forgive him. They condemn his behavior, but they treat him with affection and concern.
Despite this opportunity to adopt the patient, kind attitude he learns from the Rivers,
Shelley suggests that Falkner maintains his destructive, passionate temper and his need to
control things; he states “I tried to subdue my hatred, to be as charitable and forgiving as
Mrs. Rivers implored me to be; but my tormentors had the art of rousing the savage
again, and despite good resolves…I was again violent and rebellious; again punished,
again vowing revenge, and longing to obtain it” (163-164). In line with the greater
attention she draws to accountability in the novel, Shelley suggests that when Falkner has
an opportunity to change, he willfully chooses not to take it. She also seems to point to an
individual’s choice in committing crimes when her narrator states: “[the guilty] knows
that the still voice within was articulate to him. He remembers that at the moment of
action he felt his arm checked, his ear warned; he could have stopped, and been innocent”
(197). The tone of the novel places more responsibility on the choice of individual
offenders.
XIV. OVERCOMING FAILURES OF RESTORATIVE JUSTICE IN FALKNER
Despite Falkner’s poor choices and wavering sense of responsibility early in the
novel, Shelley suggests how personal accountability becomes critical to a successful
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restorative justice process after the crime has been committed. As noted earlier,
Falkner’s criminal trial for murder ends in his acquittal.46 Perhaps even more important
than this formal aspect of justice, Shelley draws our attention to the supplemental process
of testimony, dialogue, and forgiveness that occurs beyond the boundaries of the
courtroom. As opposed to Frankenstein, restorative justice is successful in Falkner
because the offender takes responsibility for his wrong doing, expresses remorse, and
considers the harm done to the victim.
Although he expresses guilt throughout the novel, Falkner confesses when he
recognizes the survivor’s suffering. After Falkland reads Elizabeth’s letter portraying her
sympathy with Gerard, he finally acknowledges what his offense has done to both Alithea
and her son. The narrator observes,
never had he seen the effects of his crime in so vivid a light; avoiding the name of
Neville, he had never heard that of his victim coupled with shame – she was
unfortunate, but he had persuaded himself that she was not thought guilty; dear
injured saint! had then her sacred name been bandied about by the vulgar, she
pronounced unworthy by the judges of her acts; ignominy heaped upon the grave
he had dug for her? Was her beloved son the victim of his belief in her goodness?
Had his youthful life been blighted by his cowardly concealments? Oh, rather a
thousand deaths than such a weight of sin upon his soul! – He would declare all;
offer his life in expiation – what more could be demanded! (145)
Whereas in Frankenstein, Shelley suggests that justice fails because the creature never
considers the harm he has caused Victor or his family, Falkland acknowledges his harm
to Alithea and Neville and, in fact, it motivates him to confess. Not only does he
recognize the pain he has caused, he takes responsibility for it. Falkner’s first person
testimony, an interruption from the narrated third-person form of the rest of the novel,
formally enacts Falkner’s ownership of his crime. Although at times during his
confession Falkner seems like he may be trying to skirt blame, he reassures Alithea’s
46
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family that, “Would I shift to other shoulders the heavy weight? No! no! crime and
remorse still me to her” (173). Beyond his private admission of guilt, he testifies
publicly, declaring his accountability to the community as well. He also expresses
remorse for his action. Godobo-Madikizela explains the significance of remorse to the
restoration process because “When perpetrators feel remorse, they are recognizing
something they failed to see when they violated the victim, which is that victims feel and
bleed just like others with whom they, the perpetrators, identify. Remorse therefore
transforms the image of victim as object to victim as human…At the same time, remorse
recognizes the pain of the surviving family members” (130). Falkner’s remorse signals
fellow feeling for not only Alithea but Neville too – a simple act of recognition not
accomplished in Frankenstein.
Further, Shelley suggests how an offender’s remorse is important to a victim’s
receptivity and ability to feel compassion for a perpetrator. Even if a victim can never
understand a perpetrator’s crime or identify with the perpetrator, remorse suggests to a
victim that he (the criminal) feels bad for you (the victim) and this emotion helps a victim
to see, finally, that a criminal is human. Shelley suggests that Neville’s capacity to think
beyond Falkner’s horrible crime in order to envision him as a man is critical to repairing
harm. Neville articulates this act of fellow feeling when, after Falkland’s public
testimony, he thinks, “….if his act was criminal, dearly has he paid the result. I persuade
myself that there is more real sympathy between me and my mother’s childhood’s friend
– who loved her so long and truly – whose very crime was a mad excess of love – than
one who knew nothing of her” (295). Shelley suggests that this difference between the
justice process in Frankenstein and that in Falkner – the ability of victim and offender to
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recognize each other’s humanity – is critical to moving towards repair of harm and
forgiveness. Sites reminds us how this act echoes Godwin’s idea of justice: “Neville
must overcome the base influence of both his lower nature (the desire for revenge) and
the world (the expectation that he seek revenge) to accomplish the Godwinian moment of
justice: forgiveness” (169). Neville’s ability to move beyond revenge and seek
reconciliation recalls the justice achieved in Caleb’s and Falkland’s final tribunal.
Although Neville accepts Falkner’s repentance, Shelley does not dismiss the
skepticism she raised about confessions in Frankenstein. Boyvill articulates this
skepticism when he reacts to Falkner’s written admission: “Here is a long
narrative…there is much excuse, and much expiation here. The story ought to be short
that exculpates her; I do not like these varnishings of the simple truth” (208). Even
Garver begins to second guess Falkner’s testimony; the narrator describes that “He reread the manuscript with a new feeling of skepticism; this time he was against the writer,
he detected exaggeration, where, before he had only found the energy of passion: he saw
an attempt to gloss over guilt” (214). Shelley does not resolve this skepticism in her
novel. Instead she seems to suggest that, true or not, great benefits can be gained from
accepting a confession’s intentions. Godobo-Matikizela explains what can be gained
even when a disclosure’s veracity or defendant’s remorse cannot be confirmed:
How do we judge the genuineness of…remorse? How do we know that the signs
of alleged contrition are not simply a product of the perpetrator’s having been
caught, or of changes within the society that have destroyed his power base and
support structures and have left him vulnerable?....[these] questions are real
and…legitimate. Yet it remains equally legitimate that when perpetrators do in
fact express regret or guilt or contrition, however it may be ascertained, what
seems to lie, as Nicholas Tavuchis has put it, ‘beyond the purview of apology,’
can in fact be transformed from an unforgivable deed into a forgivable one, into
‘this has happened and we must find a way to move forward.’ Philisophical
questions can and should give way and be subsumed by human questions, for in
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the end we are a society of people and not ideas, a fragile web of interdependent
humans, not of stances. (125, her emphasis)
Shelley’s answer to this human question in Falkner is that the advantages to be gained by
accepting remorse and moving toward forgiveness are worth the risk. Although
Falkner’s true intentions or even the veracity of his account of the crime cannot be
confirmed, Shelley depicts the benefits of this process for offender, victim, and
community. She suggests that the benefits outweigh the assurance of verifiable truth.
As the perpetrator, Falkner benefits most obviously: he is met with compassion
and forgiveness instead of punishment or scorn. Still, beyond these tangible results,
given the opportunity to testify and express his wrongs, Falkner shows the effects of “the
singular relief which confession brings to the human heart” (241, her emphasis). He
experiences a physical transformation; the narrator tell us that “health again filled his
veins…It was evident now that the seeds of disease were destroyed – his person grew
erect” (291). Mentally, he feels relief and liberation, which manifests in more
compassion and benevolence: “serene lofty composure had replaced his usual sadness;
and the passions of his soul, which had before deformed his handsome lineaments, now
animated them with a beauty of mind” (224). Falkner gains physically and emotionally
from testimony and dialogue.
Beyond these benefits to the perpetrator, Shelley suggests the myriad ways
victims can benefit from a restorative process. First, a survivor’s family learns of a
previously unknown version of events that prevented them from living their own life;
when Gerard finally learns what happened to his mother, he can begin to move on and
form relationships of his own. Second, this knowledge can help the victim’s family move
toward forgiveness and reconnect with the victim in a way that provides closure.
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Godobo-Madikizela describes how forgiveness “is a choice the victim makes to let go of
bitterness. This usually occurs when there has been a change in the way the victim
relates to his or her trauma...Forgiveness can also open up a new path toward healing for
the victim” (97). This new path can mean mourning and letting go of a loved one, rather
than holding onto irresolution. Finally, rather than condoning the perpetrator’s behavior,
forgiveness can be empowering because it places the victim in the role of holding the
offender accountable. Neville describes this empowerment when he tells Elizabeth “It is
a godlike task to reward the penitent. In religion and morality I know that I am justified:
whether I am in the code of wordly honour, I leave others to decide; and yet I believe that
I am” (299). Shelley highlights the strength forgiveness gives victims when Neville
recognizes that he, rather than the justice system or even the community, holds the
authority to determine this aspect of his mother’s justice process.
Finally, as I argued in my chapters on Godwin and Wollstonecraft, such a
restorative process can also benefit the community. Although less noticeable in Falkner’s
testimony that Jemima’s or Caleb’s, creating a public space to disclose private abuses or
offenses can reveal systemic abuses that need to be corrected. Bennett explains that in
Shelley’s last novel Falkner’s confession “functions in the novel as commentary on
poverty and suffering, largely the result of selfish fathers and selfish husbands who
control society. So, too, his description of his ten year’s service in India…gives Mary
Shelley the opportunity to fault both the East India Company and the Indian rajahs” (1112). Further, while much of the reconciliation in the novel happens in addition to, and
outside of the courtroom, Falkner’s public accountability allows the community to honor
Alithea’s life in a way that had been previously silenced.
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This emphasis on community marks one last way justice seems to be achieved in
Falkner where it is not in Frankenstein. Shelley implies that restorative justice can only
succeed when we begin to value other human beings as fellow creatures, regardless of
our connection to them. Critics such as Graham, Bennett, and Sites have pointed out the
language in the novel, which Shelley uses to designate non-familial relationships such as
“more than sister,” “brother,” and “more than father.” Sites explains that Shelley “adopts
the premise that relationships should be based on more substantial values than blind
adherence to the creed that blood is thicker than water. By doing so, Shelley picks up a
central theme of the social reform agenda of her parents” (215).47 Shelley conveys the
possibility of this quality by means of Elizabeth’s fidelity and compassion for Falkner in
spite of the absence of biological paternity; Garver’s forgiveness of Falkner despite his
offense; and even in the way that minor characters like Lady Cecil and Mrs. Raby
overcome personal prejudice or religious differences in order to support Elizabeth and
reach out to Falkner. Shelley’s depiction of respect within the community signifies
another barrier she suggests needs to be overcome if we wish to achieve justice beyond
that offered by Frankenstein.
XV. CONCLUSIONS
In Frankenstein, Shelley follows her parents in critiquing inequities against
disenfranchised individuals in the justice system through the coerced confession and
wrongful conviction of Justice Moritz. Placed in the center of a text constructed around
other confessions, Justine’s episode echoes Caleb’s in revealing how a logical storyline
47
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more primary than the bonds of family” (Mary Shelley 167).
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and material evidence can be used to convince the justice system that an individual is
guilty, particularly when the accused lacks authority or the means to protect herself. But
Frankenstein goes further than Caleb Williams in its exploration of the power relations
undergirding criminal trial procedures involving testimony; Shelley suggests that a justice
system that demands closure can contribute to coercing confessions for the sake of
certainty. Moreover, she suggests that false confession can be induced by an individual’s
desire to be loved, accepted, or forgiven. Despite this suggestion, her novel does not
dismiss the value of confessions. Rather, it cautions against using confessions to acquit
or condemn and asks readers to be mindful of the circumstances influencing a
confession’s transmission. Additionally, Shelley’s inclusion of the victim’s (Victor’s)
and the offender’s (the creature’s) first-person testimony emphasizes the need to
recognize both accounts of a crime. While their side-by-side accounts do not provide
readers certain resolution, they help us to understand the circumstances leading to the
creature’s offenses. The creature’s account of his marginalization reinforces Godwin and
Wollstonecraft’s notions that social alienation and abuse may not only silence the truth of
events and prevent recovery from trauma, but may also contribute to desperate and
criminal acts. Finally, in the creature’s confrontation with Victor at Montanvert, Shelley
gestures toward the sort of restorative justice process her parents had imagined: victim
and offender engage in dialogue about the wrong committed in order to understand its
effects and seek to repair its resulting harm. In the failure of their process, however,
Shelley suggests the obstacles to sympathy, benevolence, and compassion at the heart of
restorative processes. She shows the drastic consequences that may result from
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maintaining criminal justice inequities and failing to acknowledge both victim and
offender.
Twenty years later, Falkner reengages the possibility of restorative justice more
optimistically. The novel critiques the justice system mildly, but it offers a much less
scathing analysis than Caleb, Maria, or Frankenstein. Concern for marginalized or
disenfranchised individuals, particularly disenfranchisement based on class, is absent. As
a result of this less severe critique, less responsibility for the offense is placed on social
institutions and more responsibility is placed on the offender. Falkner provokes sympathy
for the perpetrator because he suffers from remorse, but unlike other popular crime
novels of this later era (Newgate Novels), there is little attempt to justify or condone his
crime. Further, Shelley dramatizes a successful restorative process that occurs as a
supplement to a just criminal trial. In Falkland’s testimony, he takes responsibility as an
offender for his wrong doing, expresses remorse, and considers the harm done to the
victim and the victim’s family. In Falkland’s disclosure, Shelley does not dismiss the
skepticism about confessions which she raised in Frankenstein. Instead, she represents
the belief that in a stable system seeking restorative justice, an offender’s confession can
be valuable by providing closure to victims, holding an offender to a standard of
accountability, and aiding a community in both remembering the past as well as moving
forward.
Therefore, while Shelley continues to comment on justice in both novels, she
begins to acknowledge the possibility that justice can be achieved within a reformed
system. She maintains the value of acknowledging the role environmental factors play in
influencing criminal behavior because understanding these factors can help to prevent
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future crimes and make sense of those that have already occurred. In addition to this
value, which was critical to both Godwin and Wollstonecraft, she also suggests that
victim, offender, and community alike can achieve greater justice and repair greater harm
by holding the perpetrator more accountable. She shows how this accountability can be a
powerful component to a process centered on testimony and dialogue, which seeks to
repair harm. Throughout the evolution of her ideas about justice she always maintains
the importance of acknowledging and listening to fellow creatures – be they monster or
criminal.
As a twenty-first century feminist, I abhor condoning Falkner’s behavior (the
forceful abduction of a woman). Even though the creature kills several innocent victims,
his status and abuse somehow make it easier for me to consider why he committed such
harms. But part of the value of Shelley’s novels is their suggestions that no matter what
our personal feelings, no matter our own obstacles to sympathy, creating the conditions to
repair harm requires making space to hear every offender. Hearing an offender’s
perspective doesn’t equate condoning their behavior. Instead, it means acknowledging
that a perpetrator is a fellow creature, so that one’s own humanity can be reaffirmed and
movement toward the future can become a possibility. Shelley’s novels show us that
criminal behavior is complicated. So are our motivations to confess or to forgive. But
Godobo-Madikizela tells us that “through the vicarious experience of stories of
forgiveness, a society can begin to heal itself” (133) – Shelley’s novels imagine,
dramatize, and give us the vocabulary for both accountability and consideration of
forgiveness, despite such obstacles.
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Chapter Four
Sexual Crime and Silence in Percy Shelley’s The Cenci
Percy Shelley wrote The Cenci in 1819. He based his play on the life of Beatrice
Cenci, a woman from a prominent Roman family who was tried, convicted, and publicly
executed for the crime of murdering her father in 1599. Although no reliable historical
accounts of Beatrice Cenci have survived, the versions that exist tell of her father’s cruel
treatment of her, including incestuous rape, as the motive for his murder. Shelley’s play
dramatically represents Beatrice Cenci’s story. Act I depicts Francesco Cenci’s cruelty
towards his family, his corruption, and his collusion with the Pope (acting as church and
state authority). Act II dramatizes Beatrice’s kind, gentle nature and her failed attempts
to elicit help and protection from the community or the state. Act III represents
Beatrice’s trauma resulting from her father’s act of sexual violation, which occurs off
stage during Acts II and III. Act IV discloses the Cenci’s murder, with Beatrice and her
family arranging for the crime. Beatrice, her step-mother Lucretia, her brother Giacomo,
and the two men they hire to fulfill the deed– Marzio and Olimpio – are all arrested. Act
V depicts their trial. Beatrice alone refuses to confess to the crime(s) – she neither
discloses her rape nor admits to murdering her father. The play ends as the family awaits
their execution.
What could Beatrice – a character who arranges for her father’s murder –
contribute to a discussion about justice processes seeking to restore and repair harm?
How does Percy Shelley’s The Cenci – a play that dramatizes vengeance, violence, and a
seeming denial of responsibility or remorse – figure into the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-

142
Shelley family vision of justice, which privileges recognition, accountability, and
understanding over punishment and retribution?
Despite its unlikely congruence, in this chapter I hope to suggest that The Cenci
continues to contribute to the literary family’s ideas about restorative justice. Like Caleb
Williams, Shelley’s play represents a justice system founded on corrupt processes and
outcomes, which fails to redress harm or produce truth. Like The Wrongs of Woman, The
Cenci calls attention to a victim denied protection or redress because of her gender and
the nature of the crime committed against her. As Mary Shelley does in Frankenstein,
Shelley’s play shows the consequences of not recognizing disenfranchised individuals
and emphasizes the circumstances that may lead to criminal behavior.
Rather than moving readers toward restorative reforms by imagining restorative
possibilities, however, Shelley’s play urges his audience toward change by dramatizing
the alternative: The Cenci insists on recognizing and making space for disenfranchised
individuals because abuse and silence may contribute to retributive, vigilante justice if
individuals are denied a more equitable and restorative option. His play complicates the
accountability and remorse for which Frankenstein and Falkner advocate by considering
how imposed silence makes such accountability impossible and implicates the justice
system in hypocrisy. Finally, though the content of The Cenci elides restorative
representations, the form does not. The choices Percy Shelley makes regarding narrative
voice and dramatic representation embody an even more active form than Godwin,
Wollstonecraft, or Mary Shelley. This form draws parallels between the rhetorical
choices called for in matters of justice and literature, endorsing an interactive, democratic
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model that grants victims, offenders, and the community the opportunity to participate in
processes and outcomes.
Shelley’s preoccupation with issues of justice, silence, and legal
disenfranchisement in The Cenci reflects issues relevant to the historical context in which
he wrote his play and parallels preoccupations of Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary
Shelley. Just as Godwin and Wollstonecraft wrote their fiction during a historic moment
that compelled them to speculate about the means and ends of justice, The Cenci was also
written during a time of legal change and political unrest. Thirty years removed from the
optimism and individual rights originally promised by the possibility of the French
Revolution, Mary and Percy Shelleys’ England was again instituting repressive measures
to silence protests and using legal means to criminalize open discussion and dialogue.
Literary scholars Paul Foot and Michael Scrivener have traced the development of
Shelley’s political thought against the backdrop of social and political changes that
occurred during his lifetime.48 While noting Shelley’s political engagement throughout
his career, both scholars emphasize the government’s repressive measures leading up to,
and during, the time of The Cenci’s composition in the summer of 1819. Foot explains
that,
In 1817, habeas corpus was suspended again and imprisonment without trial was
legalized. In the same year, Sidmouth introduced two more ‘gagging Acts’ to prevent
meetings of more than fifty people for any purpose whatsoever. In 1819, following
the massacre of Peterloo, the government introduced six more Acts which gave
unprecedented powers to magistrates to convict anyone suspected of conspiring or
meeting to discuss political questions. It gave them powers to enter homes without
warrants and to hound and bully any of their suspects....All these laws…were
enforced by a brutal system of punishment. (32-33)
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Paul Foot’s Red Shelley (1980) and Michael Scrivener’s Radical Shelley: The Philosophical Anarchism
and Utopian Thought of Percy Bysshe Shelley (1982) are still two of the most oft cited studies related to
Shelley’s political thought and historical context.
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Foot’s description of the repressive legal and political conditions in which Shelley wrote
The Cenci recalls the repressive climate of Godwin and Wollstonecraft’s 1790s – when
the state’s moves to quiet and disband discussion among community members, and to
abuse and silence individuals within the justice system, likely contributed to the authors’
vision of a justice system that promoted individual participation and greater community
control. Whereas government reaction during the 1790s was largely a response to fear of
rebellion instigated by the French Revolution, Foot explains that the government’s
reaction during Shelley’s lifetime was different. He cites the Crown’s reaction as a
response to working class uprisings and frustration brought on by the end of the
Napoleonic Wars, changing employment opportunities resulting from the industrial
revolution, and an increased demand for wider suffrage (32-34). Nonetheless, the
violence that had resulted from the French Revolution still remained fresh in the minds of
state officials and English citizens during Shelley’s era, leading to both cautionary,
reactionary policy and doubts about the possibility of non-violent, democratic reform.
Silence and repression were also issues for victims of sexual crime during the
time that Shelley wrote The Cenci. General legal changes meant that, as noted in Chapter
Two, the “era of disenfranchisement” was underway as the state moved victims further
and further from the justice process in an attempt to formalize and increase the efficiency
of judicial processes (Dignan 63). For women who were victims of sexual crimes, legal
protections had improved minimally since Wollstonecraft depicted Jemima’s plight in
The Wrongs of Women, while the perception of rape victims and the cultural conditions
for disclosing sexual crimes had not. Anna Clark notes that
The increased efficiency and diminished corruption of the British legal system did
bring more rapists to justice during this period [the early nineteenth century]. In
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the North-east assize circuit, for instance, 54 per cent of accusations of rape on
females over twelve resulted in trials between 1800 and 1829, as opposed to 33
per cent between 1770 and 1799. (60)49
Despite this statistical example of juridical improvement, women still faced immense
barriers in achieving justice for sexual crimes at the time Shelley wrote The Cenci.
According to Clark, the barriers preventing victims of sexual crimes from
achieving justice included silence, articulation, and proof. Clark explains that these
barriers resulted from fears stimulated by a number of cultural conditions, including
women’s transition from the domestic to the public sphere, growing evangelical
movements, and an emphasis on scientific language (10-11). These cultural conditions
increased concerns about protecting public morality and safe guarding women’s chastity.
They also affected victims’ ability to achieve justice by making it difficult to talk about
and prove sexual crimes, both prior to and during justice processes. Clark summarizes
and contextualizes the transition in cultural attitudes from The Wrongs of Woman to The
Cenci, explaining, “While the angry words of eighteenth-century victims of rape had
largely been ignored, in the nineteenth century women’s discourses were scrutinized,
transformed, and ultimately silenced by authorities and rapists alike” (75). The Wrongs
of Woman and The Cenci reflect this shift: Wollstonecraft addresses the cultural dismissal
of Jemima’s victimization, while Shelley addresses cultural silencing and scrutiny
regarding sexual crimes. As I hope to reveal, The Cenci, like Wollstonecraft’s Wrongs of
Woman, continues to confront the barriers facing victims of sexual crime and explode the
silence surrounding their violations.
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As introduced in Chapter Two, historian Anna Clark looks at over one thousand cases of sexual assault
between 1770 and 1845 in London and the Northeast of England in her important study, Women’s Silence
Men’s Violence (1987). Her study considers the way that court transcripts, depositions, and local
newspapers reveal cultural beliefs about sexual crime (17).
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In a political and legal climate in which silence and oppression pervaded,
particularly for individuals disenfranchised by gender or class, Shelley attempted a
remarkable task in writing The Cenci. Such a context emphasizes his risk in 1819 of
fictionalizing and dramatizing Beatrice Cenci’s historical narrative of rape. It helps
explain the motives he shares with his predecessors – a plea for a system of more
equitable and restorative justice. It also helps explain the different method he used to
advocate for justice reform; the subtle changes in social, political, and legal conditions
which had occurred during Shelley’s historical context contribute to the more drastic and
disturbing nature of his fiction.
Despite the similarities shared by The Cenci and the other fictions my project
addresses, and despite the unique additions its differences contribute, scholarly studies
have not treated these texts together or discussed the play’s treatment of justice and
gender – an aspect critical to the family’s concern with political equality and legal
marginalization.50 Michael Blood acknowledges that “The Cenci has now taken its place
securely in the canon of Shelley’s work,” and he notes that the play has been critically
understood in multiple ways, including “as a critique of patriarchy, of political
complicity, the corruption of authority, the self-legitimating structure of social
institutions, or the self-immolating tendencies of violent revolution” (370).51 Without
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There are two partial exceptions to this statement. The first is Michael Scrivener’s, “Trials in RomanticEra Writing: Modernity, Guilt, and the Scene of Justice” (2004), which provides a general survey of
romantic era texts that include trial scenes. Among these texts he discusses in his six page survey are
Caleb Williams, The Wrongs of Women, Frankenstein, and The Cenci. He argues these texts put forth
radical critiques that were “antithetical to the providential worldview” (131). The second exception is
Young-Ok An’s “Beatrice ‘s gaze revisited: Anatomizing The Cenci” (1996). She argues that The Cenci
provides a “useful textual instance to investigate…operations of violence, law, and desire that intersect
with gender issues” (27). I build on both arguments by placing The Cenci in context with historic justice
reform, and reading it in conversation with the family’s other fictional texts, which treat issues of justice.
51
Shelley’s play has also been read recently from a Queer Theory stance, particularly regarding the play’s
suggestion of sodomy. For example, in “Some of my Best Friends are Romanticists: Shelley and the Queer
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disputing the validity of these understandings and in many cases borrowing from and
extending their arguments, this chapter suggests that considering The Cenci again – from
the perspective of the family’s vision of restorative justice – is a worthwhile task that
fulfills a significant critical gap. First, this gap is significant because, whereas William
Godwin’s influence on Shelley has been discussed, consideration has not focused on the
texts my project addresses – Caleb Williams and The Cenci.52 Second, attention to Mary
Wollstonecraft’s and Mary Shelly’s influence has been almost non-existent – a glaring
discrepancy since we know Percy Shelley read and admired both women’s texts and
Mary Shelley helped him with this work more than any other.53 Third, this gap is
significant because his text, as do other texts produced by this family, reflects and
engages in the cultural debate about criminal justice leading up to the Prisoner’s Reform
Bill in 1836, which would formally replace participation by victim and accused with
representation by legal advocates. This chapter, then, considers The Cenci alongside the
Project in Romanticism,” Berry “traces Shelley’s conversion of the historical Count Cenci’s acts of sodomy
into what Shelley regards as ‘a very poetical circumstance,” incest. Shelley imagines a complex alibi with
which he shapes his own intense curiosity about intimacy between men.”
52

Godwin’s influence on Shelley’s political philosophy has been extensively considered, although most
often mainly in connection with Political Justice. Pamela Clemit provides a useful critical survey of
studies that trace Godwin’s influence on Shelley: “Godwin’s rehabilitation began with Kenneth Cameron’s
The Young Shelley: Genesis of a Radical (1951), in which he is presented as one of several radicals of the
1790s to influence Shelley’s early thought, a view taken up by Gerald McNiece. The first major study to
recognize Godwin’s unique and lasting role in Shelley’s thought was Paul Dawson’s The Unacknowledged
Legislator:Shelley and Politics (1980), and his conclusions have been developed, in different directions, by
Michael Scrivener and Timothy Clark” (190). For other comparison between Godwin and Shelley, see
Pamela Clemit’s “Shelley’s Godwin, 1812-1817” (1993); Michael Demson’s “The Disobedient Disciple:
Shelley’s Divergence From Godwin’s Guidance on History and Political Practice” (2008); and George
Watson’s “The Reckless Disciple: Godwin’s ‘Shelley’ ”(1986). None of these texts compare The Cenci
and Caleb Williams at any length. While Williams Marshall’s, “‘Caleb Williams’ and ‘The Cenci’”
(1960), does addresses the fictions my project is concerned with, he limits his brief discussion to comparing
Falkland and Beatrice. Interestingly, of all Percy Shelley’s works, Godwin found The Cenci most
appealing. In a letter to Mary on March 20, 1820, he tells her: “I have read the tragedy of ‘Cenci,’ and am
glad to see Shelley at last descending to what really passes among human creatures. The story is certainly
an unfortunate one, but the execution gives me a new idea of Shelley’s powers.” (Kegan 272).
53
Considering an entire study has been published speculating that Percy Shelley really wrote Frankenstein
– John Lauritsen’s The Man Who Wrote Frankenstein (2007) – the fact that Shelley based his play on
Mary’s translation of the Cenci family story is curiously overlooked.
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Godwin-Shelley-Wollstonecraft family fictions, hoping to draw greater attention to the
nature of gender, sexual crime, and issues of justice – one chamber of critical
conversation that still echoes with relative silence.

XVI. FOUNDATIONS OF JUSTICE : SHELLEY AND HIS INFLUENCES
Percy Shelley’s poems and non-fiction prose offer a framework for his views on
justice and suggest shared tendencies with the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley desire for
reform. To begin, a brief survey of Shelley’s poems reveals his frustration with criminal
justice administration. From his better known Queen Mab (1813), The Mask of Anarchy
(1819), and Prometheus Unbound (1820), to the less well known “To The Lord
Chancellor” (1818), written in the later stages of a custody suit that he ultimately lost
(Kohler 556), Shelley’s poems make general critiques on justice administration. For
example, the fairy in Queen Mab criticizes disparities in the justice system. She says
“Those too the tyrant serve, who, skilled to snare/ The feet of justice in the toils of law,/
Stand ready to oppress the weaker still; And, right or wrong, will vindicate for gold,/
Sneering at public virtue, which beneath/ Their pitiless tread lies torn and trampled,
where/ Honour sits smiling at the sale of truth” (SPP IV.196-201). Beyond emphasizing
an inequitable distribution of justice, this section of Shelley’s poem implies the law is
actively misused and manipulated to benefit the powerful.
Shelley depicts the administration of justice negatively again in The Mask of
Anarchy when the speaker identifies law as one of the corrupt agents of authority and
directly calls out Lord Chancellor Eldon. When the speaker does speak positively of
justice it is to address a fairer, more equitable future institution while simultaneously
undercutting current practice in England: “Thou art Justice – ne’er for gold/ May thy
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righteous laws be sold/ As laws are in England – thou/ Shield’st alike the high and low”
(SPP 230). Shelley also considers different models of punishment, Melynda Nuss
argues, in Prometheus Unbound. In Nuss’s article, “Prometheus in a Bind: Law,
Narrative and Movement in Prometheus Unbound”(2007), she supports the notion that
Shelley’s poetry reflects, and was invested in, criminal justice issues. She explains that
“Writing in the middle of a century of criminal law reform, Shelley shared the reformers’
concern with the law’s ability to resolve conflicts and move forward” (416). We can see
Shelley’s preoccupation with criminal justice in his poetry’s general attacks, which
suggest imbalanced practices and unfair advantages based on wealth and power.
Beyond his poetry, several of his less discussed prose writings also provide
indications of his interest in matters of justice, as Godwin’s and Wollstonecraft’s nonfiction prose had. One of his earliest direct comments on the criminal justice system
occurs in his “Essay on the Punishment of Death,” which David Lee Clark places to the
1813-1814 period, although the date of the essay is unknown.54 The basic argument of
this essay is the elimination of capital punishment, but Shelley also articulates rationales
similar to Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley regarding the ineffectiveness of
retributive punishment. Shelley echoes their notion that without consideration of
repairing harm retribution further exacerbates criminal tendencies, rather than controlling
or reforming such behavior: “It is sufficiently clear that revenge, retaliation, atonement,
expiation are rules and motives so far from deserving a place in any enlightened system
54

Public executions were still common during Shelley’s lifetime. Gatrell describes that the 1832 Reform
Act contributed to decreasing hangings, but states that most “most capital statues were at last repealed in
1837” (9). He reminds us that leading up to these changes, executions were frequent: “twice as many were
hanged in London in the thirty years 1801-1830 as hanged in the fifty years 1701-50 [281 hangings]. How
easily this extraordinary fact has been forgotten – that the noose was at its most active on the very eve of
capital law repeals!” (7). Shelley’s comments on public execution reflect his aversion to this continued
practice.
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of political life that they are the chief sources of a prodigious class of miseries in the
domestic circles of society” (Shelley’s Prose 155). Further, he goes on to argue for a
milder system of punishment, not only because it reflects better on the community that
institutes it, but also because he believes it will actually reduce crime (Shelley’s Prose
157).
We also see evidence of Shelley’s concern for the disenfranchised and the legally
abused leading up to his composition of The Cenci in his, “We Pity the Plumage, but
Forget the Dying Bird’; Address to the People on the Death of the Princess Charlotte,”
(1817). 55 Clark tells us this pamphlet, written under the pseudonym The Hermit of
Marlow, was penned after visiting friends in London – among them William Godwin.
The pamphlet compares the nation’s widespread mourning over the death of Princess
Charlotte of Wales to the nearly non-existent reaction to the execution of three laborers
involved in the Pentrich Revolution. While Shelley acknowledges the tragedy of the
young Princess’s death and the value of communal mourning, he also draws attention to
the need to mourn for public calamities of greater magnitude, such as “the wrestling of
old and venerable laws to the murder of the innocent” (164) .56 The pamphlet goes on to
describe the imprisonment, seemingly unjust trials, and bloody, inhumane execution of
Brandreth, Turner, and Ludlam – the three men executed for their involvement in the
uprising (Shelley’s Prose 168). As with Godwin and Wollstonecraft, although admittedly
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David Lee Clark reminds us that the “dying bird” portion of the title is from Paine’s The Rights of Man
(162).
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A fuller account of the occasion for mourning, according to Shelley is as follows: “Men do well to mourn
for the dead: it proves that we love something besides ourselves….There should be public mourning when
those events take place which make all good men mourn in their hearts – the rule of foreign or domestic
tyrants, the abuse of public faith, the wrestling of old and venerable laws to the murder of the innocent, the
established insecurity of all those the flower of the nation who cherish an unconquerable enthusiasm for the
public good” (Shelley’s Prose 164).
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to a lesser effect, Shelley’s pamphlet directly addresses the public through political tracts
that treat issues of legal injustice.
Finally, we also see criminal justice reform specifically addressed in two prose
tracts unpublished during Shelley’s lifetime. The first is “A Philosophical View of
Reform” began just after publication of The Cenci but not published until 1920 (Clark
229). The essay advocates for gradual and peaceful political change and lays out specific
measures to achieve more equitable and balanced conditions. Amidst his prescriptions
for reform Shelley suggests, “We would make justice cheap, certain, and speedy, and
extend the institution of juries to every possible occasion of jurisprudence” (249). He
continues this call for more democratic and participatory justice processes in “A System
of Government By Juries,” also dated from around the time of The Cenci’s composition,
probably 1819-20 (Clark 262). This tract, published in Athenauem in 1833, defines
Shelley’s belief in the purpose of the law (“the good of the whole”), critiques what he
describes as severe and unnecessary retributive outcomes (“in general, ten times more is
apportioned to the victims of law than is demanded by the welfare of society under the
shape of reformation or example”), and cites inequitable conditions of justice (“there is a
vague but most effective favoritism in courts of law and among lawyers against the poor
to the advantage of the rich”). On these matters his pamphlet parallels attitudes toward
criminal law reform shared by Godwin, Wollstoncraft, and Mary Shelley.
Beyond his interest in justice reform and his concern for individuals legally
marginalized by class, Shelley’s writing also addresses gender disparities. Paul Foot
discusses Shelley’s aversion to women’s oppression, noting Shelley’s tendency to cast
women in significant, revolutionary roles in his poetry. Devoting most of his discussion
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to Shelley’s representation of Cythna as a heroine seeking women’s equality in The
Revolt of Islam (1817), Foot also briefly mentions the Fairy Queen in Queen Mab (1813),
Asia in Prometheus Unbound (1820), and Beatrice Cenci. He additionally acknowledges
Shelley’s attention to mistreated and abused women; he notes that in Rosalind and Helen
(1817) Rosalind discusses her husband’s physical abuse of her and her children, and in
The Revolt of Islam Cythna describes her rape “in a verse which captures…Shelley’s
disgust for enforced sex” (121). My argument extends Foot’s discussion by considering
how Shelley calls further attention to women’s mistreatment as victims of sexual crimes
in The Cenci, an issue Foot mentions but not does not develop.
Just as Godwin influenced Shelley’s ideas about justice, Wollstonecraft
influenced his ideas about gender. Foot explains that “Shelley’s early letters are full of
requests for Mary Wollstonecraft’s books and letters. By the time he was twenty, he had
absorbed them all” (103). Mary Shelley’s reading list from 1814-1822 further supports
Wollstonecraft’s influence on Percy, indicating that Mary and Percy reread
Wollstonecraft’s prose and fiction repeatedly; she notes their reading of Maria: Or the
Wrongs of Woman in 1814 (JMS II 684). Percy Shelley’s dedication to Mary Shelley in
Laon and Cythna (1817) lyrically reflects the esteem he had for Wollstonecraft when,
referring to Wollstonecraft, his speaker says “[Her] life was like a setting planet mild/
Which clothed thee in the radiance undefiled/ Of its departing glory; still her fame/
Shines on thee” (Shelley’s Poetry and Prose 104). Despite Percy Shelley’s well
documented admiration of Wollstonecraft, few scholars have seriously investigated her
influence on his fiction, particularly as it concerns The Cenci.
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The dearth in attention to Wollstonecraft’s influence can perhaps be partially
explained in two ways. First, as Foot notes, “The Shelley cults which have grown up
over the last hundred years have been dominated by men” (159). Outside of Foot, this
male-dominated scholarship has been less quick to notice Wollstonecraft’s significant
effect on Shelley. Second, Shelley’s personal decisions have deterred many from linking
him in any way with advocating for women.57 Recent scholarship, such as Susan J.
Wolfson’s chapter “‘Something must be done’: Shelley, Hemans, and the Flash of
Revolutionary Female Violence” (2009), compares female characters in poetry by Percy
Shelley and Felicia Hemans, and Kristine Johansan’s brief and general discussion of
Wollstonecraft’s influence in her short article, “ ‘Ever Holy and Unstained’: Illuminating
the Feminist Cenci Through Mary Wollstonecraft and Shakesepare’s Titus Andornicus”
(2007), indicate that this trend in scholarship might be changing. Nevertheless,
Wollstonecraft’s influence on Shelley in terms of criminal justice and sexual crime
warrants further attention, as do the family’s other texts that treat victims, offenders,
community, and state roles in justice administration.
XVII. REPRESENTATIONS AND CRITIQUES OF JUSTICE IN THE CENCI
As Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley do before him in their fiction, Percy
Shelley represents biased and corrupt justice practices that fail to protect marginalized
individuals in The Cenci. While Shelley continues the family’s preoccupation with
critiquing justice processes, he shifts the representational mode from novel to historical
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For an articulation of this reason see Anne K. Mellors “Sexuality and Feminism in Shelley by Nathaniel
Brown” (1980). Her book review faults Brown’s study (a discussion of Shelley’s theory of sexuality) for
failing to acknowledge Shelley’s relationships with women in a book purportedly about Shelley’s
feminism. For more on the contradictions between Shelley’s theory and practice towards women, see Paul
Foot’s “Feminism,” a chapter within his larger study. I limit my interest in Shelley’s relationship with
women to his textual conversations with Wollstonecraft and Mary Shelley as well as his literary
representation of gender and sexual crime.
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drama. Shelley’s choice to write an historical drama in order to draw attention to
contemporary problems was not uncommon in the early nineteenth-century and relates to
England’s repressive climate. Jeffery Cox helps to contextualize Shelley’s choice in his
chapter “The French Revolution in the English Theater” (1990), in which Cox discusses
the tendency of playwrights to dramatize historical events during this era. Cox explains
how fear of government censors as well as fear of actually inciting revolt, prompted
authors to represent revolutionary themes in allegedly more subtle, less threatening terms
by cloaking current problems in historical, neoclassical, and Gothic dramas (38). As
Cox’s explanation helps reveal, Beatrice’s tragedy allowed Shelley to address disparities
within his justice system, but he did so in a less realistically representational or overt
way. The Cenci’s different setting (Italy), different time (1599), and different political
system (Papal state) displaced the play’s direct critique on English institutions, while still
drawing attention to contemporary problems. While Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary
Shelley chose the novelistic form to magnify issues of justice for a wide audience,
Shelley believed a drama, because of its public performance potential, would help
accomplish this goal.58
Shelley begins his critique in The Cenci by representing imbalanced justice
practices. He first suggests that wealthy and powerful individuals benefit from
inequitable processes. Already within the opening lines of the play, Camillo discloses that
Cenci is avoiding punishment for murder by bribing church officials with his land (I.i.158

Shelley articulates his intention to reach a wide audience with The Cenci in his letters to his publisher,
Charles Ollier. The first, dated September 6, 1819, says: “I shall also send you another work [The Cenci],
calculated to produce a very popular effect” (Letters of PS 116). The second, dated March 6, 1820, states:
“ ‘Cenci’ is written for the multitude, and ought to sell well” (Letters of PS 174). Although, much to
Shelley’s disappointment, the play was never performed, it was his most popular publication during his
lifetime. Stuart Curran explains that “Except for the pirated version of Queen Mab, this was Shelley’s only
volume to achieve a second edition during his lifetime” (5).
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2). In lieu of prosecution, the Cenci gives the Papal state one third of his possessions.
Just as Falkner, Tyrrel, and Victor benefit from their status, Cenci – although more
drastically – reveals the way that wealth and power can influence who is punished and for
what crimes; the Papal state decriminalizes offenses in order to serve its own corrupt
needs, thereby failing to punish the Cenci’s violent offenses.
Next, Shelley suggests that the system may be closed or prohibited to those with
less power or resources; Beatrice demonstrates this limited access when her only recourse
for protection, a direct petition to the state, is thwarted by Orsino. Shelley also
underscores the state’s negligence in protecting certain victims from certain crimes when
the Cenci prevents outside intervention by characterizing his abuses against his family as
“dull domestic quarrels” (I.iii.163); first, as Godwin had in his representation of Tyrrel’s
abuses against Emily, and Wollstonecraft had in her depictions of Maria and Jemima,
Shelley emphasizes the criminal justice system’s (and the community’s) reluctance to
protect women considered the property of other men. Shelley additionally suggests the
inefficiency of criminal justice administration when the state official comes to make his
arrest only after the Cenci has succeed in abusing and violating Beatrice. Based on the
Cenci’s corrupt relation with the Pope, Shelley’s play implies that the state intervenes on
behalf of their own interest, not to protect disenfranchised victims or their families.
Finally, Shelley represents the legal system’s abuse of power in justice processes;
Marizio, Beatrice, Giacomo, and Lucretia are all physically tortured in order to coerce
their admissions of guilt. Despite their disclosures, this process does not induce truth
during the trial. First, Marzio withdraws his statement of Beatrice’s guilt because she
uses her family’s status to pressure him into taking full blame. Her effect on Marzio
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suggests how power dynamics can distort honest disclosures and underscores the
significance of wealth and social position, even among individuals who share a
disenfranchised status. Second, Beatrice never confesses to her role in the murder, even
given her impending execution and torture. Beatrice’s silence suggests the inefficiency
of punitive or coercive measures to compel truth. Third, and perhaps most importantly,
the trial never reveals the Cenci’s crime against Beatrice – the violation which motivated
the murder. The state’s emphasis on closure regarding the offense against the Cenci, but
its dismissal regarding the offense against Beatrice (even though the two crimes are
inextricably linked), suggests the system’s failure to acknowledge and address sexual
crimes.
XVIII. UNACKNOWLEDGED VICTIMS: SILENCE AND SEXUAL CRIME
Shelley returns to and extends Wollstonecraft’s preoccupation in Maria when he
represents the justice system’s failure to acknowledge and address sexual violence. Like
Wollstonecraft, Shelley draws attention to the gravity of sexual crimes and their
traumatic effect on victims. He builds on Wollstonecraft’s representation by using lyrical
language to underscore both the horror of a sexual violation and the challenge of
articulating it. Reflecting shifts in literature and criminal justice since Wollstonecraft
wrote Maria, Shelley’s vehicle and his focus is language. His emphasis on language in
form and content reveals barriers that prevented many nineteenth-century victims of
sexual crime from achieving justice – legal requirements, medical definitions, and
cultural imperatives on women’s chastity which all revolved around how, and whether, a
survivor was able to express the crime and obtain redress. Shelley overturns assumptions
about maintaining these barriers in his treatment of Beatrice.
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First, like Wollstonecraft, Shelley underscores the horror of sexual crimes and the
challenge of articulating them. While Wollstonecraft represents Jemima’s abuse, trauma,
and dismissal in the direct, concrete language of her Enlightenment prose, Shelley
represents Beatrice’s abuse in the lyrical language of his Romantic era. Rather than
rendering the trauma more beautiful or poetic by this shift in style, his vivid, descriptive
language invokes repulsive associations – drawing attention to the violence of the crime
without actually naming it. Previous to the offense against Beatrice that occurs between
Acts II and III, Shelley portrays Beatrice as outspoken about the Cenci’s wrongs. At the
start of Act III, however, Shelley underscores the trauma that has occurred when Beatrice
speaks in fragments of sight, smell, and touch that suggest her disoriented state, saying,
“The beautiful blue heaven is flecked with blood!/ The sunshine on the floor is black!
The air/ Is changed to vapours such as the dead breathe in charnal pits!...There creeps a
clinging, black, contaminating mist/ About me…it glues my fingers and limbs to one
another” (III.i.13-19). Shelley conveys Beatrice’s horror and revulsion here, after the
Cenci’s violation, in paradoxical language that shuns everyday sensory experiences. Her
descriptions call on each of the senses to invoke images of contamination, unnatural
inversion, and morbidity, which suggest the horror of sexual violation but never name the
offense.
Beatrice continues with this repulsive imagery, describing “I thought I was that
wretched Beatrice/ Men speak of, whom her father sometimes…pens up naked in damp
cells/ Where scaly reptiles crawl, and starves her there,/ Till she will eat strange flesh”
(III.i. 43-7). While this gothic imagery suggests a vision that might be more realistically
imaginable than the previous, Shelley implies the challenge of articulating the act through
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Beatrice’s vivid and bizarre account. He urges his audience to associate Beatrice’s
experience with torture, isolation, helplessness, violation, and forced unnatural action.
His direction not only creates negative associations with the crime, but it also gives rise
to the involuntary emotions of both revulsion for the act and sympathy for Beatrice’s
struggle to verbalize it.
Second, Shelley follows and extends Wollstonecraft by dramatizing the shock and
suffering an individual may experience after an attack. He links Beatrice’s struggle to
verbalize her experience with her traumatic symptoms; like Jemima, she dissociates,
represses, and denies the offense. The fragmented and metaphoric manner in which
Beatrice describes her trauma suggests a dissociative – or alternate – state of
consciousness. This condition parallels behavior that psychologist Joyce Sese Dorado
identifies in contemporary victims of incest. Dorado explains, “The traumatic first
memories of these participants were intrusive…[they] were not merely visual, but rather
packaged with other sensations – auditory, tactile, and kinesthetic” (106). Shelley
anticipates this modern clinical description of a victim’s behavior when Beatrice draws
on sight, smell, and touch to describe her experience in non-referential images.
Shelley also depicts symptoms of trauma, which Wollstonecraft had implied with
Jemima, when Beatrice alternates between repressing the experience and blaming herself
for what happened. Disturbed by her intrusive memories, she tries to detach herself from
what happened. She says, “Misery has killed its father: yet its father/ Never like
mine…,” “no, it cannot be!” (III.i.50), and “Yet speak it not:/ For then if this be truth,
that other too/ Must be a truth, a firm enduring truth…I have talked some wild words, but
will no more” (I.i.60-3).

Shelley extends Wollstonecraft’s representation of sexual
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trauma and again anticipates modern notions of traumatic symptoms in Beatrice’s
response. For example, in their recent article about Post Traumatic Stress Disorder in
sexual assault survivors, Cynthia Najdowski and Sarah Ulman support what Shelley
portrays: they explain that repression and withdrawal are common, if maladaptive, postassault coping mechanisms for victims of rape (44). Shelley dramatizes a further coping
mechanism adopted by sexual crime survivors when he shows us how, for Beatrice, this
repression turns into self blame (Najdowski and Ulman 44). Beatrice asks, “What have I
done? Am I not innocent? It is my crime…Oh, what am I? What name, what place, what
memory shall be mine?” (I.i.70-75).
In order to avoid this blame, Shelley depicts how Beatrice follows her self-doubt by
denying her experience. She abandons her previously concrete, vivid imagery of torture
and violation, instead adopting an increasingly indiscriminate, fading vision. She asks,
“What are the words which you would have me speak? I, who can feign no image in my
mind/ Of that which has transformed me. I whose thought/ Is like a ghost shrouded and
folded up/ In its own formless horror” (III.i.108-110). In Beatrice’s response Shelley
dramatizes how, in the interest of self-preservation, victims of crime may transition from
horror and self-blame to denial. Najdowski and Ullman explain that “women who think
they are responsible for their ASA [Adult Sexual Assault] experience may have more
difficulty coming to terms with their assault and may be more likely to engage in
strategies such as denial or disengagement to avoid persistent self-blaming cognitions”
(45). Shelley dramatizes the stages of traumatic memory that many rape victims undergo
in Beatrice’s struggle to articulate and come to terms with her experience. He
underscores the role language plays in allowing victims to name, begin recovering from,
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and help others to understand the consequences of a sexual violation; whereas Jemima’s
receptive community eventually helps her to move toward healing by allowing her to
expose and reclaim her experience through language, Beatrice retreats into silence and
denial.
Beatrice’s failed struggle to verbalize her experience and her subsequent retreat into
silence reflect issues confronting victims of sexual crime during Shelley’s era,
particularly concerning language expectations of the criminal justice system. In order to
prosecute or convict cases of sexual crime, early nineteenth-century survivors had to
fulfill the legal language requirements of the criminal justice system. Anna Clark
explains that an increased emphasis on medical and legal discourse made proving rape
difficult and appropriated victims’ opportunity to testify in their own terms during the
justice process: women had to prove emission by their offender until 1828 and “[b]y the
second decade of the nineteenth century, assize depositions…reveal that magistrates
apparently asked women not only if the assailant had ejaculated but also how far he
penetrated, how he moved, and the duration of the act” (61). Clark explains that the
problem with these legal conventions, aside from the burden of proof, intimate details,
and technical language such conditions demanded, was that sexual violence perpetrated
against women was defined in narrow terms. Such narrow terms meant that women were
limited in their ability to express and prove their experience: a victim struggling to find
language to describe the offense was expected to speak about it in a way that met the
legal needs of the court. By dramatizing Beatrice’s challenge to articulate the crime,
Shelley suggests that victims of trauma disrupt and exceed expectations of normative
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language or concrete narrative testimony; he questions the medical and legal language
required to express and prove sexual trauma.
Clark explains that language constraints also meant that the justice system failed to
recognize equally traumatizing sexual crimes when victims could not specify emission
(62). By allowing Beatrice to articulate her experience in metaphoric and fragmented
language while still acknowledging the existence and trauma of the crime, Shelley defies
the specificity of this medical definition. He represents the Cenci’s act as a violation and
a serious offense without demanding Beatrice fulfill a set of rigid medical criteria
detailing “how far he penetrated, how far he moved, and the duration of the act” (Clark
61). Because Beatrice’s expression of her experience makes clear she has been seriously
harmed, but does not clinically or legally spell out the Cenci’s violation, Shelley perhaps
suggests that the justice system broaden how it defines sexual crimes – in order to allow
for potentially less precise terms in describing an offense and to acknowledge violations
that do not involve penetration.
Further, Shelley’s representation draws attention to the limits of legal and medical
language requirements for sexual crime but also protects Beatrice’s virtue for a popular
audience; he allows Beatrice to articulate the act and emphasize its horror without
sacrificing conventions of public morality or condemning Beatrice for “knowing too
much.” Clark explains that another barrier of medical-legal language was that if a woman
was able to describe the crime in her own terms, but not in the language or manner
required by the law, she was also condemned for revealing too much sexual knowledge.
For magistrates, such carnal knowledge might prove the victim was not chaste, and
therefore not violated; Clark explains “If the victim of rape could testify that emission
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had occurred, her frankness branded her as immodest, and her assailant as less culpable”
(63). Shelley protects Beatrice against this accusation, and also mistakenly believes he
makes the play performable, by articulating the act in figurative language.59
Although Shelley attempts to preserve the perception of Beatrice as virtuous, he also
exposes problems with this cultural emphasis on female chastity. In the silence that
follows Beatrice’s initial response, Shelley reveals how cultural expectations of female
chastity prevent victims from disclosing crimes against them in order to sustain a climate
of silence. For example, when Orsino instructs her to “let the law/ avenge,” Beatrice
responds:
If I could find a word that might make known
The crime of my destroyer; and that done
My tongue should like a knife tear out the secret
Which cankers my heart’s core; aye, lay all bare
So that my unpolluted fame should be
With Vilest gossips a stale mouthed story;
A mock, a bye-word, an astonishment: –
If this were done, which never shall be done,
Think of the offender’s gold, his dreaded hate,
And the strange horror of the accuser’s tale,
Baffling belief, and overpowering speech;” (III.i. 155-65 emphasis added)

Beyond challenges of articulation, Beatrice’s response reveals that she avoids legal
redress because, first, she fears that her character will be ruined and, second, she fears she
will not be believed. She implies that by revealing her father’s rape, her and her family’s
59

Shelley was aware of the obstacle that the subject matter of his play posed to getting it performed.
Nonetheless, his letters indicate that he thought he had portrayed Beatrice’s incest in a sensitive and
culturally acceptable way. In his letter from July 20, 1819 he tells Thomas Love Peacock that “I have taken
some pains to make my play fit for representation…I send you a translation of the Italian Mss. on which
my play is founded; the chief circumstance of which I have touched very delicately; for my principle doubt
as to whether it will succeed as an acting play hangs entirely on the question as to whether any such thing
as incest in this shape however treated wd. be admitted on the stage – I think however it will form no
objection, considering first that the facts are matter of history, & secondly the peculiar delicacy with which
I have treated it” (Letters of PS 102). Despite Shelley’s attempts at delicacy, the play was rejected by
Covent Garden. Thomas Harris, the manager, declared himself “morally outraged” by the play’s content
(Curran 4).
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reputation, not her father’s, will be tarnished. In her response, Shelley underscores the
immense risk that public shame poses for victims when chastity is one of the only
possessions culturally granted to women. Disclosing a sexual crime not only presents the
risk of not being believed – as Clark’s study demonstrates – it also bares the risk of losing
the very thing that gives you value and secures your worth in the future.
Clark explains that increased attention to protecting chastity during the early
nineteenth century affected women by reinforcing silence in cases of sexual crime: “more
and more, women hesitated to report sexual assaults, fearing rape would be seen as a taint
upon their reputations” (63). The likelihood of being doubted, not achieving justice, and
losing your social value meant that disclosing a sexual crime usually led to more
suffering for the victim, rather than leading to redressing and repairing harm. Why seek
legal measures, Beatrice asks, when “we the victims, bear worse punishment/Than that
appointed for their torture?” (III.i.192-3). Beatrice’s duty as she understands it – for her
own sake as well as her family’s – involves concealing the atrocity committed against
her. Shelley suggests that a system that privileges chastity by punishing victims through
disbelief and shame reinforces this duty and encourages silence.
Shelley’s drama also overturns several other assumptions about chastity that
fostered and maintained such a climate. First, because his character is an innocent,
virtuous, aristocratic woman, he dispels myths about these traits preventing sexual crime.
While Wollstonecraft underscores the greater risks and fewer protections laboring class
women faced regarding sexual crimes, Shelley underscores that sexual crime is not a
choice; a woman’s character neither instigates nor protects against sexual violence.
Second, because Beatrice is violated by her own father in her own home, Shelley dispels
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the nineteenth-century notion that chastity can be protected or maintained by keeping
women within the domestic sphere. Third, by dramatizing the degree of harm caused to
Beatrice, he emphasizes that such abuse is not merely a private matter but an issue of
public concern. Finally, he challenges the notion that public morality can be preserved or
women’s suffering can be contained through silence. Beatrice’s response to such
repression explodes this fallacy.
XIX. PROCESSES AND OUTCOMES OF INJUSTICE: CRIMINAL EVOLUTION AND
OFFENDER ACCOUNTABILITY
Beatrice’s evolution from disenfranchised individual (Caleb), to unacknowledged
victim (Jemima), to extralegal agent of justice (the creature) follows the projection of the
characters within Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley’s fictions. As their texts
gradually evolve to suggest, if individuals are marginalized and wrongs committed
against them are ignored, then criminal behavior and violent repercussions are the likely
consequences. Shelley emphasizes the force of this mistreatment since, like the creature,
Beatrice is virtuous and well intentioned until she is pushed to react by horrific
conditions, unnatural acts, and abuse. While Frankenstein imagines the consequences of
this evolution as the murder of innocent victims (William, Justine, Clerval, and
Elizabeth), The Cenci imagines the consequence as the murder of a violent, tyrannical
perpetrator. When Beatrice responds by arranging for her father’s murder in order to stop
his unmitigated abuse from continuing, Shelley’s play begs the question, was justice
achieved?
In response to this question, critics and readers cannot agree. Shelley’s play provides
no easy answer – particularly given his preface, which seems to condemn Beatrice for her
action. The Cenci’s preface tells us that:
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Undoubtedly, no person can be truly dishonoured by the act of another; and the fit
return to make to the most enormous injuries is kindness and forbearance, and a
resolution to convert the injurer from his dark passions by peace and love. Revenge,
retaliation, atonement, are pernicious mistakes. If Beatrice had thought in this manner
she would have been wiser and better; but she would never have been a tragic
character. (240)
Shelley’s emphasis on “kindness and forbearance” suggests that Beatrice should have
patiently and compassionately waited as her father threatened repeated abuse – an
unlikely proscription given how the play depicts the grave failure of such a passive
response.
Critics who have tried to reconcile this contradiction – the message in his preface
from the content of his play – have not reached a consensus regarding justice. Some
argue that Shelley’s preface implies Beatrice was wrong to seek her own justice. For
example, there is Robert Whitman’s most often cited response: “in one sense Beatrice’s
murder of her father can be condoned, and yet we must not let our sympathy for her
suffering or her humanity blind us to the fact that she is wrong. In Shelley’s eyes, and, he
intended in ours, her act was a ‘pernicious mistake’” (251). Others, such as Laurence
Lockbridge, suggest that despite Shelley’s intentions in his preface, his play seems to
imply that perhaps Beatrice “overrides the question of culpability.” Lockbridge explains,
“Beatrice becomes evil without having been culpable. His statement in the
Preface…must be regarded as a wishful misreading of his own play. The Cenci portrays
a world so evil that it can tragically infect the innocent” (98).

Even critics who put aside

the preface and reserve judgment against Beatrice for the murder, seem to turn against
her because during her trial she appears dishonest and manipulative. Margot Harrison
explains that
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Critics agree that Beatrice Cenci turns readers and spectators against her in the
fifth act, where, under arrest for the murder of the father who raped her, she
undertakes to save herself by lying about her role in the crime…Worse still,
perhaps, Beatrice fails to make the audience a party to her deceit…she does not
expose and deplore her own hypocrisy in soliloquy. (188)
In this reading, Harrison describes how many readers measure justice less by Beatrice’s
culpability in committing the crime, than by her dishonesty in refusing to admit to it.
Finally, other critics have pointed out that, whether or not we are concerned with
Beatrice’s guilt or innocence, she is punished for an act she does commit; Michael Kohler
states this perspective: “Though brutal, the court is nonetheless justified in executing
Beatrice, for she did murder her father” (587).
But in light of the restorative visions forwarded by the Godwin-WollstonecraftShelley fictions, and in light of the climate of silence surrounding sexual crimes that
Shelley depicts in his play, perhaps our emphasis should be different. First, rather than
urging his audience to agree on guilt or innocence, perhaps Shelley urges us to look at the
process used to determine justice. If justice is measured in part by the level of truth
achieved, then Beatrice’s silence suggests we examine the conditions created to
encourage disclosure. In the justice process he dramatizes, Shelley reveals that for a
nineteenth-century victim of sexual crime the conditions for disclosure encourage partial
truths. Second, rather than urging his audience to focus on who is punished and how
severely, perhaps Shelley urges us to look at the outcomes that justice processes achieve.
If justice is measured in part by the degree of harm restored, then Beatrice’s refusal to
admit to her part in the murder highlights how repressive processes fail to achieve
accountability or provide healing. Her actions outside of the justice system suggest that
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victims may pursue their own drastic outcomes if they are denied adequate recognition
and redress within state structures.
First, Shelley depicts how Beatrice’s justice process obtains partial truths. During
Beatrice’s trial for her father’s murder, the criminal justice process is not concerned with
the Cenci’s violation of Beatrice, which motivated her crime of murder. The climate of
silence and repression surrounding sexual crime, which Shelley dramatizes in the first
four acts of the play, is maintained during Beatrice’s justice process. Young-ok An
explains this void, “while such a heinous crime is easy for the Father to commit, it has no
name and thus no appropriate channel to be exposed and prosecuted” (10). The justice
process not only overlooks Beatrice’s motive in dismissing the rape, it likewise overlooks
its own failure to protect Beatrice or prevent the rape.
The trial reveals that the justice system wants only the facts of the murder, not the
facts of the crime committed against Beatrice. The system demands a confession, but
does not necessarily demand the whole truth. When the judge asks Beatrice, “Art thou
not guilty of thy father’s death?,” she replies, “Or wilt thou rather tax high judging God/
That he permitted such an act as that/ Which I have suffered, and which he beheld;/ Made
it unutterable, and took from it/ All refuge, all revenge, all consequence, But that which
thou has called my father’s death?” (V.iii.79-84 emphasis added). Beatrice response
conveys the demands of the court: there is no other concern or crime beyond Cenci’s
murder. Because the patricide threatens their authority, but Beatrice’s rape represents
nothing more than an ugly inconvenience, the justice system attempts to seek truth and
justice according to its own agenda.
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Shelley suggests that justice system’s main goal is to reach closure: the state’s
focus is to find and publicly punish the individual who committed the murder of a
powerful man – the crime that threatens institutional stability the most. Beatrice knows
she cannot confess to the rape, which prevents her from confessing to the murder, but she
also knows the court needs to maintain its legitimacy. Because the truth of her
experience can never be disclosed, Beatrice offers the justice system her best attempt at
honesty: she acknowledges the murder, by means of Marzio, but she denies her own
responsibility by means of her silence. Shelley’s play implies that her silence is a
consequence of the justice system’s conditions for truth: her half truth reflects their half
truths. Beatrice reveals only so much as is necessary to protect and legitimize her family,
just as the trial reveals only so much as is necessary to protect and legitimize the justice
system. Shelley draws attention to the failure of justice processes that repress certain
abuses in order to forge toward finality and closure. On this point, he echoes Godwin,
Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley’s representations of crimes against the disenfranchised
that are dismissed for the sake of closure: it is easier to find Caleb, the Hawkins, Jemima,
Maria, Justine, and the creature guilty (even of crimes they don’t commit) then it is to
acknowledge the layers of offenses first practiced against them.
Second, Shelley draws attention to the element of accountability that both
restorative and punitive justice systems demand. The half truths Beatrice’s trial produces
reveal that in order to achieve accountability criminal processes need to make room, and
create conditions, conducive to hearing even those offenses they wish to suppress.
Shelley’s justice system (and audiences alike) demand and expect from Beatrice a full
confession, to admit that she is wrong and to disclose the truth, but in eagerness for
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honesty and justice, the tendency to deny, suppress, and forget the terrible crime she has
survived is overlooked. Acknowledging rape and incest is uncomfortable and disturbing,
and it may be much easier to neatly finalize a crime such as Beatrice’s by finding an
individual solely responsible without having to admit to larger problems. Shelley’s play
responds that in a restorative process, taking responsibility for one’s actions can perhaps
only occur when the system and the community take responsibility too – for their failure
to listen, prevent, and protect. Shelley’s play implies that the task of being accountable is
shared.
The desire to renounce sexual crimes and to silence their existence was a reality
of The Cenci’s historical context: Shelley’s play was never performed during his lifetime.
Before outright dismissing it, many of his reviewers first expressed shock, offense, and
denial regarded the “unnatural” or “immoral” acts his work depicts (An 14-15). The
topic of rape, especially incestuous rape, was a topic to be muted, regardless of the
forum. Anna Clark’s study reveals that the courts “began to suppress the publication of
transcripts of sexual crimes…presumably [because], judges wished to protect the public
from exposure of such ‘offensive’ testimony” (17). Even newspaper accounts stressed
the victim’s contribution to the crime, rather than her suffering, and substituted moderate
language in order to lessen the severity of the offense (Clark 19). A climate of
suppression was normal, even encouraged, to silence and ignore the reality of sexual
crimes.
Modern day response continues to reflect the impulse to silence the issue of
Beatrice’s abuse. The critical dispute regarding the veracity of the historical Beatrice
Cenci’s incest further demonstrates this impulse. For example, Barbara Groseclose
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argues in “The Incest Motif in Shelley’s ‘The Cenci’” (1985) that Shelley “introduced the
act of incest” to serve as a symbol (225). Groseclose’s belief that Shelley “introduced”
the incestuous rape because no historic account verifies consummation (225) overlooks
the harm and sexual trauma Francisco Cenci caused his daughter and replicates
nineteenth-century desires to deny sexual crimes without quantifiable proof of
penetration. Despite this desire, Truman Guy Steffan maintains in “Seven Accounts of
the Cenci and Shelley’s drama” that four of the seven accounts that remain “are crudely
specific about the father’s gross humiliation of his wife and daughter…[and] All accounts
state that by threats and force he tried to violate…Beatrice” (607). The account which
Shelley purportedly used as a source for his play “The Relation of the Death of the
Family of the Cenci,” which Mary transcribed from Italian in 1818, states that Francisco
Cenci tried to “debauch” his daughter (Steffan 607), and even Groseclose acknowledges
that Shelley “seemed to truly believe in the accuracy and authenticity” of Mary’s
transcribed version (223). Fact or fiction, the veracity of Beatrice’s sexual abuse remains
a focus – not the crime and the trauma it exposes. Shelley’s play suggests that until the
offense first committed against Beatrice is recognized and acknowledged, the demand
that she take responsibility for her part in the murder is inequitable and ethically
nebulous.
XX. RESTORATIVE JUSTICE?
But while The Cenci’s violent and tragic content seems to convey more of a
critique than a model for positive change, Shelley’s play is restorative on several levels.
Shelley does not represent restorative processes in the content of his play, as Godwin and
Wollstonecraft had in their fiction, but he advocates for the disenfranchised and puts
forward an alternative justice model. First, by treating a historic injustice, The Cenci is
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restorative: it looks back in order to tend to the present and reform the future. Stephen
Berhendt explains that,
The Cenci stands as Shelley’s argument by analogy about the English nation’s need to
learn by studying the tragedies of fallen nobility of mind and spirit that the past furbishes,
and to choose for itself the only acceptable alternative to the downward spiral of
violence: not revolution, but reform of the entire inhering structure of society, its
assumptions, and its institutions…To the historian’s task of recounting the past, however,
The Cenci adds the poet’s concern with influencing the present and shaping the future.
(215)
While Berhednt argues that The Cenci was largely aimed at tempering motivation for
reform by exposing Beatrice’s violence, Shelley’s play might also recuperate Beatrice for
reasons beyond slowing revolutionary action. In Shelley’s act of recounting the past in
order to influence and shape the future, his recuperation is restorative.
When Shelley recovers Beatrice’s story from history he performs a restorative act.
Desmond Tuto explains that “the past, far from disappearing or lying down and being
quiet, has an embarrassing and persistent way of returning and haunting us unless it has
in fact been dealt with adequately” (28). By reconstructing and fictionalizing Beatrice’s
story in a way that remembers the crimes against her and records her suffering, Shelley
advocates for marginalized victims whose stories have been silenced by history or
appropriated by popular myth. He underscores the significance of recalling past injustice
in order to prevent repeating it and the significance of recuperating marginalized voices
in order to restore their value. The collaborative nature of his project reminds us of the
communal action of restorative processes. He draws on his family’s ideas about justice
to arrive at his own understanding, he enlists the help of Mary Shelley to translate The
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Relation and discuss his tragedy,60 and he engages the audience to witness and interpret
his drama.
Second, The Cenci’s form contributes to the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley
discussion of justice, particularly in terms of the inclusive and participatory conditions
desirable for restorative processes. Each of the family’s fictions develops this notion; in
Godwin’s Caleb Williams, Caleb narrates his first-person account as a disenfranchised
individual falsely accused of a crime. In Wollstonecraft’s Maria, Jemima provides the
first-person testimony of a marginalized victim. In Shelley’s Frankenstein, a witness
(Walton), a victim (Victor), and an outcast criminal (the creature) testify to their
experiences within the structure of a frame narrative. Percy Shelley’s Cenci goes furthest
in employing a form that offers the most opportunity for individual agency and
participation: the victim, the accused, the community, and the justice system each
perform a part. The novel’s structure, which limits characters’ actions by containing them
within the bound pages of a text, is abandoned in favor of a dramatic rendering, which
allows individual characters to physically act.
His form is also more participatory in terms of the audience. Readers become
audience members – present, engaged, and sharing the fiction together, both as it unfolds
before them and as they leave the theatre to discuss individual interpretations and
implications of their collective experience. By crafting a play that dramatizes legal
processes for a popular audience, Shelley uses the stage as a forum to educate citizens;

60

Mary Shelley tells us in her ‘Note on The Cenci’ that “This tragedy is the only one of his works that he
communicated to me during its process. We talked over the arrangement of the scenes together” (Novels
and Works of Mary Shelley 283). Like Godwin, Mary Shelley admired The Cenci more than any other
work by Percy. She explains in the ‘Note’ that “The Fifth Act [the trial] is a masterpiece. It is the finest
thing he ever wrote, and may claim proud comparison not only with any contemporary, but preceding poet”
(286).
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Simon Goldhill explains that, dating back to Greek drama “the theatre was regarded as a
citizen’s duty, privilege and requirement. This sense of theatre as a civic act is enforced
and repeated by statements that poets are ‘the teachers of the people’” (67). Shelley
attempts to put his theory, that “poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the world,”
into practice in The Cenci by dramatizing a legal trial in order to inform and engage
citizens in civic issues of justice. Further, the narrative choices Shelley makes in writing
his drama draw attention to the rhetorical relationship between law and literature.61 The
Cenci suggests that shared concerns between literature and law may reach beyond subject
matter or even parallels between juries and audiences; his dramatic form raises rhetorical
and narrative questions that help us reflect on criminal justice administration and
practice.
His dramatic form also raises questions about the subjects of our criminal processes.
In our justice system, he asks: Who are the actors? Are our protagonists judges and
lawyers or victims and offenders? Do we privilege some roles more than others or do we
attempt to empower each with some level of agency? What role should the community
play? He also raises questions about legal discourse, his play asks: What about our script?
Is it dominated by silence or speech? Is the language common or specialized? Does it
prioritize crimes against the disenfranchised as much as crimes against the wealthy and
powerful? Does it make space for traumatic, unsettling crimes even when they make the
audience uncomfortable?

61

The relationship between literature and the law is also an ancient part of the Western literary tradition.
Paul Cartledge explains that, since the inception of Western drama, “a good case can be made for there
having been a productively dialectical relationship between Athenian drama and lawcourt procedures” (15).
Carteldge discusses this relationship in terms of writers who wrote speeches for tragedies as well as legal
clients, overlapping themes, and “the tragedians’ dramatic exploitation of technical legal language” (15).
As I suggest, Shelley’s play revists this relationship.
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His plot raises questions about the method of our processes and the purpose of our
outcomes: Do criminal procedures lead toward certain, contained finales or ambiguous,
messy conclusions? Are they action or dialogue based? Do they favor retributive or
restorative resolutions or do they seek to accommodate some hybrid of both? Do they
end in tragedy? His choice of genre and his dramatic staging raise questions about the
forums we choose for justice: are they open and public or exclusive and intimate? Are
they contained and aloof or fluid and accessible? Who sits in our audience and what do
we require of them? Should they pass judgment, acknowledge and witness, or leave and
perform some action? If Shelley’s play seems in many ways to raise more questions then
answers, audiences benefit. These questions give readers tools to help us reflect and
engage with literary works and judicial practice alike. They ask us to consider not only,
“how is justice being performed in this text?,” but moreover, “how is justice being
performed in our communities?”.
XXI. CONCLUSIONS
The Cenci makes a plea for a change in nineteenth-century justice processes, and
explodes constraints imposed by concerns over public morality, by representing the
incestuous rape of Beatrice Cenci and thereby underscoring the existence of a sexual
crime. Like Wollstonecraft’s novel, it draws attention to the trauma of sexual assault, but
it also emphasizes the challenges of articulating this trauma in a system or culture that
demands chastity and a contained, authorized language in which to express it. In
depicting the damaging effects of silencing marginalized individuals and providing no
opportunity for recognition, his play replicates his family’s texts by considering the
circumstances that contribute to criminal behavior, but it also extends their consideration
of justice. He complicates the accountability and remorse for which Frankenstein and

175
Falkner seem to advocate by considering how silence imposed by the justice system and
the wider culture makes such accountability impossible. Finally, though the content of
The Cenci elides restorative representations, the form does not. The choices Percy
Shelley makes regarding narrative voice and dramatic representation embody an even
more active form than Godwin, Wollstonecraft, or Mary Shelley. This form endorses an
interactive, democratic model that grants victims, offenders, and community the
opportunity to participate in processes and outcomes.
But Percy Shelley’s play is important today not only because of its literary merit, or
the way it advocates for marginalized individuals, or even because it helps to deepen our
understanding of historic debates about criminal justice reform. Shelley’s play is also
important because, just as Godwin, Wollstonecraft, and Mary Shelley’s texts also do, his
work engages in issues of contemporary justice. In attempting to respond to the
questions that Shelley’s play raises, I had to look no further than my own local paper to
find that, as Gina Barton and Becky Vevea report on July 6, 2010 in The Milwaukee
Journal Sentinel, “Rape victims say police failed them: Chief defends 'complex' sex
assault investigation.”
Barton and Vevea’s article describes the abuse that convicted offender Gregory
Tyson practiced against women, many of them prostitutes or drug users, over the course
of almost twenty-five years. It reports how in 2007 Tyson was charged with 32 offenses,
including kidnap, sexual assault, and the murder of seven women. It describes that
following his conviction, three victims filed a complaint against the Milwaukee Police.
The women’s complaint alleges that when they reported Tyson’s abuses against them –
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including repeated rape, beatings, and torture – the criminal justice system ignored and
then dismissed their violations.
In light of the nearly two hundred years that have passed since Shelley wrote The
Cenci, Tyson’s predatory focus on vulnerable victims is shocking and disturbing, but
additionally upsetting is the persistent suggestion that disenfranchised individuals
continue to be dismissed by the criminal justice system, potentially because of the nature
of the crime or the status of the individuals involved.62

As the article’s title articulates,

the allegations in the complaint are currently under investigation and misconduct by the
police has not yet been substantiated, but Chief Flynn’s response to the allegations leaves
readers of Shelley, and neighbors of these victims, with an aching, sinking feeling. The
Journal reports the following portion of Flynn’s statement:

‘There is no way that the non-specific, generalized allegations in the charging document
can be substantiated. Certainly we do not approve of discourteous behavior on the part of
our officers but we note the 32-count charging document certainly indicates that the
Milwaukee Police Department took very seriously the victims' reports of crime,’ the
statement says.
‘The allegations, without specific dates and times, contained in the complaint are not
statements of fact - it doesn't mean the assertions are true,’ the statement says. ‘We want
to take every opportunity to interview those complainants who feel they were ill-served
by the Milwaukee Police Department. We believe, as we did with the victims in the case
of serial killer Walter Ellis, that the status of the victims had no bearing on the
investigation.’ (Barton and Vevea)
Flynn’s statement reveals several things about progress towards victims of sexual crime
in the justice system since Shelley wrote The Cenci. Flynn’s pledge to investigate is
positive; it reflects that many local justice systems register criticisms seriously, and
follow up is required when citizen complaints are made. His reassurance that “the status
62

The Journal Sentinel reports that, for example, one of the victims "went to Milwaukee Police Department
District Stations 3, 4, and 7 in an attempt to report the kidnapping and sexual assaults but kept being
referred to different stations."
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of the victims had no bearing on the investigation” is also important. It reveals an
awareness of the history of, and continued possibility for, discrimination against
individuals because of gender, race, or class. But the terms he uses to describe the
victims’ complaints – qualifiers such as “non-specific, generalized allegations” and “the
allegations…without specific dates and times…are not statements of facts” – raise red
flags for students of The Cenci. They indicate a persistent discrepancy between the
criminal justice system and the victims’ of sexual trauma regarding the language and
evidence required to articulate and prove sexual violence. The victims’ complaints and
Flynn’s response, sadly, suggest the continued relevance of Shelley’s play. They tap into
the urgency of his concerns and reveal to us the obstacles that continue to silence and
repress survivors brave enough to articulate their violation. They invoke again Shelley’s
question and repeat The Cenci’s plea for a response, asking each of us: How is justice
being performed in your community?
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Conclusion
Restorative Justice is Not a Fiction

My dissertation argues that Caleb Williams, Maria, Frankenstein, Falkner, and
The Cenci advocate for individuals disenfranchised from the justice system and imagine
alternative models of justice. Their works prioritize the victim’s, the accused’s, and the
community’s participation in often complex and convoluted truth-seeking processes.
They search for outcomes that attempt to repair harm, rather than merely punishing
offenders or deterring individuals from committing future crimes. My project argues that
the narrative choices in these texts, and the representations of justice they depict therein,
are particularly worthwhile to our understanding of justice because they were written
during an era of democratic possibility and intense legal and penal reforms. Moreover,
they are significant because they were written at a historical moment when criminal
justice changes were adopted that would have far reaching consequences, even for
contemporary practices.
My project also suggests that the models of justice they propose – built on
individual stories, audience interpretation, and sometimes messy, uncertain conclusions –
function in restorative ways that are literary as well as legal: the content of their
representations and their narrative form progressively empower victim, offender, and
community – regardless of status – to take part in justice processes. The resolutions they
dramatize and the uncertainly their conclusions enact in readers, acknowledge and
encourage subjective interpretations as much as they seek consistent or objective
judgments. They encourage audience engagement and action. Still, the question remains,
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if these fictions speak so persuasively for an alternative model of justice, then why
haven’t they been considered more seriously before?
It is hard to pin-point one reason why Godwin’s, Wollstonecraft’s, and Mary and
Percy Shelleys’ visions of justice have not been considered more seriously. This
dismissal may exist in part because then, and now, their visions were and are radical.
The representations of justice they depict call for more flexibility on the part of the state,
and they place greater trust and responsibility in the hands of citizens. Such bureaucratic
flexibility poses a practical challenge to administer. Such citizen-based responsibility
poses a potential threat to order.

Their suggestion to seek outcomes that eschew

traditional retributive resolutions is also risky – who is accountable if such outcomes fail?
What is the price of failure?
Related to this radical opposition to traditional paradigms, and another possible
reason why their visions of justice have not been taken more seriously, is the issue of
gender perceptions. In her discussion of historical legal constructions of agency and
reason, Christine Krueger describes how in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century
England, perception of gender affected credibility: she writes, “Women who reasoned
were vilified as masculine, while radical reason, such as that displayed by
Wollstonecraft’s husband, William Godwin, was denounced as feminine and irrational”
(112). Just as such perceptions may have contributed to dismissing Wollstonecraft and
Godwin, we see the extension of this gendered criticism extend to Mary and Percy
Shelley too; Frankenstein has been appreciated in multifarious ways, but consideration of
its contribution to criminal justice debates has not been attempted, perhaps because these
have been traditionally masculine conversations. Matthew Arnold’s famous, and far
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reaching, Victorian characterization of Percy Shelley as an “ineffectual angel” picks up
on and echoes the feminization charge of Godwin’s ideas, thereby discrediting Shelley’s
contributions as irrational as well. The previously under explored idea that
Wollstonecraft may have influenced Percy Shelley at all, let alone in terms of his
representation of a sexual crime survivor, further implies the way that gendered
perceptions may have contributed to dismissing these authors’ valuable ideas about
criminal justice. Politically radical, a challenge to traditional gendered categories of
reasoning, and personally scandalous – not only the posthumous reputation of Mary
Wollstonecraft, but also the stigma associated with Mary and Percy’s marriage – this
family’s ideas about justice were underestimated and overlooked as their century
progressed and became increasingly conservative. As the criminal justice system became
professionalized and modernized, and the ideals of the French revolution became muted,
authors such as the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley family would, more and more, be
seen as outsiders – good storytellers perhaps, but non-specialists with lofty and
unrealistic ideas about justice and how it should be administered.
With the shift towards restorative practices in the twentieth and twenty-first
centuries – within countries seeking peaceful, transparent government transitions
following gross human rights violations or within local institutions seeking less
expensive and more effective ways to reduce crime – the relevance of this family’s
writing seems both significant and timely. Situated within an era of legal changes,
witnesses to a government transition on the Continent that was anything but peaceful, and
in some cases directly affected by their own government’s reactionary response, William
Godwin, Mary Wollstonecraft, and Mary and Percy Shelley offer fictional reflections and
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representations that anticipate modern restorative justice ideals; they suggest how
literature may act as one powerful method for imagining both possibilities for change and
ramifications of stagnancy; and they underscore the value of interdisciplinary
conversation. Speaking in his characteristically optimistic way about strategies for trying
to achieve human perfection, Godwin writes in Political Justice, “Let us look back, that
we may profit by the experience of mankind; but let us not look back as if the wisdom of
our ancestors was such as to leave no room for future improvement” (163). If looking
back at this family’s fictional intervention into the criminal justice conversation helps us
to make sense of the past, what do their texts tell us about future improvements to such
interdisciplinary endeavors?
To begin, in immediate and practical ways, their fictions encourage us to
recognize and listen to individuals who may be currently marginalized and to include
more voices in our dialogues about justice – voices of victims and offenders as well as
literary and legal voices. They encourage us to continue working towards better, more
representative and participatory justice processes that come closer to revealing truth and
achieving accountability. They also encourage us to continue pursuing suitable,
proactive outcomes that seek long-term solutions for correcting conditions that contribute
to criminal behavior and that repair harm for victim and community. Depending on our
positions, these fictions suggest that the manifestations of our pursuits might look
different, but they can be active, feasible pursuits nonetheless.
As practitioners within the discipline of criminal justice, their texts imply that
such a pursuit might mean implementing or participating in broader, more humanist
based training. Such training would foster in police officers greater competency in
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listening to a victim or an offender and greater sensitivity to harm, regardless of status or
crime. It might mean encouraging public defenders, prosecutors, and judges to respect
the wishes of victims or victims’ families who desire public acknowledgment and
accountability from the offender, rather than a plea bargain or a severe sentence. It might
mean choosing alternative conditions to punitive outcomes, such as deferred prosecution
agreements, which consider the social factors that contribute to crimes and allow
offenders the opportunity to repair harm through meeting with the victim, paying
restitution, or performing some service to the community. It might mean creating
conditions to give community members a forum in which to disclose frustrations and
traumas – a forum that functions as a healing circle as well as a place to come up with
creative, locally conceived solutions for preventing and reducing crime.
As practitioners within the discipline of literature and the humanities, this pursuit
might mean reading, writing about, and teaching texts that encourage conversations about
justice – from older texts such as Sophocles’ Antigone (442 B.C.E) and Ardish of
Faversham (1592, author unknown) to more recent texts such as Jim Coetzee’s Age of
Iron (1990), Ariel Dorfman’s Death and the Maiden (1992), and Sapphire’s Push: A
Novel (1996); texts that represent a variety of literary, historical, and cultural perspectives
on the experience and trauma of crime, that encourage us to consider how and why
different models of justice are adopted, and that suggest the interrelationship between
literature, justice, and civic participation.63 This pursuit also might mean fostering skills
63

Antigone represents a woman who challenges the state’s authority and raises questions about 5th century
BCE Greek conceptions of individual, family, and citizen obligations in respect to natural and positive law.
The Tragedy of Master Arden of Faversham dramatizes an historical crime committed by a woman and her
lover (the murder of her husband). It raises questions about how perceptions about gender, authority, and
desire manifested in Elizabethan literary and legal anxieties. The Age of Iron depicts the experience of a
white South African woman who opposes Apartheid, but never took an active role against it. It raises
questions about community members’ roles in achieving or preventing justice. Death and the Maiden is
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in our students that require them to be discerning citizens who are aware of justice
processes so they are critical of assumptions about the supremacy or inflexibility of the
law. It might mean asking students to learn about injustice in their own community, as
well as globally or historically, and giving them opportunities to write about and be
active in eradicating disparities or serving underserved populations. Such a pursuit
would also mean committing to such activities ourselves and seeking out ways to model
this commitment to our students. Whether we practice law, literature, politics, education,
or parenting the texts by the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley family suggest that any
pursuit of justice means recognizing the ways in which non-specialists and outsider
parties enrich our understanding and enhance our expertise.
In terms of scholarly pursuits, recent studies such as Mark Canuel’s The Shadow
of Death (2007) and Krueger’s Reading for the Law (2010) lend credence to my current
claims as well as offer direction for a related, future, project. Canuel’s study supports
looking back and looking again at literary contributions to eighteenth- and nineteenthcentury justice debates; he notes that Romantic era texts devoted to penal reform are
“underrepresented in scholarship on the literature of the period” (6). His study also
supports my claim that the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley family fictions intervene in
order to offer alternatives to dominant retributive paradigms; although he limits his study
to justice outcomes, he argues that “Romantic opposition to the death penalty as a species
of humanitarian reform…aimed to redefine the relationship between political subjects
and legal structures” (12). By showing Romantic-era texts in conversation with
about a Latin American woman who survived rape and torture during her country’s period of dictatorship.
The play dramatizes her confrontation with one of her perpetrators and raises questions about retribution,
offender accountability, and victim participation in justice processes. Push is about the experience of an
African-American teenager who is an unacknowledged survivor of incest. The novel raises questions about
disenfranchised individuals and sexual crime within the American justice system.
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reformers such as Romilly and Bentham, his study suggests a similar relationship
between literary and legal reformers. Krueger’s study also helps support my current
argument and suggests a future research direction. First, her study demonstrates the
multidisciplinary nature of cultural constructions of the law. Second, it validates the
notion that fiction, such as that which my project addresses, sought to recognize and
empower legally marginalized individuals, noting that “Literary discourse, at least that
which aimed at a popular audience, might also be seen as a force assisting readers to
exercise rights they had won, and, in turn, to embolden unrecognized groups to agitate on
their own behalf” (198). Third, her study suggests direction for further development of
my project: by drawing on a wide array of legal and literary texts in order to historicize
juridical developments, she breaks down the false binary between literature as a
champion of the dispossessed and law as a champion of oppression. In doing so, her
study suggests how a future project would benefit from considering individuals within the
legal field who, like the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley family, sought similar
restorative reforms during this era of democratic ideals.
Finally, in addition to the insights these texts shed on past constructions of justice,
and the possibilities they suggest for pursuing it in the future, the interdisciplinary and
interfamilial nature of this family’s fictions have had a profound and personal affect on
my current literary interests. Most obviously, they have contributed to my interests as a
scholar and a teacher, but beyond this they have encouraged me as a wife and a neighbor.
The characters and narratives in their fictions have stimulated conversations between me
and my husband, who is a community-based criminal prosecutor, which I believe have
impacted us both in the ways we think about and practice justice. For my husband, one
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outcome of our conversations has been an increased appreciation for outsider
interpretation of, and participation in, criminal justice practices. For me, one practical
outcome of our conversations has been an increased awareness of incredible individuals
in my own community who pursue restorative justice on a daily basis.
The Benedict Center of Milwaukee, Wisconsin is “an interfaith non-profit
criminal justice agency…[that] works with victims, offenders, and community to achieve
a system of justice that is fair…where differences are valued and values are respected,
ensuring fair and equitable justice for all.” The Benedict Center seeks to reduce harm
and ensure equitable justice by offering a variety of services, such as programs devoted to
Women’s Harm Reduction, Justice Advocacy, Interfaith Counseling, and Community
Outreach. In my limited experience there, I have met staff, volunteers, and participants
committed to correcting disparities and dedicated to living out the vision of justice I
argue the Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley family fictions imagine.
Individuals working towards this goal at the Benedict Center have volumes to
teach us about how far the family’s vision of justice has progressed and how far it still
needs to go.

David, who runs the women’s continuing education classes, demonstrates

how to use education to restore harm. He injects compassion and humor into his
instruction and treats all of his students with dignity and respect. Elizabeth, artist and
volunteer, shows how literature and justice can connect by running a book club at the
women’s prison and coaching other community members to do the same. She
demonstrates how art can recognize, and give voice to, marginalized individuals: she
paints vivid, colorful portraits of participants and then asks the women to write their own
stories to accompany them. Patricia, Jennifer, and Stacey, survivors, teach us the
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complicated categories of victim and offender. They show that overcoming obstacles and
disadvantage requires not only an extraordinary amount of hard work and determination
but also a committed network of support. They remind us how pressing, necessary, and
important such a commitment is.
Beyond the sheer value of participation and awareness, if my experience with the
Godwin-Wollstonecraft-Shelley family fictions has taught me one thing – restorative
justice is not a fiction. It is an urgent, shared vision eager for continued improvement.
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